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PREFACE
This project addresses the freedom/foreknowledge problem through an analysis of future
contingents. A few points are worth making before starting the essay. This preface discusses
the approach used here and introduces the reader to some mechanisms used to enhance the
clarity of this work.
Degrees of Formality
Formal apparatus are often helpful for designating a succinct picture without the limi-
tations inherent in visuals. However, formality comes with at least two drawbacks. First,
formal systems have limited (although important) use. Selecting a particular formal system
can bury crucial philosophical issues as assumptions lurking behind the system. This phe-
nomenon is ﬁne when understood, for then the system can be used to test and analyze the
underlying views. The risk is that, occasionally, thinkers do not pay enough attention to
the assumptions of the system. In such cases, formal systems are merely blind mechanisms
supporting various results. There should instead be a dynamic justiﬁcatory relationship be-
tween results, which may be plausible or implausible for reasons independent of the system,
and the system itself.
Second, too many symbols can generate unnecessary confusion. Although writers may
have steeped themselves in the formal mechanisms and particular statements they are writing
about, it takes some eﬀort for readers to understand a string of symbols. Natural language
correlates are often easier to comprehend. Indeed, not all readers interested in a subject
want to intimately acquaint themselves with a formal system.
Regarding the topic of discussion, the philosophical literature contains two relatively sepa-
rate branches. The future contingents literature is more formal. The freedom/foreknowledge
literature, on the other hand, involves only minimal formalism. Yet, as those in the future
contingents literature are fond of pointing out, the two problems are closely related. In the
ii
freedom/foreknowledge literature, the lack of references to important work by, say, Belnap
or Øhrstrøm is suspicious. To make the situation worse, both areas in the philosophical
literature tend to ignore relevant scholarship in linguistics.
Attempting to render this document relatively accessible to all parties, formalism is
portrayed in varying degrees. Throughout most of the essay, symbolism is restricted to a
level approximating that in much of the freedom/foreknowledge literature. The less formal
results should stand on their own. Formal systems are relegated to Chapter 8. Several
mechanisms are in place to facilitate eﬃcient transitions between related areas of the text.
There is a system of inter-text references with hyperlinks, an index, a set of bookmarks, and
of course a table of contents. Obviously, some of these devices are only available in digital
versions of the ﬁle.
Where somewhat informal presentations are given, it is assumed that formally inclined
readers can generate an appropriate formalization. Informal portrayals should be unambigu-
ous to a point of either isolating a particular formalization or a class of adequate formaliza-
tions. Usually, this goal is achievable without dense symbolization in the text. Exceptions
are made where necessary. For instance, using brackets ⌜ and ⌝ tends to be excessive
in this sort of text; but these brackets are used where it is important to separate certain
elements of metatheory from propositions or forms, as in the discussion of supervaluationism.
Figures
The discussion contains several ﬁgures and illustrations. Visual illustrations, while often
helpful, have certain obvious limitations. For instance, unbounded lines cannot be depicted
perfectly by a bounded image. To enhance clarity, the illustrations given here are further
simpliﬁed in the following ways.
(0.1) Figures involving modal or temporal relations typically do not depict all of
possible relationships between nodes. For instance, all nodes are logically
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accessible to one another, but ﬁgures usually do not represent this accessibility
relation. Completely connected graphs can be very confusing with more than
just a few nodes. Transitivity can also be quite a mess, so it is often not
directly illustrated.
(0.2) Despite appearances, temporal structures are unbounded both from above and
from below. This holds for both linear and branching temporal structures.
(0.3) Figures involving temporal structures depict moments discretely. Removing
this discrete representation would make it diﬃcult to represent the relations
between nodes. However, temporal structures are presumably continuous.
The following is an example of an image that demonstrates the aforementioned simpliﬁ-
cations. Not all relations are depicted (transitivity is left out). The tree is presumably
unbounded although not depicted as such. Additionally, the temporal structure is continu-
ous even though only certain nodes are emphasized.
real
moment
counterfactual
standpoint
no
TRL
Acronyms and Symbols
Acronyms are useful for some purposes. For example, if one uses non-bivalent open
futurism several dozen times in a chapter, it might be a good idea to introduce an acronym
to represent the term. To avoid obscurity, acronyms should remind the reader of the terms
iv
they represent. In the case of non-bivalent open futurism, NBivOF might be appropriate.
Additionally, one should try not to introduce too many acronyms.
In a work this size, the collection of acronyms can be quite large. The reader is reminded
of what acronyms represent where appropriate. Some other mechanisms are also used to make
it easier for the reader to use acronyms. The appendix contains deﬁnitions for acronyms and
symbols used in this document. Once can also look up acronyms alphabetically in the index,
where each acronym is also deﬁned. Readers using the digitized version of the document will
ﬁnd that each acronym links to the page on which it is deﬁned in the appendix. That makes
it easier to use a PDF reader to hop to appendix, then use a back button to return to the
main text.
Jones, Smith, and God
Unfortunately, English uses a bifurcated notion of gender. English lacks adequate neuter
pronouns, for instance. The characters that appear most often in this text are Jones, Smith,
and God. The (perhaps only) upshot to English's gender-dependence is that gender makes
it easier to disambiguate between individuals using pronouns. In this essay, Jones is given a
feminine gender. Most of the examples involving Jones have to do with whether or not she
has drunk, is drinking, or will drink coﬀee; and the contingency of her actions or possible
actions. Smith has a masculine gender. He typically predicts that Jones will drink coﬀee.
God is assigned the masculine gender in accordance with the Abrahamic tradition. Pronouns
referring to God are not capitalized here. Fortunately, it is easy to tell the diﬀerence between
Smith and God, so there is no need to use he for one and He for the other.
v
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Summary of Results
This essay proposes developments for branching temporal logics, using the enhanced sys-
tems to address logical and theological fatalism. The theory endorsed is dubbed standpoint
inheritance. Standpoint inheritance allows branching temporal logics to avoid wantonly
changing perspectives by making a perspective or standpoint parameter explicit in the truth
function. Below is a list of this project's major results. More explanation is given in upcom-
ing sections.
(1.1) Standpoint inheritance allows true futurism and open futurism to avoid sig-
niﬁcant linguistic problems and clariﬁes the semantics for those views.
(1.2) Under open futurism with standpoint inheritance, all strings of consecutive
will 's and was 's are reducible to at most two such operators.
(1.3) Standpoint inheritance enables supervaluationism to have an open-futurist ba-
sis rather than the usual true-futurist basis.
(1.4) Under open futurism, standpoint inheritance commandeers the best semantic
evidence for true futurism. Standpoint inheritance accounts for the evidence
2but the evidence does not support true futurism's stronger claims.
(1.5) Theistic eternalism is incompatible with dynamic/branching time.
(1.6) In the context of dynamic/branching time, true futurism does not avoid the
generalized grounding problem, by which true futurism is either ad hoc or
entails fatalism.
(1.7) If true futurism is viable at all, it is so only within an absolutist framework
employing general eternalism and the B-theory.
(1.8) Standpoint inheritance shows that Ockhamism is not viable by clarifying how
Ockhamism requires that God's beliefs are drastically unlike normal beliefs.
(1.9) Based on the preceding results, the only way to avoid logical fatalism given
dynamic/branching time is with open futurism; and the only way to avoid
theological fatalism within that framework is with open theism.
1.2 From the Beginning
Arthur Prior, notorious for his work on temporal logic, was drawn to philosophy through
the challenges of reconciling predestination and foreknowledge with freedom and contin-
gency.1 William Rowe gave a pleasantly concise rendition of the freedom/foreknowledge
problem, an argument for theological fatalism:
(1.10) God knows before we are born everything we will do.
(1.11) If God knows before we are born everything we will do, then it is never in our
power to do otherwise.
(1.12) If it is never in our power to do otherwise, then there is no human freedom.
1[Hasle(2012)]
3(1.13) Therefore, there is no human freedom.2
Prior's interest in freedom, foreknowledge, and morality led to his development of temporal
logic. He passionately maintained that formal analyses could yield great insight into those
and other problems.3 Since Prior, much of the scholarship on theological fatalism has ne-
glected the relevance of temporal logic and logical fatalism, the latter being the view that
everything is either accidentally necessary or accidentally impossible. Recent literature on
the freedom/foreknowledge problem developed largely in isolation of the future-contingents
literature. Lack of communication has led to some embarrassing results. For instance, Ock-
hamists in the freedom/foreknowledge literature have failed to capture the hard/soft fact
distinction4 although Peter Øhrstrøm developed a well-known system for it three decades
ago.5 Fortunately, renewed interest in both theological fatalism and Prior's work has led
a few scholars to return to logical fatalismand how to avoid itto handle theological
fatalism.6
This essay is a contribution to the new trend and old tradition of analyzing theological
fatalism in light of its relationship to logical fatalism. The project focuses on two kinds of
views about branching time. One position is true futurism, which designates what will occur
regardless of contingency. The opposing view is open futurism, by which no possible course
of events is privileged over others; that is, there are no soft facts.
Along the way, a contextualist theory of temporal standpoints is designed to enhance
Priorian temporal logics. The proposal helps all branching time systems, not only those
with an open future. Despite the fact that an account of temporal standpoints goes a long
2[Rowe(2007)], p. 166
3[Copeland(1996)]
4Soft facts are facts about the contingent future. Soft facts correspond to what will happen contingently
or what agents will do freely, where freedom is taken in the libertarian sense. Hard facts are not contingent,
although they may have been so. See Section 2.7.
5See [Todd(2012)] for the problems with explicating the hard/soft fact distinction, [Øhrstrøm(1981),
Øhrstrøm(1983), Øhrstrøm(1984)] for Øhrstrøm’s most notable early contributions to Ockhamist temporal
logic, and [Øhrstrøm(2009), Øhrstrøm and Hasle(2011)] for updated synopses of those systems.
6Most of the push to reconnect logical and theological fatalism is by some open theists. See, for in-
stance, [Boyd(2003), Rhoda et al.(2006)Rhoda, Boyd, and Belt, Tuggy(2007), Rhoda(2003), Boyd(2010),
Arbour(2013)].
4way towards aiding various analyses from a linguistic standpoint, theories that designate a
true future ultimately succumb to philosophical diﬃculties. Attempts to explain why one
timeline is privileged as the actual future lead to fatalism. Open futurism and a related
kind of open theism are the only viable alternatives under dynamic, branching time. If true
futurism is feasible at all, it is so only with a static or eternalist basis.
1.3 Fatalism
The problems of logical and theological fatalism have provoked scholars for millennia.
Logical fatalism is the view that whatever happens was necessary in some disconcerting
sense. For instance, start with the premise that either Jones will drink coﬀee tomorrow or
she will not. Suppose that she will drink coﬀee. Were it to be the case that she does not
drink coﬀee, then it would be false that she was going to drink coﬀee. Thus, it is not possible
that she does not drink coﬀee given that she will. What is impossible is necessarily not the
case, so it is necessary that Jones drinks coﬀee. In general, whatever will be the case must
be so, which is fatalism.
No one, presumably, accepts the fatalistic conclusion. Thinkers have proposed various
ways of avoiding fatalism. The response endorsed by Prior and (arguably) Aristotle is to
deny that Jones either will drink coﬀee or she will not.7 Another way of dismantling the
argument is to reject the connection between time and modality, a tactic associated with
Ockham. An important task of this essay is to analyze and critique those two views, open
futurism and true futurism, respectively.
Addressing logical fatalism is important because the task demands a reﬁned explication
of temporal language. There are some conﬂicting intuitions about time brought out by
the argument for logical fatalism. The tension needs to be sorted out for several reasons.
One motivation is to develop an adequate theory that represents actual use and speakers'
presuppositions as well as possible. Another reason is that decision-making procedures, for-
7[Prior(1967)] contains a mature formulation of Prior’s view.
5mally represented by decision theory and game theory, require a coherent analysis integrating
time and modality. Decision-making presupposes future-contingency, at least epistemically.
So avoiding logical fatalism is necessary to adequately represent decision-making processes.
Some thinkers also maintain that libertarian freedom, which involves future-contingency,
is important for responsibility; in which case logical fatalism challenges not only decision-
making, but the basis of morality itself.
There is some division on whether or not theological fatalism is related to logical fatal-
ism. There are two kinds of argument for theological fatalism. One type develops theological
fatalism from logical fatalism in that God's comprehensive foreknowledge resuscitates some
otherwise-avoidable argument for logical fatalism. This approach was taken by Edwards and
Prior, and more recently by open theists like Gregory Boyd, Alan Rhoda, and Dale Tuggy.8
The second kind of position takes arguments for logical and theological fatalism separately.
There is something special about God's comprehensive foreknowledge, perhaps that he has
it necessarily. This sort of incompatibilism fueled much of the freedom/foreknowledge schol-
arship in the second half of the twentieth century. Opponents of theological fatalism may
need to address both types of argument but this essay emphasizes only the ﬁrst type.
Theological fatalism is not relevant to many inﬂuential varieties of theism. Providen-
tialism is stronger than fatalism, so providentialists like Luther and Calvin need not worry
about fatalism per se. Providentialism aside, many contemporary theists hold views contrary
to fatalism, like libertarian freedom, close to their hearts. These theists must ﬁnd a way to
dismantle arguments for theological fatalism. One route, open theism, denies that God has
comprehensive foreknowledge. Other theists, freedom/foreknowledge compatibilists, main-
tain God's comprehensive foreknowledge. Some compatibilists follow Ockham and Lavenham
in separating time from modality while retaining God's temporality. Theistic eternalists ad-
vocate compatibilism for diﬀerent reasons. According to theistic eternalists, God is outside
of time; so he does not have foreknowledge as such.
8[Prior(1967), Rhoda et al.(2006)Rhoda, Boyd, and Belt, Tuggy(2007)]
6This project emphasizes the connections between logical and theological fatalism. The
analysis draws out a number of common elements in scholars' responses to arguments for
those fatalisms. This observation is hardly new. The future-contingents literature emphasizes
those similarities. The soft facts of Ockhamists in the freedom/foreknowledge literature are
necessary and suﬃcient for specifying the temporal relation used by true futurists (frequently
also called Ockhamists, but not here) in the future-contingents literature. At the end of
the day, the evidence weighs in against true futurism and Ockhamism. The biggest problem
faced by true futurists has to do with attempts to identify a speciﬁc, privileged future over
merely possible futures. Under the dynamic framework used here, any such attempt is either
ad hoc or leads to fatalism. In terms of the freedom/foreknowledge literature, the criticism
pertains to the existence of soft facts; in terms of the future-contingents literature, the issue
is the temporal relation, the so-called thin red line.
1.4 Temporal Standpoints
Traditional branching-time theories for open- and true futurism encounter some linguistic
diﬃculties. All of these theories yield unsavory results. True futurism has yet to overcome
Nuel Belnap and Mitchell Green's criticism that the theory cannot handle some combinations
of past and future operators (was and will) at counterfactual scenarios. Suppose that a coin
toss did in fact come up heads. Consider the counterfactual situation in which the toss came
up tails. Of that circumstance, true futurism yields the following awkward result:
The coin came up tails, but this is not what was going to happen. The coin was
going to come up heads. It's just that it didn't.9
The issue is further complicated when God is around. Ockhamists maintain that if the
coin had come up tails, then God would have believed that it was going to come up tails.
Branching true futurism does not accommodate this result. The coin was going to come up
9[Belnap and Green(1994)], p. 380.
7heads even if it had not done so. As such, if the result of the toss had been tails, then God
would have held the incorrect belief that the coin was going to come up heads, not tails.
For similar reasons, open futurism (and supervaluationism) give incorrect results for
predictions of future-contingent events. Suppose that Jones drank a cup of coﬀee although
she might have done otherwise, and that Smith predicted that Jones would do so. Smith's
prediction was correct, but not according to traditional open futurism.
The source of these problems is that traditional systems do not account for perspective.
Without explicitly acknowledging temporal standpoints, branching time logics eﬀectively
shift perspective too frequently. The unhappy results of traditional systems indicate that
a more conservative approach is warranted. One should only change to a new standpoint
when absolutely necessary; that is, when evaluating at a relatively counterfactual node.
The examples that raise diﬃculties for canonical theories show that, in English, temporal
operators are limited by perspective in ways that their genuinely modal counterparts are not.
In Belnap and Green's coin toss example, the perspective throughout the example is one in
which the coin came up tails. Traditional true futurism gets the wrong answer because it
abandons the tails perspective in the middle of the proposition:
(1.14) The coin was going to come up heads,
which should only be true from the heads perspective. True futurism can avoid this problem
by retaining the tails perspective rather than abandoning it. Traditional open futurism
suﬀers from essentially the same diﬃculty. From the perspective in which Jones drank coﬀee,
she was going to do so and hence Smith's prediction was correct. The traditional theory
abandons the perspective in which Jones drank coﬀee in the middle of the proposition:
(1.15) Jones was going to drink coﬀee.
(1.15) is untrue in traditional open futurism since, from the perspective before Jones drank
coﬀee, it was untrue that Jones would drink coﬀee. These wanton shifts in perspective are
not only troublesome but seem outright baseless when made explicit.
8A temporal standpoint is a moment representing a perspective in time. The theory of
temporal standpoints proposed here is called standpoint inheritance. Under standpoint
inheritance, standpoints limit temporal operatorswas, will, was-always, and will-always.
These operators never yield an evaluation that is counterfactual with respect to their stand-
points. Modal operatorsnecessarily, possibly, was-inevitably, and will-inevitablyare not
so restricted and can access counterfactual nodes, thereby forcing occasional standpoint
shifts. All operators pass their standpoints down to their sub-propositions.
Standpoint inheritance has a number of advantages. The theory is very general. It
is applied to every system discussed in this analysis to handle shortcomings of traditional
logics. With standpoint inheritance, true futurism avoids the criticism given by Belnap and
Green while open futurism accounts for predictions. Standpoint inheritance helps clarify
what it is for characterizations of God's beliefs to be soft and how his beliefs must diﬀer
from normal beliefs to retain softness. For open futurism, all strings of consecutive will 's
and was 's can be reduced to at most two such operators under standpoint inheritance, but
not under traditional theories. The open futurist distinction between will and will-inevitably
is clariﬁed, too. Standpoint inheritance allows for a supervaluationist semantics using open
futurism as its basis instead of the usual true futurism. The theory of standpoint inheritance
enhances dynamic, branching accounts of time to better compete with their static correlates.
1.5 Background Assumptions
This project devotes signiﬁcant eﬀort towards clarifying analyses that play important
background roles in debates on fatalism and temporal semantics. These underlying views
make a diﬀerence although they are often relegated to the sidelines, as if they were someone
else's problem. Logical and theological fatalism draw a lot from many areas of study. Some
steps are taken here to further work done by others towards integrating relevant areas of
study.
9With so many relevant background views, it is important to specify a framework for the
discussion. Much of the future contingents literature takes a Priorian view of modality and
time. Time is dynamic, represented by branching time structures. Additionally, the Priorian
approach is endurantist, presentist, and emphasizes the A-theory of time. These views are
assumed for this project without much in the way of argument. Chapter 2 provides some
explanation of the dynamic approach to modality and time.
The conclusions derived here should be taken in the context of the aforementioned back-
ground assumptions. For instance, if the dynamic view of time holds, then true futurism
is not the best theory and open futurism/theism win the day. Put in other terms, true
futurism is incompatible with the dynamic view; and true futurism entails the static view.
Static or absolutist views like (general) eternalism, the B-theory, and perdurantism call for
substantial treatment that is beyond this project.
1.6 Overview
Part I develops relevant background assumptions and preliminaries for other aspects of
the analysis. Chapter 2 is about modality and time. There are various types of possibility
and necessity, but familiar genuine modalities tend to be captured by sets of principles. These
principles yield accessibility relations depicting their corresponding modalities. Besides this
propositional modality, there are other senses in which a relation can be modal. Four types
of modality are formal, grammatical, propositional, and ontological. Only the latter two
directly bear on contingency and fatalism. Chapter 2 also sheds light on the dynamic view
of modality that is used to explicate necessity per accidens, which is opposed to future-
contingency. An adequate representation of necessity per accidens, in turn, easily captures
the hard/soft fact distinction.
Chapter 3 discusses the role of will in English. Will, like can and should, is grammatically
modal. This is an important point about how will should be analyzed but does not in
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itself threaten contingency. After all, should does not interfere with contingency although
the term is grammatically modal. Nevertheless, will 's grammatical modality is later seen
to favor a variety of open futurism over other theories. The next portion of Chapter 3
characterizes some future-oriented laws of excluded middle. The subtle distinctions among
excluded middles constitutes a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between open futurism on the one hand,
and true futurism and supervaluationism on the other. These future excluded middles play
substantial roles in analyzing particular theories. Finally, there is an introduction to temporal
standpoints and standpoint inheritance. Some of the features and advantages of standpoint
inheritance are given, although many details and view-speciﬁc descriptions are reserved for
later chapters.
With much of the background out of the way, Chapter 4 returns to freedom and fatalism.
Arguments for logical and theological fatalism are given in more detail than before, together
with popular responses to those arguments. Chapter 4 also discusses the importance of
fatalism to libertarians and freedom/determinism compatibilists alike.
Speciﬁc views are assessed in Part II. Chapter 5 is about theistic eternalism, sometimes
called Boethianism, according to which God is outside of time. Some work is done to
capture what God's atemporality amounts to. Varieties of theistic eternalism are described
and critiqued. Outside of a more general eternalism, theistic eternalism does not appear to
work. Regardless of its viability or lack thereof, theistic eternalism entails true futurism.
Even if God is outside of time, there is a relevant sense in which it is true that he knows
what will occur even though he does not apprehend future events as such.
True futurism is the topic of Chapter 6. True futurists identify a particular course of
events as actual, privileging this timeline over merely possible ones. The actual timeline,
called the thin red line, is equivalently identiﬁed by a comprehensive set of soft facts to-
gether with facts about the past and present. The thin red line plays a semantic role as the
temporal relation behind will, was, and other temporal operators. According to true futur-
ists, the thin red line is not modal in any sense that interferes with contingency, separating
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temporal operators from genuinely modal operators. This distinction between temporal and
modal operators is what allows true futurists to reject both logical and theological fatalism.
Although true futurism has been challenged on linguistic grounds, standpoint inheritance
allows the view to handle some of the most pressing criticisms. True futurism nevertheless
faces insurmountable diﬃculties. On one hand, true futurists cannot explain will. Inter-
preting will as will-actually, as some authors have proposed, does not avoid fatalism.10 On
the other hand, there is the problem of explaining the thin red line or, equivalently, the
dependence of soft facts on future things and events. Any such explanation opens the door
to fatalism. Molinism is a case in point. The only alternative left for true futurists is to
abandon the dynamic framework and turn towards a general eternalism. An additional dif-
ﬁculty is encountered by Ockhamists, who maintain that characterizations of God's past or
present beliefs can themselves be soft facts. Standpoint inheritance clariﬁes that just as soft
facts are standpoint-dependent, God's beliefs must be standpoint-dependent in order to be
soft. Under Ockhamism, God's beliefs are radically diﬀerent from those of typical agents.
Ockhamists have yet to explain this peculiarity.
Chapter 7 is about open futurism and related views; in particular, supervaluationism and
open theism. Those theories are described along with their most inﬂuential variations. Open
futurism and supervaluationism maintain that there is no privileged future when genuine
future-contingency is involved. Open theism is the view that God does not have compre-
hensive foreknowledge. Assuming that God exists, open theism follows from open futurism
(but not conversely). Hence, endorsements of open futurism are likewise of open theism. In
support of open futurism and open theism, a few arguments are given to challenge intuitions
that appear to favor the strong future law of excluded middle, the principle by which a given
event either will occur or it will not. For instance, either Jones will drink coﬀee or she will
not. Additionally, a signiﬁcant problem with traditional kinds of open futurism is that they
do not adequately handle predictions. This issue with predictions is symptomatic of the fact
10[Malpass and Wawer(2012)] is especially clear about endorsing this interpretation of will. See also
[Øhrstrøm(2009)].
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that canonical depictions of open futurism do not capture the wait-and-see semantics that is
supposed to characterized the view. Open futurism can represent predictions using wait-and-
see semantics by incorporating standpoint inheritance. Standpoint inheritance also allows
open futurism to reduce all strings of consecutive will 's and was 's to at most two operators.
Additionally, standpoint inheritance, which is independently required by true futurism, al-
lows open futurism to accommodate what otherwise appears to be logico-linguistic evidence
for true futurism.
The formal details are given in Chapter 8. A generic multi-modal system is developed
from which particular systems are individuated. All of the major logics discussed in preceding
chapters are given some formal treatment. The generality of the multi-modal system helps
with comparing various logics and also in depicting the general character of standpoint
inheritance. After traditional systems are given, standpoint inheritance is added and applied
to the major systems. Most of the results in Chapter 8 are intended to clarify the discussions
in earlier chapters for the formally inclined reader.
Chapter 9 summarizes important results and suggests avenues of research. The analyses
in preceding chapters indicate that under a dynamic conception of time and modality, open
futurism and a corresponding version of open theism are the best options. If true futurism
and freedom/foreknowledge compatibilism work at all, it is under a static view of time and
general eternalism. Although this project introduces standpoint inheritance and uses it to
solve a number of problems, there is still a lot more to be said about the theory and how it
beneﬁts the A-theory in general. Static views like eternalism, the B-theory, and perdurantism
are not addressed here.
Overall, this project emphasizes Prior's contributions, both in the choice of puzzles as-
sessed and in the use of logic to handle those challenges. Old and recent developments are
inspected in the context of a uniﬁed analysis; even a single, general formal system. In ad-
dition to the formal system developed here, this essay makes a number of other valuable
contributions. Several new arguments are given for or against certain views, while some
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familiar arguments are cast in a new light. The most important contribution may be the
theory of standpoint inheritance. The theory greatly improves the linguistic standing of
all branching time logics, open- and true futurist alike, enabling those theories to better
challenge their static, two-dimensional counterparts.
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Part I
Preliminaries
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Chapter 2
Modality and Time
Kripkean modal logics have four basic components: nodes, accessibility relations, propo-
sitions, and truth functions. Modal systems can illustrate many diﬀerent kinds of items.
These systems have been used in analyses ranging from metaphysics to ethics, mathematics
to ﬁnite state machines. Modal logic's fruitfulness, breadth of application, theoretical gener-
ality, and connection to graph theory testify to the fascinating character of modal systems.
The signiﬁcance of modal systems, what the components of models represent, may change
from one application to another. This chapter aims to clarify how modal systems are used
in this project, shedding light on how to understand nodes, diﬀerent ways of viewing accessi-
bility relations, what sorts of propositions are involved here, what kind of system forms the
basis of this analysis, and the fundamentals of how to depict time and modality.
Philosophically (as opposed to, say, grammatically1), modalities are modes of possibility
and necessity. There are various ways in which events, propositions and things can be
possible or necessary. Types of possibility and necessity are discussed in Section 2.1.
Modalities are formally represented using so-called accessibility relations. However, not
all accessibility relations correspond to modalities. Determining which accessibility relations
are modalities, which are not, and in what sense is the topic of Section 2.2. Four senses of
modality are distinguished: formal, propositional, ontological, and grammatical.
1See Section 3.1 for more on grammatical modality.
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An important type of possibility/necessity, the foundation of the dynamic branching
structure used in many temporal logics, is here called all-things-considered (ATC) possi-
bility/necessity. ATC necessity is sometimes called necessity per accidens or hypothetical
necessity. The characteristics of the ATC relation are the topic of Section 2.3.
Contingency and fatalism are obviously important facets of this analysis. In section 2.4,
contingency and fatalism are deﬁned in terms of the multi-modal approach outlined in
the preceding sections, emphasizing logical and theological fatalism. Section 2.4 concludes
with some remarks on the distinction between fatalism and determinism within temporally-
sensitive modal logics.
Section 2.5 contains a discussion of how to interpret accessibility between possible worlds
or moments. Static accessibility can be explicated by taking consistency as the starting
point. Dynamic accessibility, on the other hand, begins with the ﬂow of time along the ATC
relation. More and less stringent accessibilities can be derived from ATC accessibility, thus
allowing for a dynamic account of other types of accessibility.
Section 2.6 provides a rough categorization of views about time. This taxonomy is used
throughout the project. The three most important views discussed here are open futurism,
supervaluationism, and true futurism. These positions are explicated in terms of branching
time semantics. Section 2.6 gives a basic description of those positions while some details
are reserved for later chapters.
Ockhamists in the freedom/foreknowledge literature have failed to provide an adequate
explication of the hard/soft fact distinction. Meanwhile, true futurists in the future contin-
gents literature, who share the Ockhamistic belief that the hard/soft fact distinction holds,
seemed unconcerned. The diﬀerence between hard and soft facts turns out to be relatively
simple to portray in terms of branching time. Section 2.7 contains deﬁnitions for hard and
soft facts, and a discussion of the characteristics of those deﬁnitions.
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2.1 Types of Possibility and Necessity
Modalities (in the philosophical sense) correspond to types of possibility and necessity.
When something is necessary, it is necessary in some sense or other. There are diﬀerent
modes or ways in which a proposition, event, or thing can be necessary. For instance,
physical determinists hold that events, things, or propositions are physically necessary given
their antecedent conditions. The modality in this case is physical or material, as encapsulated
by physical principles. Physical laws on this view determine whether or not the sun will rise
next Tuesday and whether or not Jones will have a cup of coﬀee tomorrow.
Physical modality is a good example because the notion is fairly ordinary. One way
of capturing physical modality is in terms of consistency with physical laws expressed as
propositions. A proposition is physically possible if and only if it is consistent with the laws
of nature (perhaps given some antecedent conditions about the current and past state of the
world). A proposition is physically necessary if its opposite is inconsistent with the laws of
nature. There is a close relationship between physical modality and physical laws.
Natural laws could be diﬀerent. The modality selected by could, in this case, is pre-
sumably not along the lines of physical modality. Physical possibility operates under the
stipulation that physical laws remain unbroken and are thus unaltered across possibilities.
That the laws of nature could be other than they are requires a change in physical principles
across possibilities. Whenever physical laws are not held constant across possibilities, the
modality involved is at least partially non-physical. Logically, the laws of nature could be
diﬀerent. There are other consistent sets of physical principles aside from those that actually
obtain.
Hence, there are diﬀerent ways in which events, propositions and things can be possible or
necessary. The example of physical modality also indicates that modalities can often be an-
alyzed in terms of consistency with a set or sets of principles expressed as propositions. Log-
ical possibility involves consistency with logical principles, which is consistency simpliciter.
Metaphysical possibility involves consistency with metaphysical principles. Physical possibil-
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Logical
Metaphysical
Physical
Practical
Figure 2.1.1: Intensional categorization of types of possibility/necessity. This is one way
in which some kinds of possibility and necessity may be categorized. The principles of each
inner set are properly contained in the principles of each respective outer set.
ity involves consistency with physical principles. Permissibility, ethical possibility, involves
consistency with a set of moral rules. Legality, legal possibility, involves consistency with
a set of legal principles. Practical possibility involves consistency with a set of practical
principles. Et cetera.
Figure 2.1.1 shows a taxonomy of a few common varieties of possibility/necessity in
terms of their basic principles. Some philosophers treat metaphysical and logical possibility
identically. If logical possibility is associated with consistency, then metaphysical possibility
is more restrictive than logical possibility. Metaphysical possibility requires some extra
principles, like that no object can be two diﬀerent colors all over at the same time. Such
laws are not true on account of their structure; that is, not logically true. The truth of
metaphysical laws depends on their content. One might stipulate that metaphysical rules
hold in all possible worlds. In that case, logical and metaphysical possibility would be
extensionally equivalent since every world would be logically and metaphysically accessible to
every other world, although logical principles are a proper subset of metaphysical principles.
For this project, modalities are primarily classiﬁed intensionally, in terms of the strictness
of their deﬁning principles. So metaphysical possibility is a proper part of logical given that
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the rules of the former contain and are stricter than the those of the latter.
Here are some examples illustrating the distinction between types of possibility.
(2.1) An object can be red and green all over at the same time.
This proposition is logically possible, but not metaphysically possible.
(2.2) A glass marble dropped in a vacuum near the Earth's surface will fall away
from the Earth.
This proposition is logically possible, but not physically possible.
(2.3) If Jones punches her boss in the face, she will not be ﬁred.
This proposition is physically possible, but perhaps not practically possible.
(2.1) is logically possible since there is no logical rule by which an object cannot be red
and green all over at the same time. However, given the metaphysical rule that being red
and being green are contrary properties, (2.1) is not metaphysically possible. In the case of
(2.2), it is not logically absurd that the marble would fall away from the Earth, but for the
marble to do so would be inconsistent with the laws of physics. Granted, if the universe
were relevantly diﬀerentif there were an incredibly massive object whose center of gravity
is close enough to the marblethen the marble might fall away from the Earth. One might
want to block such possibilities by involving antecedent conditions about the way the world
is or similarly by using ceteris paribus clauses. Finally, in (2.3), the laws of physics do not
entail that Jones will be ﬁred if she punches her boss in the face. There might be some other
set of rules, like laws or mores, by which she cannot drive the punch home and still retain
her job.
The propositions corresponding to a modality may even be world-dependent. For in-
stance, diﬀerent sets of possible worlds may vary in their physical laws. It is logically
possible that empirical constants are other than they are, such as that the speed of light in
a vacuum is faster than 3.00 × 108m/s. What is physically possible with respect to worlds
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with one set of physical principles is not the same as what is physically possible from worlds
with diﬀerent physical laws.
A set or sets of principles need not be given explicitly to designate a modality. It is not
a requirement that one knows everything about physical laws to speak meaningfully about
physical possibilities. It is enough that there is a cohesive set of principles even if no one
knows exactly what they are. A thousand years ago, most natural science was relatively
underdeveloped. That does not entail that the same physical laws that hold today did not
hold a thousand years ago. A thousand years from now, natural science may adhere to
diﬀerent theories than the ones held today, but it does not follow that the natural world
would operate diﬀerently in the future than it does now.
One type of modality that is especially important for this project is all-things-considered
(ATC) possibility/necessity. ATC necessity goes by several other names, including necessity
per accidens, hypothetical necessity, and antecedent necessity. ATC possibility is whatever
is required for an event to occur, be actualizable, or be realizable. For instance, Jones can
drink coﬀee tomorrow if and only if, all things considered, it is possible for her to do so. ATC
possibility is at least as stringent as physical possibility in the sense that ATC possibility
requires physical possibility; so the former incorporates the principles of the latter. Unlike
some renditions of physical possibility, ATC possibility/necessity changes over time.
Again, ATC possibility is accidental possibility, whatever that amounts to. The most
plausible explication of ATC possibility is that the things to be considered are the principles
relevant to determining whether or not Jones' coﬀee-drinking, for instance, is genuinely
possible, actualizable, or realizable. Physical principles and antecedent conditions are of
course relevant. One might impose additional factors when determining things like whether
or not Jones will inevitably be ﬁred if she punches her boss, but the context-sensitivity of
all things considered is ignored here for simplicity. It is assumed that there is only one
ATC possibility.
Oﬃcially, ATC possibility is deﬁned broadly. The reason for the nebulous deﬁnition
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Figure 2.2.1: Graphical structure of a modal logic model. Possible worlds are nodes and
accessibility relations are directed edges between nodes.
of ATC possibility is that what exactly it consists of is at the heart of the debate about
logical fatalism. Some readers may ﬁnd it convenient to think of ATC possibility as physical
possibility in the sense described for branching time systems in Section 2.4.3. Presumably,
laws and antecedent conditions should be enough to dictate ATC possibility. It will be
made clear when ATC possibility threatens to elude capture by principles and antecedent
conditions. ATC possibility will be discussed further throughout this project.
2.2 Types of Modality
Formal systems are very general. They need not have anything to do with modality
despite involving accessibility relations. Structurally, models of modal logic are just graphs
like the one shown in Figure 2.2.1. Possible worlds are just nodes or vertices, abstracta
lacking inherent meaning, and accessibility relations are sets of directed edges between
nodes.
The rest of the semantics has no more intrinsic meaning. A truth function is a function
taking two parameters, a proposition and a possible world, and mapping them to things
called truth values. For any application, it is important to explicate the parts of a modal
system and give some details about how models relate to the analysanda.
Logical systems can be helpful for creating explicit illustrations and analytic mechanisms.
In this sense, logical systems need not attend to propositions, possible worlds, truth values,
accessibility relations, or even logic. Suppose, for instance, that one wants to develop a
system for bags of colored marbles. Non-modal propositions represent colors and possible
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worlds represent sizes. Colors can be manipulated by taking their complement with ¬ or
their combination with ∧. The accessibility relation between sizes is understood as is larger
than. The truth function may be partial, mapping size/color pairs to true just in case
there is a marble of that color and size. The modal operator ◇ is used to indicate that there
is a larger marble. For instance, ◇red holds at 1.5cm if there is a red marble larger than
1.5cm.
There is nothing wrong with using modal systems to represent one thing as opposed
to another, although it is desirable to avoid confusion no matter how a logical system is
applied. The marble example is not evidently harmful, illustrating that modal systems can
by interpreted in ways having little to do with modality or propositions. Anything that can
be depicted using an accessibility relation may be called formally modal to distinguish the
mere formality of accessibility in the technical sense from more modal senses of modal.
Formal systems can be applied in various ways and formally modal elements of a system
need not be modal in other senses of the term. It may therefore be desirable to identify
criteria for separating genuinely modal accessibility relations from simply formal ones.
As indicated in Section 2.1, genuine modalities like logical, metaphysical, and physical
are explicable in terms of a set or sets of principles expressed as propositions. Such relations
may be called propositionally modal. The structure of propositional modalities reduces to
consistency with the laws characterizing those modalities. This is not to say that proposi-
tional modalities themselves reduce to consistency. Rather, the accessibility relations used
to illustrate those modalities can be deﬁned using consistency.
Propositional modalities always unambiguously pick out an accessibility relation. Here
is an explication for the formally inclined. Let Lp be the set of laws corresponding to a
propositional modality. For a given language in which Lp is expressible, each model has a
unique accessibility relation, Rp, such that:
(2.4) Rp = {⟨m,m′⟩ ∣Lp is satisﬁed at m}2
2This definition assumes that moments are characterized by the set of propositions that are true there.
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Again, this deﬁnition just states that the laws Lp characterize the modality, which in turn
is represented by the accessibility relation Rp. For instance, consider physical modality.
Physical laws dictate what is physically possible or necessary. Nodes respecting physical
principles can only physically access certain other nodes. As a more concrete example,
stipulate a modality, Sisyphean modality, having a single law:
(2.5) The deceitful necessarily roll boulders.
(2.5) holds at moments at which no one is deceitful. (2.5) is also satisﬁed by moments at
which there are deceitful individuals provided that those moments only access moments in
which the deceitful persons roll boulders. The most inclusive accessibility relation satisfying
those criteria represents the Sisyphean modality.
There are two cases of propositional modality. On the one hand, the set of laws may
be node-independent. Logical possibility is the prime example here. Given that all nodes
are consistent, each node relates to every other. The principles of logic are not world- or
moment-dependent. Additionally, there may be no need to consider more than one set of
physical laws. These laws are presumably the actual physical laws, although they do not
have to be. On the other hand, it may be important to represent diﬀerent logically possible
physical laws, legal laws, moral rules, et cetera. It would thus be appropriate to refer to the
laws at a world rather than the laws simpliciter. World- or moment-dependent accessibility
relations will play an important role in this analysis (although there will be no need to
employ node-dependent laws).
All propositional modalities are formal modalities. The converse is false; that is, not all
formal modalities are propositionally modal. Unlike formal modality, propositional modality
It is also assumed that there is a moment corresponding to each set of propositions that is both consistent
and closed under entailment.
Note that the definition does not directly require that Lp is also satisfied at m′. Consider the case
of physical laws. Standard physical laws seem to be physically necessary in that if φ ∈ Lp, then
physically-necessarily:φ ∈ Lp. In this case, if Lp is satisfied at m and mRpm′, then Lp is satisfied at
m′. However, it is possible that the current physical laws change; for instance, if there were another big
bang and some constants change. So it is not in the nature of physical modality, and thus propositional
modality generally, that the same laws must be satisfied at both nodes. Only the source node must satisfy
the modality’s laws.
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Figure 2.2.2: A formal modality that is not propositional. The modality F is represented
by an accessibility relation, RF , such that RF consists of one simple cycle. (a) and (b) depict
two candidates for RF in otherwise identical models. This ambiguity shows that F is not
propositionally modal.
necessarily involves what is true at nodes (possible worlds/moments). Formally modal rela-
tions might have little or nothing to do with principles given that these rules are propositions
represented by the object language. Put another way, propositional modality has to do with
what is going in at nodes, their content. Formal modality is not so limited.
A formal modality that is not propositional is such that no set of laws is both necessary
and suﬃcient to characterize the modality. It is a simple matter to create a modality that is
formal but not propositional. Let F be a modality with a corresponding accessibility relation
RF . RF is a subset of logical accessibility having just one simple cycle of nodes. The scenario
is illustrated in Figure 2.2.2. There may be several options for RF in a given model, one of
which must be chosen arbitrarily. F is not characterized by a set of principles.
The thin red line, the temporal relation of true-futurist theories, is supposed to be a
formal modality that is not propositional. The thin red line is a linear subset of ATC
accessibility.3 Whenever contingency plays a role, there is more than one possible thin red
line but there is no special rule for prioritizing one timeline over others.
Although propositional modality is stricter than formal modality, propositional modality
is still not enough to pick out all and only genuine modalities. A case in point is permissibility,
which does not amount to any sense of genuine possibility. Even assuming that permissibil-
ity is propositionally modal and that only possible acts are permissible, permissibility is not
3In the case of indexical true futurism, the arbitrariness stems from the assignment of timelines to nodes;
that is, the precedence of one thin red line over another.
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necessary for any genuine possibility. Genuine modality ultimately stems from the object
of analysis, the philosophical interpretation of the formal system. Physical possibility, for
instance, can be represented in terms of consistency with propositions corresponding to the
laws of nature. That the representation is of physical possibility depends on identifying
the relation's characterizing propositions as the laws of nature, and that is something that
must be done outside of the system. So propositional modality is not suﬃcient for gen-
uine modality. Nevertheless, familiar genuine modalities are propositionally modal, making
propositional modality an indicator of genuine modality.
An empiricist might insist that propositional modalities are the only genuine modalities.
Propositional modalities are characterized by a set of principles. Principles in that sense
denotes propositions; but the term may also pick out mechanisms. Here is a candidate ex-
ample. It is logically possible that some physical mechanism is entirely arbitrary, objectively
random. There is a possible universe in which physical determinism holds except that there
is a special, troublesome machine. This machine periodically outputs a binary digit, 0 or
1. The catch is that the number chosen by the machine is objectively random. The arbi-
trariness of the selection process renders the mechanism impossible to describe using a law.
The machine ensures that the universe, which would otherwise be physically determined, is
indeterministic. It is possible that the next number will be 0, and it is possible that the next
number is 1. So there is a mechanism, a principle in the ontological sense, that signiﬁcantly
alters the physical accessibility relation for that universe. Propositional modality cannot
account for this accessibility relation because the indeterminism generated by the machine
cannot be depicted by laws. A new sense of modality is required, ontological modality.
One might object that ontological modality is nonsense if taken apart from propositional
modality. A genuine mechanism can always be captured by propositions in a suﬃciently rich
language. Objective randomness stems from an absence of mechanisms, of principles in the
ontological sense, not their presence. The contrived example of the indeterministic machine
is indeed representable as a physical modality. The propositions representing physical laws
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must become as contrived as the objective principles themselves: some laws must contain
clauses exempting the machine. These exemptions correspond to an absence of principles in
the ontological sense.
If ontological modality can be explicated in terms of propositional modality, the former
may be considered a subtype of the latter. Under such a taxonomy, propositional modalities
may be divided into two groups, ontological and artifactual. Artifactual modalities stem
from human artiﬁce or convention, including legal laws and mores. Ontological modalities,
in this paciﬁed sense, may simply be non-artifactual or they might be explicated positively.
This paciﬁed notion of ontological modality is not used in this essay.
Even if all legitimate instances of ontological modality are reducible to propositional
modality, the ontological sense of modality is nevertheless intensionally distinct from the
propositional sense. As such, ontological modality is here added to the list of types of modal-
ity. The arguments given later in this essay do not hinge on the legitimacy of ontological
modality.
Finally, terms can be grammatically modal. Familiar grammatical modalities include
could, would, should, can, might, and so forth. Interestingly, will and shall are also gram-
matically modal, as discussed in Section 3.1. Ignoring terms like will and shall to avoid
begging the question herethose terms are primary analysanda of this essayother stock
grammatical modalities are propositionally modal and hence formally modal. Such terms
are propositionally modal in that they can be represented by operators deﬁned using propo-
sitionally modal accessibility relations, although those accessibility relations may depend on
the context of utterance. Can, for instance, might address logical or physical possibility.
2.3 Temporally Sensitive Modality
Nodes are accessible with respect to a set of propositions or laws if and only if those
propositions hold at those worlds and consistency is maintained. For example, the node
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representing the actual world physically accesses any node that satisﬁes the actual physical
laws as long as such accessibility does not yield inconsistency. This characterization of
accessibility is fairly simple and also popular, but it turns out to be quite distant from the
ordinary sense if nodes are taken to span time. As such, it is important to be more speciﬁc
about the type of node under discussion before moving on.
The notion that nodes span time leads to problems when accessibility needs to change
over time. When nodes span time, it does not make sense to use principles to specify
diﬀerent accessibility relations at diﬀerent times. For instance, suppose a stone is dropped
from atop a building and nothing can interfere with its descent. If a single node represents
both the scenario before the stone was dropped and the situation afterwards, then one cannot
formulate:
(2.6) It is necessary that the stone will hit the sidewalk, yet before the stone was
dropped it was not necessary that it would hit the sidewalk.
(2.7) (necessarily: will: hit) and (was: not necessarily: will: hit)
Accessibility is deﬁned between nodes; so if nodes span time, accessibility cannot change
over time.
There are two common ways to depict temporally-speciﬁc nodes. Some analysts prefer
a two-dimensional system in which the parameters are time and possible world.4 Note that
possible world in this case does not refer to a node that spans time, but rather a parameter.
On this view, nodes amount to world-time pairs. The other representation of temporally-
speciﬁc nodes uses branching time. The branching interpretation is emphasized here.
2.3.1 Necessity per Accidens
Temporally sensitive characterizations of the worldmetaphorically, snapshots of possi-
ble worldsare here called moments. Temporal sensitivity is required to account for ATC
4See [MacFarlane(2012)] for a synopsis of the two-dimensional view that is relevant to this discussion.
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(all-things-considered) necessity, necessity per accidens, an important component of (liber-
tarian) freedom and contingency. According to the principle of the ﬁxedness of the past,
facts about the past (and present) are now unalterable. Such facts are physically necessary
insofar as physical principles require that these facts cannot be altered once their correspond-
ing events occur, but not in that these facts are logically necessary, nor in that they must
be physically determined before the respective associated events happen. The ﬁxedness of
the past generates a type of necessity that is quite diﬀerent from logical necessity. Ockham
made the distinction as follows:
I claim that every necessary proposition is per se in either the ﬁrst mode or the
second mode. This is obvious, since I am talking about all propositions that are
necessary simpliciter. I add this because of propositions that are necessary per
accidens, as is the case with many past tense propositions. They are necessary
per accidens, because it was contingent that they be necessary, and because they
were not always necessary.5
Some facts about the past are such that they were contingent and became necessary. Con-
sidering both physical principles and antecedent conditions, states of the world become unal-
terable once the events they capture have occurred. The notion of modality behind necessity
per accidens is here called ATC (all-things-considered) modality, which constitutes the basis
of branching time systems. All of the things to be considered include some modalities and,
as a result, antecedent conditions describing the state of the world up to and at the time
at which necessity per accidens is being evaluated. The modalities in question are all of
the relevant ones, which presumably include propositional modalities like logical, metaphys-
ical, and physical. ATC modality might not be stronger than temporally sensitive physical
modality, but the possibility is left open.
As in Ockham's description of necessity per accidens, ATC necessity changes with time.
Thus, it may have been contingent that a stone was dropped from atop a building, as
illustrated in Figure 2.3.1. Physical considerations entail that such facts cannot be undone
once they are complete. After the stone has been dropped, nothing respecting the physical
5Ockham Ordinatio I Prologue q.6
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principles that do in fact hold, in which causes are not preceded by their eﬀects in accordance
with the arrow of time (or light cones), can make it the case that the stone was not dropped.
Examples like that of the stone dropped from atop a building indicate not only that
temporally sensitive nodes are crucial for representing cases in which accessibility changes
over time, but also that the state of the world (that the stone was dropped) is relevant to
accessibility. The current state of the world is that the stone has been dropped. Physical
laws, which are statements involving modal and temporal operators, dictate that the stone
will hit the sidewalk in a few seconds. So of the moments at which it is a few seconds from
now, only (but not all) those moments in which the stone hits the sidewalk are accessible
from the current moment. Thus, the stone will necessarily hit the sidewalk, as far as physical
possibility is concerned. Logical laws do not require that the stone will hit the sidewalk in
a few seconds. So there are some logically accessible moments at which it is a few seconds
from now and the stone does not hit the ground.
One popular way to represent ATC modality is to use branching time systems. The
branching structure of those logics is designed to model ATC modality. Although branching
is used to represent ATC modality here, other depictions are possible. That said, branching
systems are the most sensible choice given a dynamic understanding of accessibility.6
2.3.2 Antecedent Conditions
A lot has been said thus far about the importance of antecedent conditions. The remain-
der of this section clariﬁes the role of antecedents for nodes in general, temporal sensitivity
aside, then returns the discussion to how antecedent conditions are relevant to ATC modality
in particular.
In moving towards a uniﬁed explication of accessibility, there are two cases to consider,
the general case of formal modalities and the special case of propositional modalities. Assum-
ing that there are no inconsistent nodes, consistency is the only limitation on accessibility
6See Section 2.5 for more on dynamic accessibility.
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Figure 2.3.1: Dropping a stone from a building. Before the stone is dropped (m0), it
is possible that it will not hit the ground (m4). Once the stone is dropped (m1), it will
inevitably hit the ground (m2). m4 is inaccessible from m1. Although not physically, all
nodes are logically accessible from one another.
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pertaining to all formal modalities. For instance, if
(2.8) M -necessarily:φ holds at moment m,
(2.9) ¬φ holds at moment m′,
then m cannot be related to m′ by M 's accessibility relation, RM . Otherwise, both φ and¬φ would hold at m′ since (2.8) entails that φ is true at all nodes accessible from m. In more
concrete terms, something like the following absurdity would hold at m if m relates to m′:
(2.10) It is necessary that Jones will drink coﬀee, but she might not.
If M is a propositional modality, then M is characterized by a set of laws, L. One node
M -accesses another just in case L is satisﬁed at the ﬁrst while consistency is maintained.
The consistency requirement plays a signiﬁcant role in determining both the structure of
M -accessibility and the relevance of antecedent conditions. Examples like the one above
involving (2.8) and (2.9) show that consistency may rule out reﬂexivity, for instance, if m is
identical to m′.
Antecedent conditions are important because they can determine modal statements when
combined with certain laws. Physical modality serves as a helpful example. Suppose that a
stone is dropped from atop a building. Physical considerations may require that the stone
will inevitably hit the sidewalk. It is assumed that many physical laws assert that particular
consequents, like the stone's hitting the sidewalk, necessarily follow from certain antecedent
conditions, like that the stone was dropped. Physical laws, although typically stated in
general terms, entail a set of conditionals, like:
(2.11) If a stone is dropped from the building, the stone will inevitably be falling at
9.8m/s in one second;
(2.12) If a stone is dropped from the building, the stone will inevitably hit the side-
walk in two seconds;
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and so forth. Such conditionals help bring out the role of antecedent conditions. If the an-
tecedent in (2.12) is not satisﬁed, (2.12) generates no modal requirements. The circumstance
is diﬀerent if the antecedent is satisﬁed, in which case
(2.13) The stone will inevitably hit the sidewalk in two seconds
follows. (2.13) is akin to (2.8), which limits accessibility based on the consistency require-
ment. Moments in which the stone does not hit the sidewalk in two seconds are not accessible
from a node satisfying (2.13). (2.13) follows from (2.12) combined with the antecedent that
the stone was dropped but not from (2.12) alone. Thus, antecedent conditions can determine
modal relations for propositional modalities.
Antecedent conditions tend to be relevant to propositional modalities broadly. If moment
m relates to m′ by modalityM , then one might say that the state of the world at m provides
M -antecedent conditions for the state of the world at m′. This sort of M -antecedence is
more general than what is typically meant by antecedent conditions. In the usual sense,
antecedent conditions involve something like temporal or causal antecedence.
2.4 Contingency and Fatalism
Contingency and fatalism must be explicated in terms of the current analysis. The pa-
rameterization given in this section allows for more explicit deﬁnitions of future-contingency,
logical fatalism, and theological fatalism in terms of diﬀerent modalities.
Start with a familiar notion of contingency deﬁned in terms of propositions:
contingent proposition a proposition φ is contingent if and only if it is neither necessary
nor impossible. Put another way, both φ and ¬φ are possible. That is,
possibly:φ ∧ possibly:¬φ
Fatalism is taken to be the view that there are no contingencies. Thus:
fatalism the thesis that no φ is contingent. For any φ,
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necessarily:φ ∨ necessarily:¬φ
2.4.1 Contingency and Fatalism in Multi-Modal Branching Time
The preceding deﬁnitions of contingency and fatalism need to be improved in two ways.
First, there are diﬀerent types of modality and ways in which a proposition, event, or thing
can be possible.7 A statement might be logically possible but not physically possible, for
instance. Correspondingly, a statement can be logically contingent yet not physically contin-
gent. A formal modality is anything that can be represented using an accessibility relation.8
So the deﬁnitions of contingency and fatalism should make explicit the type of formal modal-
ity, M , involved. Second, in the branching time semantics used here, truth is deﬁned with
respect to moments, temporally speciﬁc possible worlds. Something may be contingent at
one moment and not at another. Thus, the second parameter is the moment, m, at which
contingency is evaluated.
M-contingent proposition For formal modality M and moment m, a proposition φ is
M -contingent at m if and only if φ is neither M -necessary nor M -impossible at m.
Put another way, both φ and ¬φ areM -possible at m. That is, the following holds m:9
M -possibly:φ ∧ M -possibly:¬φ
M-fatalism For formal modality M , the view that no proposition is M -contingent at any
moment, in which case everything is either M -necessary or M -impossible.10 That is,
for any φ, the following holds at all moments:
7See Section 2.1.
8Of course, formal modalities need not be modal in other senses. For a discussion of formal modality, see
Section 2.2.
9Regarding this and upcoming definitions, it may be better to bring the main connective—∧ for contin-
gency and ∨ in the case of fatalism—into the metatheory if supervaluationism is under consideration. The
shift is not used here for clarity.
10It may be desirable to further restrict fatalism to particular sets of moments. This may be desirable if,
for instance, different sets of physical laws are taken into consideration. In this case, there are also various
types of (moment-specific) ATC modality corresponding to different sets of physical laws. Some sets of laws,
physical or otherwise, may yield fatalism while others do not. This notion of restricted fatalism could be
defined without much trouble, but it is unnecessary here.
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M -necessarily:φ ∨ M -necessarily:¬φ
This project emphasizes future-contingency. Future-contingency uses all-things-considered
(ATC) modality. Although it is not standard practice, one might use ATC-contingency or
accidental contingency instead of future contingency.
future contingent a proposition φ is future-contingent at moment m if and only if φ is
neither ATC-necessary nor ATC-impossible. Put another way, the following holds at
m.
ATC-possibly:φ ∧ ATC-possibly:¬φ
Instances of future contingency are opposed to ATC-fatalism.
ATC-fatalism For any proposition φ and moment m, φ is either ATC-necessary or ATC-
impossible at m. That is, the following holds for all φ and m:
ATC-necessarily:φ ∨ ATC-necessarily:¬φ
Consider a speciﬁc example. Suppose that it is contingent whether or not Jones has a
cup of coﬀee tomorrow. The event of Jones' coﬀee-drinking may come to pass and it may
not. In terms of propositions,
(2.14) possibly:coﬀee ∧ possibly:¬coﬀee,
where possibility is understood as ATC-possibility.
2.4.2 Explicating Logical and Theological Fatalism
The preceding discussion aside, varieties of fatalism tend not to be named after their
associated modalities in the philosophical literture. For example, logical fatalism is not the
view that all truths are logically necessary. The threatening variety of modality is instead the
more stringent ATC modality. Similarly, theological fatalism is not the view that all truths
are theologically necessary, whatever that means. What distinguishes theological fatalism
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from logical fatalism is that in the theological case but not the logical case, God plays an
essential role through his comprehensive foreknowledge or atemporal direct apprehension of
events.
Types of fatalism are instead named after the considerations that render some type of
contingency inconsistent, regardless of the type of contingency or necessity involved. Physical
fatalism is based on considerations about the physical world and about natural laws. Logical
fatalism is based on logical and linguistic concerns, especially worries pertaining to time.
Theological fatalism has to do with theological considerations, plus those of logical fatalism.
logical fatalism ATC-fatalism stemming from the incoherence of future-contingency.
theological fatalism ATC-fatalism stemming from God's comprehensive foreknowledge or
his atemporal direct apprehension of events.
2.4.3 Fatalism and Determism
A ﬁnal point worth mentioning here pertains to the distinction between fatalism and
determinism. Determinism is typically understood as physical determinism although the
notion can be generalized to M -determinism just as contingency and fatalism were. The
diﬀerence between fatalism and determinism is often said to be that antecedent conditions
are relevant to determinism, not fatalism. Some elaboration is called for.
Using the deﬁnitions of the preceding sections, one might stipulate that fatalism sim-
pliciter is logical fatalism while determinism simpliciter is just physical fatalism. This way
of making the distinction shifts emphasis away from antecedent conditions and towards
laws. There is not in general anything special about antecedent conditions. They are always
lurking and which conditions obtain need not have any bearing on fatalism. The issue is
whether or not the relevant set of laws is enough to defeat contingency given the antecedent
conditions. In the case of determinism, laws together with antecedent conditions block con-
tingency. In the case of fatalism, laws together with antecedent conditions do not entail
36
necessity. Necessity, lack of contingency, is rather arbitrary.
Modalities can be distinguished by their characterizing principles and whether or not
there are such principles. In the context of a branching system, both determinism and
fatalism involve a linear modality. The ATC tree may collapse into a line. Suppose that
ATC-possibility is physical possibility. In this case, ATC modality is propositional. If this
modality linearizes the tree, it is because physical laws together with antecedent conditions
are suﬃcient to determine the future. This kind of entailment may be used characterize
determinism: the principles of the modality together with antecedent conditions generate
necessity. Next, suppose that physical possibility is not suﬃcient for ATC-possibility and
that ATC-modality is not propositionally modal. In this case, there is no characterizing set
of laws which, when combined with antecedent conditions, yield necessity. If the relation is
nevertheless linear, involving necessity, then it is fatalistic. The necessity of fatalism does
not stem from principles, but is instead arbitrary. While a determined future event is present
in its causes, a fated future event need not be.
The fatalism/determinism distinction may also be stated in terms of which considerations
are relevant. Logical fatalism has nothing to do with what physical laws are or whether or not
attitudes towards science engender physical determinism. Physical principles are relevant to
time ﬂow, the rule that eﬀects cannot precede their causes, and perhaps other considerations
relevant to logical fatalism. Although some such physical rules are at work behind the logic of
temporal statements through which logical fatalism is studied, physical determinism involves
much more. A pointed example is the rule that every event has a cause. Some such law is
relevant to physical determinism, but logical fatalism is compatible with uncaused events.
Consider again the example of Jones' coﬀee-drinking. If her coﬀee-drinking is physically
determined, then prior conditions together with physical laws are suﬃcient for her coﬀee-
drinking, and her choice stems from physical causes. Now, suppose that physical determinism
is false. Whatever the physical laws are, they are not enough to determine Jones' coﬀee-
drinking from the relevant antecedent conditions. Logical or theological fatalism may still
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hold. Neither logical nor theological fatalism require that Jones' actions are caused by
something, let alone something physical. It may be that Jones' coﬀee-drinking or abstinence
is ATC-necessary on account of a basic assumption about temporal propositions, such as that
she will either drink coﬀee or she will not do so, or that will is covertly modalnot the sort
of thing one worries about when dealing with physical determinismthus yielding logical
fatalism. In the theological case, the ATC-necessity of her coﬀee-drinking or abstinence may
follow from God's comprehensive foreknowledge or atemporal apprehension of all events,
again not the sort of consideration that is relevant to physical determinism.
2.5 Dynamic Accessibilities
Various notions of accessibility appear in the literature. Accessibility is given a par-
ticular understanding in this essay, in keeping with the tradition of branching time logics.
Roughly, a nodefor clarity, call it the target nodeis accessible from another nodecall
it the source nodejust in case the target is realizable or actualizable from the source; that
the source might transition into the target. For instance, there is a genuine transition or
potential transition between the states depicted in Figure 2.3.1 on page 30. This notion
of accessibility will be called the dynamic account of accessibility. The dynamic account is
relatively intuitive and has been the prevalent take on accessibility in branching time logics,
used heavily throughout this essay. Such focus, especially in the ﬁeld of temporal logic, is no
doubt inﬂuenced by Prior, to whom Peter Geach suggested this understanding of accessibility
for temporal logics.11
There is no pretension that the brief discussion here proves that the dynamic notion of
accessibility is the best. Oﬃcially, the dynamic account is taken as a background assumption.
It is nevertheless worthwhile to clarify Priorian accessibility, comment on its generality, and
explain why it is relevant to this project.
In ordinary language, a thing is accessible to someone if and only if the person can get to
11[Copeland(1996)]
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it. If and only if Jones can reach a book on a shelf, the book is accessible to her. Provided
that the book is inaccessible to her, then she cannot get to it, perhaps because it is locked in
a vault. One might say that a target node is accessible from a source node if and only if the
source can get to the target. This portrayal makes it look as if nodes are like people in space,
some of whom can touch some others. Another analogy might convey nodes as places, like
Detroit and Chicago. Detroit and Chicago are connected by the interstate highway. They
are accessible from one another; that is, people can go from one to the other. Maybe a target
node is accessible from a source node if and only if one can go from the source to the target.
These analogies provide an intuitive start, but they appear circular if mistaken for expli-
cations. Accessibility is itself a modal notion, indicating that a (grammatical) subject can
access an object, and was just described using modal terms; in this case, can. The course
can get to the target, one can go from the source to the target, and so forth. Modality, in
turn, is explicated using accessibility; hence the apparent circularity.
Seeking to avoid circularity, many philosophers nowadays use consistency as the foun-
dation of accessibility.12 Propositional modality plays a signiﬁcant role here. The weakest
form of accessibility is just logical accessibility. Every node is accessible to every other node.
For propositional modalities in general, a source node accesses a target node just in case the
source satisﬁes the laws of the modality, given that consistency is not violated. This deﬁni-
tion makes it so that accessibility depends on what is true at nodes, with modal statements
playing an especially important role in limiting accessibility; even though modal operators
are characterized in terms of accessibility.
There is no circularity, at least no vicious circularity, in interdeﬁning accessibility relations
and modal operators using the above method; but such deﬁnitions do not capture very much
in the way of content. That is exactly what one would expect for accessibility and modality.
Propositional modalities specify accessibility structure in connection with true propositions.
12This is not to say that those scholars think that there is no more to modality than consistency. One
must know what the laws are, which laws are relevant to genuine modality (whatever that means), how a
formal system must be developed to represent modal statements involving individuals, and so forth. Such
issues are tangential to this discussion.
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There is no more content to be found when accounting for propositional modality because
those modalities are so diverse. For instance, physical and deontic modality may not have
much in common besides the fact that both lend themselves to this type of characterization
in terms of propositional modality. Additional content, accounts of accessibility relations
and modal operators, is only to be found when addressing those rather diﬀerent modalities
individually, not in a more general account including both. The sources of content for
physical and deontic modality, if not independent, are at least disparate.
The account of accessibility indicated so far is static. The static notion is based primarily
on consistency, which generates no ﬂow or movement, not even possible ﬂow or movement.
The ordinary notion of accessibility, to the contrary, involves accessing.
It has been argued that the dynamic content associated with nodes accessing each other
is only metaphorical.13 There are, however, reasons to include dynamic content. Many
philosophers, especially those who use branching time systems, hold that time ﬂows.14 In
branching time logics, the present moves along accessibility paths. The debate about whether
or not time ﬂows has a very long history, dating back at least to Heraclitus and Parmenides
in the Western canon, and remains too contentious to address in satisfactory detail here.
The dynamic view of time is taken as a background assumption for most of this essay.
The problems of logical and theological fatalism are in part about what might become
the case or, put in terms of agents, what is within an agent's power to bring about. If it is
within Jones' power to drink coﬀee tomorrow, then she can make her coﬀee-drinking real or
actual tomorrow. Put in terms of moments, there is some moment in which Jones drinks
coﬀee tomorrow and it is in her power to make that moment real. Agents aside, if some
event is future-contingent, then there is a moment representing its occurrence that might
become real. A static account of accessibility is insuﬃcient to explicate libertarian freedom
and future contingency, which have dynamic content. Freedom and contingency are not just
13See, for instance, [Smart(1949), Nerlich(1998), Sider(2003)].
14This idea is prevalent in Prior. See, for instance, [Prior(1957), Prior(1967)]. McCall also advocates time
flow [McCall(1998)].
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a matter of consistency, but of change or potential change.
A good candidate source of accessibility's dynamic character is the so-called ﬂow of time.
In branching time models, present moments move along the tree as if it were a road.15 The
notion of time ﬂow works well with the ordinary idea of accessibility and has been used in
formal settings involving both branching time logics and relativistic branching space-time
logics.
A common question (or criticism) is, how fast does time ﬂow? The standard answer is,
one second per second.16 Consider an analogy. One might watch a ﬁlm at various speeds
fast, slow, even backwards. The characters do the same things, although faster, slower,
or backwards. Similarly, one can imagine present moments moving through a branching
time model at diﬀerent speedsagain faster, slower, or even backwards. That movement is
faster, slower, and backwards is only in comparison between the time scale of the ﬁlm or the
model to another, relatively external time scale of the viewer. From the perspective of the
ﬁlm characters or someone in the model, there is no diﬀerence in time ﬂowit ﬂows at one
second per second. From the perspective of the viewer, time also ﬂows at one second per
second, although the viewer apprehends that the ﬁlm's time scale can diﬀer. This analogy
illustrates two points. First, no matter how the viewer plays the ﬁlm or the logician imagines
the model, it makes no diﬀerence to those in the ﬁlm or model. Second, no matter which
frame of reference one is in, time ﬂows at the same rateone second per second, although
the rate at other frames may appear diﬀerent.
A more rigorous account of dynamic accessibility is called for. Such an explication might
be given by just tacking on the property of being dynamic to the static account; but that
approach is misleading, if not backwards. The static account may be taken to start with
logical accessibility, using it to build stronger types. This direction of construction is not
appropriate for the dynamic account because it is not evident how movement is supposed to
15The same may be said of branching space-time models, although past, present, and future are frame
specific. See, for instance, [Belnap(1992), McCall(1976), McCall(1994), McCall(1998)].
16See [Prior(1967), McCall(1998)]. Cf. [Smart(1949), Nerlich(1998)].
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come from logical accessibility.
Whatever accessibility is involved in future contingency and libertarian freedom might
be called all-things-considered (ATC) accessibility. It was indicated above that ATC acces-
sibility has a dynamic character that goes beyond mere consistency. Future contingency is
about what might become the case; libertarian freedom is about what an agent can bring
about. Time ﬂow is part of ATC accessibility. So ATC accessibility, not logical accessibility,
is the starting point of the dynamic account. Other propositional modalities are derived
from ATC modality, and the former inherit the latter's dynamic character.
Suppose that ATC accessibility is propositional. In fact, physical accessibility is a good
candidate for ATC accessibility, although the issue is oﬃcially left open here. Given that ATC
accessibility is propositional, its structure can be represented in terms of consistency just
as in the static account described above. The structure of ATC accessibility is represented
using consistency, but ATC accessibility is not derived from logical accessibility per se. It
follows that ATC accessibility is free to retain its dynamic character. ATC accessibility is
more than its structure.
Let P be the set of laws characterizing ATC accessibility. P represents all of the rules
to be considered in all-things-considered accessibility. Thus, if S is a nonempty subset of P ,
then S generates a some-things-considered accessibility. If S is the empty set, then S leads
to a no-things-considered accessibility, which is just logical accessibility. If S is a proper
superset of P , then S yields an extra-things-considered accessibility. Et cetera.
Here are some examples. It is not ATC-possible to drop a stone from atop a building
without it falling. However, ignoring physical principles, it is possible to drop the stone
without it falling. Considering only some principles or no principles at all, the type of
accessibility can be weakened. Suppose that it is ATC-possible for Jones to punch her boss
in the face without getting ﬁred. Given extra considerations, like the rules of her workplace,
Jones will inevitably get ﬁred for punching her boss. So it is not possible in this stronger
sense for Jones to punch her boss without getting ﬁred.
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ATC accessibility can be weakened, strengthened, or some combination thereof to con-
struct any propositional modality. The dynamic character of ATC accessibility is inherited
by those accessibility relations derived from it. Thus, propositional modalities in general
are dynamic under this interpretation of accessibility. It does not follow that all formal
modalities are dynamic, nor that propositional modalities are dynamic if they are given a
diﬀerent interpretation, one by which ATC modality is not taken as primary. The dynamic
interpretation is nevertheless the most appropriate for considering future contingency and
libertarian freedom.
2.6 Views about Time and Temporal Language
Scholars propose many diﬀerent accounts of time and temporal language. Several of
these analyses are portrayed as responses to the problems of logical and theological fatalism,
although these theories have implications that go beyond directly addressing fatalism. At
least, logical and theological fatalism involve a lot more than fatalism. Historically, the many
views on time and temporal language can be divided into two categories: open futurism
(OF) and true futurism (TF). A third approach, supervaluationism (Sup), falls somewhere
in between. These theories are discussed throughout most of this essay. At this point, only
preliminary descriptions are in order.
One inﬂuential account is open futurism (OF), the topic of Chapter 7. OF is a doctrine
by which contingent futures should be left open in all senses. Open futurists hold that
designating an actual or otherwise privileged future makes that future the only genuinely
actualizable possibility. Statements involving will, like:
(2.15) Jones will drink coﬀee
single out a particular future. If Jones were to not drink coﬀee, then (2.15) would be rendered
false. So if (2.15) is true, Jones cannot fail to drink coﬀee, where the modality of cannot
is ATC. Thus, there is a conﬂict between statements like (2.15) and contingency/freedom.
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coffee ¬coffee
present
Figure 2.6.1: Open futurism: Jones might drink coﬀee and she might not. Open futurists
hold that assigning a privileged future conﬂicts with contingency and freedom. It is nei-
ther true that Jones will drink coﬀee nor that she will not. The temporal relation is ATC
accessibility.
coffee ¬coffee
present
Figure 2.6.2: True futurism: Jones will contingently drink coﬀee. True futurists designate
an actual timeline (TRL); in this case, the left branch. It is nevertheless possible that Jones
will not drink coﬀee. Both future moments are ATC-possible, but only the left one will
occur.
It follows that there is no fact of the matter regarding what will happen until contingency
is resolved, and no particular future can be singled out. This notion is illustrated in Fig-
ure 2.6.1. Friends of OF would say that it is neither true that Jones will drink coﬀee nor
that she will not. Note that only somenot allforms of OF involve rejecting bivalence or
the law of excluded middle. Prior ultimately held a form of OF that retains bivalence and
excluded middle.17
True futurism (TF) is the topic of Chapter 6. Adherents seek to divorce will from
possibility/necessity. On this account, Jones might drink coﬀee tomorrow and she and might
not, although she will drink coﬀee. That is, Jones will contingently (or freely) drink coﬀee.
This notion is illustrated in Figure 2.6.2.
TF interprets will as something like will-actually. Will is not modal, at least not in any
17[Prior(1967)]
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sense required by freedom or future contingency. This move is accomplished by deﬁning
a separate, linear temporal relation on top of ATC-accessibility. This temporal relation is
often called the thin red line (TRL). ATC accessibility is what is required for contingency
and freedom. Will does not aﬀect ATC accessibility, but only follows the TRL.
Supervaluationism (Sup), discussed brieﬂy in Section 7.2.3, has elements of OF and TF.
Acknowledging that TF and OF both have virtues and shortcomings, Sup is an attempt to
combine the advantages of both theories while minimizing their disadvantages. Sup friends
retain all of TF's intuitively plausible validities, such as:
(2.16) Either Jones will have coﬀee or she will not
which OF does not account for. Nevertheless, Sup does not assign a privileged future,
thereby avoiding some of TF's most troublesome criticisms.
2.7 Hard and Soft Facts
Most scholars in both the future contingents and freedom/foreknowledge debates ac-
knowledge necessity per accidens, here represented in terms of ATC modality, discussed in
Section 2.3. Suppose that whether or not Jones drinks coﬀee tomorrow is ATC-contingent.
That is,
(2.17) Jones might drink coﬀee and she might not
Jones' coﬀee drinking is not ATC-necessary. In other words, her coﬀee drinking is not ATC-
necessary now. Tomorrow, whatever Jones decides to do will become necessary. Her choice
cannot be undone once she implements it.
Following Ockham and others, TF maintains that there are facts about the future, soft
facts, that are nevertheless contingent. For instance,
(2.18) Jones will drink coﬀee.
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TF supplements an account of ATC necessity with a stronger distinction between hard
and soft facts. Roughly, soft facts are those facts about the future that are not necessary
while hard facts are about the past or present, which are always ATC-necessary. Having
enough soft facts to specify a particular future as the actual one is equivalent to using a
thin red line (TRL) as illustrated in Figure 2.6.2. Ockhamists in the freedom/foreknowledge
literature talk about soft facts and their counterparts in the future contingents literature use
the TRL. The former type of Ockhamism also involves the more stringent requirement that
characterizations of God's past or present beliefs about soft facts are themselves soft.
2.7.1 Soft Facts in the Freedom/Foreknowledge Scholarship
Over some decades, Ockhamists in the freedom/foreknowledge literature struggled to
characterize the hard/soft fact distinction. Patrick Todd recently provided an insightful
analysis in which he observed that these attempts meet with severe diﬃculties.18 Despite
Todd's concerns, it is possible to explicate the hard/soft fact distinction using entailment,
although no successful analysis is given in the freedom/foreknowledge literature.
Ockhamists in the freedom/foreknowledge literature emphasize whether or not a given
fact is at least in part about the future. On this characterization, soft facts are in part about
the future while hard facts are not. Such an analysis was endorsed by Marilyn Adams and
came to be the dominant notion of soft factuality in the freedom/foreknowledge literature.
Adams provided the following characterization of what it is for a statement to be about a
time.
Statement p is at least in part about a time t =def The happening or not happen-
ing, actuality or non-actuality of something at t is a necessary condition of the
truth of p.19
Adams proposed that soft facts are those true statements that are at least in part about a
future time while hard facts are not. Adams gave an illustrative example:
18[Todd(2012)]
19[Adams(1967)], p. 493
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Caesar died in 44 B.C. expresses a hard fact about 44 B.C. But the statement
Caesar died 2009 years before Saunders wrote his paper does not, since it is at
least in part about 1965 A.D.20
Notice that Adams spoke of hard facts about times, not hard facts about times at other
times. Caesar died in 44 B.C.E. expresses a hard fact after 44 B.C.E., but Caesar will
die in 44 B.C.E. may well be soft before 44 B.C.E. Whether or not a proposition is a soft
fact depends on when (or, more speciﬁcally, at which moment) it is evaluated. Adams'
deﬁnition, by which soft facts are about future times, indicates that she was aware that soft
factuality changes over time. She nevertheless did not incorporate ATC modality, by which
soft factuality changes over time.
The literature contains many criticisms, attempted ﬁxes, and analyses of Adams' pro-
posal. John Fischer introduced an especially illuminating type of counterexample.21 He
pointed out that any hard fact about a past occurrence entails something about the future.
For example,
(2.19) Jones had coﬀee yesterday (hard fact)
entails that
(2.20) Jones will not have coﬀee for the ﬁrst time tomorrow.
(2.20) is in part about the future and (2.20) is necessary for (2.19), so (2.19) is a soft fact on
Adams' account. A similar trick can be used to show that on Adams' deﬁnition, all facts are
soft facts. The resulting attempts to ﬁx Adams' explication of the hard/soft fact distinction
are ad hoc and not particularly helpful to this discussion. The problems facing Adams'
view and its successors led Todd to claim that the notion of entailment is insuﬃciently
discriminating to capture the relevant notion of dependence; that is, the dependence of soft
facts upon the future.22
20[Adams(1967)], p. 494
21[Fischer(1983)], p. 75
22[Todd(2012)], p. 8.
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2.7.2 Explicating Soft Facts in a Temporally Sensitive Framework
Meanwhile, logicians advocating TF did not seem particularly concerned about the
hard/soft fact distinction. Using the temporal logics developed by Prior and others, it
is quite easy to represent Ockham's solution to the freedom/foreknowledge problem. Not
only was Prior aware of Ockham's position, but he formalized it.23 Priorian Ockhamism
was developed further by Øhrstrøm.24 It is disappointing that many scholars in the free-
dom/foreknowledge literature have and continue to ignore such important developments in
the future contingents literature.
The problem with attempts to explicate hard/soft facts in the freedom/foreknowledge
literature is that such eﬀorts fail to account for ATC-modality. ATC-modality is a prereq-
uisite of the hard/soft fact distinction. The dependence of the hard/soft fact distinction
on ATC-modality is clear in Ockham's work on theological fatalism. Recall that propo-
sitions describing events can change modal status over time, so that an event that was
future-contingent (Jones will drink coﬀee) eventually becomes ATC-necessary, part of the
unalterable past (Jones drank coﬀee). It was argued in Section 2.3 that temporally sensitive
possible worlds, here called moments, are crucial to representing ATC-modality. In fact,
the fundamental structure of branching time is designed to represent ATC-modality. Thus,
scholars working on temporal logics were in the best position to handle this sort of problem.
Armed with a temporal-modal structure representing ATC-modality, one can explicate
the hard/soft fact distinction. Note that truth is moment-speciﬁc since ATC-necessity
changes over time.
soft fact A proposition φ is a soft fact at moment m if and only if the following hold
(i) φ is true at m
(ii) φ entails will:ψ for some proposition ψ.
23See [Prior(1962)] and, for additional developments, [Prior(1967)].
24See [Øhrstrøm(1981), Øhrstrøm(1983), Øhrstrøm(1984)]. For a more recent synopsis, see
[Øhrstrøm(2009)].
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(iii) ψ is future-contingent (not ATC-necessary, not necessary per accidens)
hard fact A proposition φ is a hard fact at moment m if and only if φ is true at m and φ
is not a soft fact at m.
(i) accounts for the factuality of soft facts, (ii) introduces factual future content, and (iii)
pertains to softness. Observe that ATC-necessity is relevant to (iii). It is (iii) that Adams'
deﬁnition is missing. While Adams deﬁned a soft fact as a fact that entails something about
the future, the deﬁnition given here adds that a soft fact entails something contingent about
the future. Soft facts are soft, and not just any future content can serve to make them so.
2.7.3 Comments on the Deﬁnition
This explication of the hard/soft fact distinction has some interesting features. First, the
analysis is immune to the formal criticisms of Adams' view, with or without the epicycles later
appended to her deﬁnitions. Second, the analysis partitions the space of facts along diﬀerent
lines than many other attempts. Third, as desired Ockhamists in the freedom/foreknowledge
literature, characterizations of God's past and present beliefs about the future turn out to be
soft facts. Fourth, the explication nudges discussions of Ockhamism back to more relevant
ground.
Recall Fischer's criticism of Adams' deﬁnition. Given that Jones had coﬀee yesterday,
it is not future-contingent but inevitable that Jones will not have coﬀee for the ﬁrst time
tomorrow. Thus, (iii) fails for Fischer-style counterexamples. Todd more recently pointed
out that Adams' account cannot diﬀerentiate between God's foreknowledge and his decrees.
However, if God decrees that Jones will have coﬀee tomorrow, then it is inevitable that Jones
will have coﬀee tomorrow. Again, (iii) fails.
There is a prevalent view in the freedom/foreknowledge scholarship that soft facts pertain
to the future while hard facts depend only on the past and present. The deﬁnition proposed
here does not carve up facts in this way. There can be hard facts about the future. For
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instance, suppose the laws of physics determine that the sun will rise tomorrow. It is not
future-contingent, but inevitable that the sun will rise tomorrow. Thus, that the sun will
rise tomorrow is a hard fact. Hard facts can be about the future only insofar as the events
they pick out, if future events, are already present in their causes, so to speak. Soft facts are
never present in their causesotherwise, they would be inevitable and hence not soft.
Ockhamists in the freedom/foreknowledge literature insist that characterizations of God's
past and present beliefs about the future are soft facts. Most others ﬁnd this view awkward,
at best, on the grounds that past beliefs do not seem future-contingent. On the deﬁnition
given here, theistic Ockhamists get their wish. If God knows all and only truths, propositional
characterizations of God's past and present beliefs about the future are soft facts. Unlike
normal past/present beliefs, God's beliefs are infallible, entailing that their content is true.
Thus, statements characterizing God's beliefs about the future satisfy (ii) while normal,
fallible beliefs do not. There is nothing new about this distinction between God's beliefs
and normal beliefs. For instance, Nelson Pike indicated that this diﬀerence is the source of
the incompatibility between freedom and foreknowledge.25 Although the softness of God's
beliefs is what freedom/foreknowledge compatibilist Ockhamists have wanted all along, it
may turn out to work against them, as in Pike's argument.
One could debate about whether or not characterizations of God's beliefs should count
as soft facts, or if something in the analysis needs to change. That issue will come up
later. It will be seen that there are diﬃculties for TF in the context of traditional branching
time semantics. An account of temporal standpoints, standpoint inheritance, is introduced
in Section 3.4 and goes a long way towards helping TF in branching time. Standpoint
inheritance also brings out nuances in the semantics of soft and hard facts, including those
describing God's and others' beliefs. God's beliefs must be quite diﬀerent than those of
everyone else if his beliefs are to retain their softness, which is required to truth-track soft
facts. The demand for handing temporal standpoints thus revitalizes the debate about
25That is, under Pike’s assumptions. See [Pike(1965)].
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whether or not characterizations of God's beliefs should count as soft. The topic will be
discussed further in Sections 3.4 and 6.3.4.
If successful, this deﬁnition of soft facts allows discussions of Ockhamism to return to the
central questions. How can any past or present belief be soft? Why do soft facts pick out
one contingent future over another? What is the mysterious dependence relation of the past
upon some contingent future by which soft facts are true? Does it make sense to hold that
characterizations of God's past and present beliefs are soft facts? What is the relationship
between logical and theological fatalism? Et cetera. TF, and with it Ockhamism, is the topic
of Chapter 6. Various sorts of TF are discussed there. Scholars have also provided several
formal representations of TF theories. Some of these systems are illustrated and discussed
formally in Chapter 8.
2.8 Branching Time and Relativity
Some thinkers have voiced concerns to the eﬀect that branching time systems fail to ac-
count for relativity.26 These worries may be distracting for this project given the importance
of branching time to the literature on future contingents and freedom/foreknowledge. It is
nevertheless worthwhile to brieﬂy clarify the position taken here on relativity.
Some criticisms are not against branching time per se, but some associated views. On
the one hand, there is the A-theory, which is the view that relational temporal operators
cannot (or should not) be reduced to atemporal operators. The A-theory may be considered
a semantic thesis. On the other hand, there is the A-theory's metaphysical counterpart, the
view that past, present, and future are fundamental features of reality instead of, say, mere
artifacts of subjective experience.
Here is one way of putting the criticism from relativity against the reality of past, present,
and future. In the theory of relativity, observers in diﬀerent reference frames may record
the time of a given event in ways that are incompatible with branching time systems. One
26See, for instance, [Smart(1963)].
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event may appear to come before another in one reference frame; in a second reference frame,
the events are perceived in reverse order. In one frame, one event may be past while the
other is present; while in the second frame, the order is reversed. No event can be past
and present at the same time. So, assuming that pastness, presentness, and futurity are
frame-independent, the result is absurdity. The same event is both present and past, thus
present and not present.
Prior gave a rather strong reply. He concludes that
[W]e may say that the theory of relativity isn't about real space and time, in
which the earlier-later relation is deﬁned in terms of pastness, presentness, and fu-
turity; the `time' which enters into the so-called space-time of relativity isn't this,
but is just part of an artiﬁcial framework which the scientists have constructed to
link together observed facts in the simplest way possible, and from which those
things which are systematically concealed from us are quite reasonably left out.27
Prior argues that genuine temporal relations (those associated with the A-theory) cannot be
reduced to atemporal earlier-later relations (those associated with the B-theory), although
the reduction works in the other direction.28 If the A-theory is indispensable and if, in light
of considerations like ATC modality, the A-theory yields branching time, then branching
time systems are the only viable alternative. Scientists or their philosophical interpreters
who claim that observations supporting relativity are incompatible with branching time are
mistaken, according to Prior.
Prior's view may be diﬃcult to accept. Fortunately, there are other (perhaps less com-
mitted) alternatives supporting branching time analyses. The oﬃcial position taken in this
essay involves a few parts:
(2.21) It is possible to construct a branching space-time system that is compatible
with relativity.
(2.22) Relativistic interpretations conﬂict with ordinary assumptions to the eﬀect
27[Prior(1996)], p. 51.
28See esp. [Prior(1957), Prior(1967)], although he provides a synopsis of the argument in [Prior(1996)].
See [McTaggart(1908)] for McTaggart’s labeling of “A-theory” and “B-theory”.
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that temporal order is retained between reference frames. For convenience,
it may be assumed that all reference frames are equivalent under Galilean
transformation. In eﬀect, there is only one reference frame.
(2.23) The branching time system presented here can be transformed into a branching
space-time system compatible with relativity by dropping the assumption that
there is eﬀectively one reference frame and making additions to the theory as
needed.
Even if traditional branching time systems conﬂict with relativity, they can be generalized
to account for relativity. Branching space-time systems allegedly compatible with relativity
have been proposed and defended successfully. The most inﬂuential branching space-time
systems are given in [Belnap(1992), McCall(1994)]. A recent synopsis of the status of branch-
ing space-time projects is given in [Müller and Strobach(2012)].
One of the primary desiderata of this essay is to provide a reasonable semantic account
of temporal language. An ordinary assumption, outside of the context of discussions about
relativity, is that there is eﬀectively just one reference frame. In special relativity, the
distinction between reference frames together with fascinating observations about light's
behavior that yield the result that the temporal order of events is frame-dependent. The
frame parameter is typically irrelevant to temporal order. There is no good reason to think
that ordinary speakers really mean to parameterize temporal order with respect to reference
frames. The semantics of temporal language do not involve such a parameterization.
Although the systems used here do not account for shifts in reference frame that are
not order-preserving, temporal standpoints may be considered a step towards more general
reference frames. A theory of temporal standpoints is presented in Section 3.4 and more
formally in Section 8.3. This theory involves parameterizing the temporal relation in a
way that allows propositions to shift standpoint (or not, as the case may be). The result
is something like a frame-relative system; however, the sort of frame shift inspected here
preserves temporal order unless further generalized.
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What is desirable for this essay is a system that can provide a reﬁned semantic account
in simple termsas simple as the subject matter allows, at least. This account should
be generalizable to accommodate more nuanced observations that may conﬂict with usual
presumptions about the world. The system used here should fulﬁll those needs. Strictly
speaking, branching time systems may be inaccurate, as is Newtonian mechanics. Like
Newtonian mechanics, it is ﬁne to use simpliﬁed branching time systems for many purposes
as long as it is understood that some analyses require dropping the simplifying assumptions.
There is no need for branching space-time systems in decision theory or game theory, let
alone accounts of ordinary language, and that is what is relevant here. It may be assumed
that, in all examples given in this essay, Jones is not moving too much faster than Smith.
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Chapter 3
The Future of English
Linguistic considerations play an important role throughout this project. This chapter
conveys a few observations about the grammatical nature of will and, on a somewhat dif-
ferent note, perspectival shifts associated with temporal statements. Section 3.1 contains
a discussion of will as grammatically modal. The sense in which will is evaluated in this
project, the bleached sense, is distinguished from other notions associated with the term.
In Section 3.2, various types of excluded middle are enumerated. Aside from the usual law
of excluded middle, there are three kinds involving the future: a weak, a medium, and a
strong future excluded middle. The weak and medium varieties are typically equivalent and
usually innocuous, but the strong type is more contentious. Section 3.3 sets out a method for
distinguishing between corresponding instances of weak and strong future excluded middle.
Finally, Section 3.4 introduces temporal standpoints. Temporal standpoints are moments
determining perspectives. Traditional branching time logics are unable to account for sev-
eral important types of statements because, in eﬀect, those systems change standpoints too
frequently. The theory of standpoint inheritance is introduced in a general form, while
theory-speciﬁc and formal accounts are reserved for later chapters. Standpoint inheritance
resolves many linguistic inaccuracies of traditional branching time logics in a way that is
general, simple, and intuitive.
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3.1 Grammatical Modalities and Bleached Will
In the philosophical literature, tense seems to refer to the manifestation of temporal re-
lations in language. Linguists often use the term diﬀerently, focusing on verb forms. Consider
a simple example.
(3.1) Jones runs.
(3.2) Jones ran.
In (3.1), runs is a present tense verb. Ran in (3.2) is past tense. There is there no future
tense rendition of the verb in English. In general, English is a two-tense language. The two
tenses are past and present. There is no future tense.
(3.3) Jones will run.
It is tempting to think that (3.3) is in the future tense, but there is no future tense modi-
ﬁcation of the main verb. So-called future tense in English is not grammatically analogous
to past and present tense. Rather, futurity is expressed with modal auxiliary verbs like will.
Compare (3.3) with:
(3.4) Jones should run.
(3.5) Jones can run.
(3.6) Jones must run.
Should, can, and must are all grammatically modal. Grammatically (if not also philosophi-
cally), will is also modal. This simple fact is often ignored, or perhaps swept under the rug,
in most philosophical literature. Indeed, many philosophers use temporal logic and tense
logic interchangeably. It is not tense logic that philosophers and logicians are particularly
concerned with; for they largely focus on how to account for the future using grammatically
modal terms like will. Rather, these scholars are interested in a logic of time, preferably one
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that accords well with natural language usage, avoids disastrous metaphysical consequences,
accounts for scientiﬁc and other applications, and so forth.
Acknowledging the grammatical modality of will may be an important step towards
resolving philosophical issues surrounding how to represent temporal relations involving the
future. Will, although grammatically modal, has some characteristics that diﬀerentiate it
from other grammatical modalities. One such candidate is will-not commutativity, discussed
in Sections 6.3.1 and 7.3.1.
Semantically, will has several dimensions and senses. Only a rudimentary, bleached
sense is inspected within this project. Other content of will is mentioned here for two
reasons. The ﬁrst reason is to shed light on the bleached content by way of contrast. The
second goal is to point towards additional criteria of adequacy for the analysis of this essay.
A good analysis of bleached will should be compatible with and perhaps generalize to other
senses of the term, if possible.
Often, will expresses something like determination or intention.
(3.7) I will win the contest although the odds are against me.
In (3.7), will expresses (among other things) the speaker's determination or intention to
win the contest. Notice that the speaker's expression of determination runs counter to her
perceived small likelihood that the speaker will in fact win. One might even interpret this
use of the odds are against me as conveying something like there are signiﬁcant obstacles,
I will not win without great determination and eﬀort, but I am likely to win with enough
determination and eﬀort. In that case, the speaker uses (3.7) to proclaim her intention to
put forth the determination and eﬀort necessary for her to win.
Compare (3.7) to:
(3.8) I will win the contest although it is impossible for me to do so.
Although (3.7) is acceptable, (3.8) is self-contradictory. The speaker may again be expressing
determination to win the contest, but such intention presupposes the ability, or at least the
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perceived ability, to accomplish the goal. Nothing impossible will ever be. Thus, insofar as
will is about determination or intention, will involves certain assumptions about the future
or possible future. If those assumptions are denied, determination seems absurd.
Will often has probabilistic content. For instance,
(3.9) The incumbent mayor will win the election.
As the philosophical literature has shown, there are several ways to interpret probabilities:
as frequencies, as subjective estimates, as objective mechanisms, to mention a few inﬂuential
views. That debate is beyond this analysis. One can in any case observe that will, taken
probabilistically, is compatible with might not, even under open futurism.1 This is not to
say that (3.9) would not become false should the incumbent lose the election, but such issues
can be handled using shifts in context or temporal standpoint, discussed in Section 3.4.
The bleached content of will, the sense inspected in this essay, does not immediately
accommodate either determination/intention or probabilities. Nevertheless, bleached will
should be both compatible with determination content and generalizable to encompass prob-
abilities. Bleached will itself is diﬃcult to isolate without begging the question in favor of
one theory or another. One of the tasks of this project is to analyze diﬀerent ways of expli-
cating bleached will. Those theories were brieﬂy introduced in Section 2.6 and are given a
more detailed treatment in Part II.
3.2 Future Excluded Middles
The law of excluded middle (LEM) is one of the cornerstones of classical logic. The rule
may be stated as follows.
law of excluded middle (LEM) For any proposition, φ, φ ∨ ¬φ is valid. That is,
⊧ φ ∨ ¬φ
1Cf. Section 7.2.1.
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LEM is typically associated with its metatheoretic compatriot, the principle of bivalence,
which asserts that every proposition is either true or false.2 LEM and bivalence are equivalent
in every system presented here except one. LEM is valid in supervaluationism, but bivalence
does not hold in that system.
If LEM is valid and the future is unbounded, then LEM instances will hold. (In fact,
they will always hold.)
weak future law of excluded middle (W-FLEM) For any proposition, φ, φ ∨ ¬φ will
be true. With some symbols,
⊧ will:(φ ∨ ¬φ)
For example,
(3.10) Jones will either have coﬀee or not.
or the logically equivalent yet somewhat more pedantic:
(3.11) It will be the case that either Jones has coﬀee or she does not.
W-FLEM is closely related to another principle, also closely linked to LEM.
medium future law of excluded middle (M-FLEM) For any φ representing a propo-
sition,
⊧ (will:φ ∨ ¬will:φ)
where will has higher precedence than ∨. For example:
(3.12) Jones will have coﬀee or it is not the case that she will have coﬀee.
M-FLEM is a particular case of LEM. W-FLEM is nearly always equivalent to M-FLEM.
There is only one system discussed in this essay in which M-FLEM is stronger thanW-FLEM,
2For a description of LEM and bivalence in the context of temporal logic, see [Lucas(1989)], pp. 72–8.
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a non-bivalent variety of open futurism. Outside of discussing that system, W-FLEM and
M-FLEM are here treated as equivalent principles.
(3.10)(3.12) are relatively innocuous given LEM. True futurists and open futurists who
assent to LEM and bivalence agree on W-FLEM and M-FLEM. There is, however, contention
about a stronger principle:
strong future law of excluded middle (S-FLEM) For any φ representing a proposi-
tion,
⊧ (will:φ ∨ will:¬φ)
Again, will is understood with smaller scope that ∨. Notice that in S-FLEM, ¬ has
smaller score than will in the right disjunct; but in M-FLEM, ¬ has larger scope than will.
That is the only diﬀerence between M-FLEM and S-FLEM. Here is an instance of S-FLEM.
(3.13) Jones will have coﬀee or she will not have coﬀee.
Typical English usage indicates that the disjuncts of M-FLEM and S-FLEM instances
are about the same time or interval unless otherwise speciﬁed. For instance, the disjuncts
of (3.13) are presumably about the same time or interval, where this time or interval can
be designated by the context in which the statement occurs. Speakers do not assume that
the ﬁrst disjunct might be about, say, this afternoon, while the second might be about next
Thursday.3
LEM is neither suﬃcient nor necessary for S-FLEM. S-FLEM therefore may not be as
logically evident as W-FLEM and M-FLEM. That said, friends of S-FLEM (true futurists and
supervaluationists) contend that their principle is linguistically accurate and fruitful both
within and outside of philosophy.4 5 According to true futurists and supervaluationists, such
considerations warrant accepting S-FLEM as a logical rule.
3This issue is addressed formally in Section 8.1.3.
4See, for instance, [Hasle and Øhrstrøm(2004)].
5Some reasons for accepting S-FLEM’s validity are given in Section 6.3.1.
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English speakers often use instances of W-FLEM, like (3.10) and (3.11), interchangeably
with corresponding instances of S-FLEM, like (3.13). The two types of sentences are never-
theless quite diﬀerent. Disjunction (∨) is the main operator in M-FLEM and S-FLEM, but
will is the main operator in W-FLEM. The distinction between W-FLEM, M-FLEM, and
S-FLEM is further evidenced by the grammatical modality of will and other future desig-
nators in English. Section 3.3 clariﬁes the distinction between instances of W-FLEM and
those of S-FLEM for the interested reader.
3.3 Identifying Instances of W-FLEM and S-FLEM
An understanding of grammatical modalities, modal auxiliary verbs, is suﬃcient for dis-
tinguishing instances of W-FLEM from those of S-FLEM. Nevertheless, some readers may be
interested in clarifying the diﬀerences between the two types of propositions. In this section,
a method for identifying corresponding instances of W-FLEM and S-FLEM is applied to a
couple of simple examples.
The ﬁrst order of business is to show that (3.13) is deﬁnitely an instance of S-FLEM,
not W-FLEM. Grammatically, conjunctions and disjunctions are very similar in English.
Indeed, linguists use conjunctions both for what philosophers call conjunctions (linguistic
entities whose main connective maps to ∧) and for disjunctions (linguistic entities whose
main connective maps to ∨). The procedure given here for identifying (3.13) and other
instances of W-FLEM as such relies on the assumption that conjunctions and disjunctions
are grammatically analogous.
Deﬁne:
(3.14) c ∶= Jones is having coﬀee.
(3.15) b ∶= Jones is having biscuits.
Start with a simple, relatively innocuous case. Consider:
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(3.16) Jones will have coﬀee and she will have biscuits.
(3.17) will:c ∧ will:b
(3.18) will:(c ∧ b)
Does (3.16) amount to (3.17) or (3.18)? Additional information may be appended to (3.16),
yielding:
(3.19) Jones will have coﬀee and she will have biscuits, but not at the same time.
Using metric future operators, (3.19) can be represented as:
(3.20) will-in-t1-units:c ∧ will-in-t2-units:b ∧ t1 ≠ t2.
Just as (3.16) is adjusted to yield (3.19), (3.17) can be modiﬁed to produce (3.20). (3.19)
requires two future operators in order to represent that Jones' coﬀee-having and her biscuit-
having occur at diﬀerent times. (3.18) has just one future operator and implies that Jones
will have coﬀee and biscuits simultaneously. Thus, (3.18) cannot be morphed to represent
(3.19). In fact, (3.18) is outright inconsistent with (3.19). Uniformly interpreting (3.16)
therefore requires (3.17), not (3.18).
The next example is a step closer to (3.13).
(3.21) Jones will have coﬀee and she will not have coﬀee.
(3.22) will:c ∧ will:¬c
(3.23) will:(c ∧ ¬c)
Observe that (3.21) is self-contradictory given that the two events in the proposition
Jones' having coﬀee and her doing otherwiseoccur at the same time. That is, the two
instances of will are about the same time. The absurdity is reﬂected in both candidate
interpretations, (3.22) and (3.23). Assuming the law of non-contradiction, (3.23) cannot
be true. (3.22) is also impossible by non-contradiciton, provided that the two temporal
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operators are about the same time. This last supposition, that the two temporal operators
are about the same time, can be derived from something like conversational implicature; but
the assumption is not an essential part of (3.22) itself. Additional information can nullify
the assumption and make distinct times salient. (3.21) can be modiﬁed to:
(3.24) Jones will have coﬀee and she will not have coﬀee, but not at the same time.
(3.24) is similar to (3.19). (3.24) can only be represented by a modiﬁcation of (3.22) like
(3.25) will-in-t1-units:c ∧ will-in-t2-units:¬c ∧ t1 ≠ t2.
(3.23) cannot be adjusted to represent (3.24). (3.24) requires two temporal operators to
account for the fact that the two events occur at distinct times. As such, a uniform inter-
pretation of (3.19) requires (3.22), not (3.23).
Recall the initial question, Which of the following does (3.13) amount to?
(3.26) will:c ∨ will:¬c [an instance of S-FLEM]
(3.27) will:(c ∨ ¬c) [an instance of W-FLEM]
Conjunctions and disjunctions are grammatically similar. Except that (3.21) is a conjunction
while (3.13) is a disjunction, the two propositions are the same. Therefore, since (3.21)
amounts to (3.22), (3.13) should be interpreted as (3.26), not (3.27).
Roughly the same procedure can be used to mark instances of W-FLEM, like (3.10) and
(3.11). As above, consider an independent case for clariﬁcation.
(3.28) Jones will have coﬀee and biscuits.
(3.29) It will be the case that Jones has coﬀee and she has biscuits.
(3.28) and (3.29) should be represented as (3.18), not (3.17). To see why, append extra
information to (3.28) and (3.29) as follows.
(3.30) Jones will have coﬀee and biscuits, but not at the same time.
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(3.31) It will be the case that Jones has coﬀee and she has biscuits, but not at the
same time.
(3.30) and (3.31) are self-contradictory,6 for (3.28) and (3.29) imply that there is a time at
which Jones is having both coﬀee and biscuits. Contrast (3.24) with (3.30) and (3.31). Only
(3.24) is consistent.
(3.32) will-in-t-units:(c ∧ b) ∧ t ≠ t
(3.32) is therefore the correct interpretation of (3.30) and (3.31). As such, (3.18) rather than
(3.17) is the right depiction of (3.28) and (3.29). Moving a step closer to (3.10) and (3.11),
consider:
(3.33) Jones will have coﬀee and not have coﬀee.
(3.34) It will be the case that Jones has coﬀee and she does not.
(3.33) and (3.34) are self-contradictory. These sentences may be appended as follows.
(3.35) Jones will have coﬀee and not have coﬀee, but not at the same time.
(3.36) It will be the case that Jones has coﬀee and she does not, but not at the same
time.
Recall that appending the same information to (3.21), forming (3.24), yields a proposition
that is not self-contradictory. In that case, the appended information makes salient two
temporal operators picking out distinct times. This is not so for (3.35) and (3.36), which
remain self-contradictory despite the change because there is only one temporal operator.
The correct representation of those sentences is therefore:
(3.37) will-in-t-units:(c ∧ ¬c) ∧ t ≠ t
6The result assumes that and is interpreted as the unordered conjunction, ∧, not something like and then.
An example of and representing and then is Jones ate breakfast and left to work, in which case the and then
interpretation makes the most sense.
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Thus, a uniﬁed approach requires that (3.33) and (3.34) are represented by (3.23) instead of
(3.22). The grammatical similarity of conjunctions and disjunctions yields that (3.10) and
(3.11) should be represented by (3.27), not (3.26). That is, (3.10) and (3.11) are instances
of W-FLEM rather than S-FLEM.
3.4 Temporal Standpoints and Standpoint Inheritance
This section introduces temporal standpoints and the theory of standpoint inheritance
here used to represent standpoints. The emphasis at this point is on describing tempo-
ral standpoints, providing a brief history, and explaining the basics of tree-pruning and
standpoint inheritance. What cannot be done in this section is address problems for speciﬁc
theories. Those issues are mentioned here but not explained. Without going into more depth
on particular theories, one cannot see how they fail and how exactly standpoint inheritance
is supposed to help.
Suppose that Jones drank coﬀee. Yesterday, Smith claimed that Jones would drink coﬀee.
This arrangement, illustrated in Figure 3.4.1, renders the following true:
(3.38) Smith correctly predicted that Jones would drink coﬀee.
It is also true that:
(3.39) Had Jones not drunk coﬀee, Smith's prediction would have been incorrect.
Theists may also assent to the following:
(3.40) God believed that Jones would drink coﬀee.
(3.41) Had Jones not drunk coﬀee, God would have believed that Jones would not
drink coﬀee.
Traditional theories have diﬃculty with many of the preceding statements. For instance,
(3.38), which depends on:
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correct
Smith
incorrect
Figure 3.4.1: Smith predicts that Jones will drink coﬀee. Given that Jones is drinking coﬀee,
Smith's prediction was correct. Given that Jones has not drunk coﬀee, Smith's prediction
was incorrect.
(3.42) Jones was going to drink coﬀee
(3.43) was:will:coﬀee
Traditional branching time logics switch perspectives in the middle of (3.43), between was
and will. The mechanics of the change in perspective are given in more detail below. It will
be seen that true futurism renders (3.42) and hence (3.38) true even from the counterfactual
perspective in which Jones did not drink coﬀee, making (3.39) and (3.41) false.7 Traditional
open futurism makes (3.42) and hence (3.38) untrue, although such statements appear true.8
To inspect and account for statements like (3.38)(3.43) in branching time systems, one
can utilize the notion of temporal standpoints. A temporal standpoint is a moment repre-
senting perspective in time.
The importance of temporal standpoints is not a new discovery although analyses have
developed only slowly. In 1947, Hans Reichenbach provided an insightful analysis diﬀeren-
tiating between not only the time at which a temporal statement is made (S) and the time
when the proposition aﬀected by a temporal operator is evaluated (E), but also a point of
reference (R) that may diﬀer from the other two contexts.9 Consider two examples.
(3.44) Jones drank coﬀee. (simple past)
7See Section 6.3.3.
8See Section 7.3.2.
9[Reichenbach(1947)]
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Figure 3.4.2: Reichenbach's standpoints. (a) Jones drank coﬀee. (b) Jones has drunk coﬀee.
(3.45) Jones has drunk coﬀee. (present perfect)
In (3.44), the statement is given now (S); but both the time of reference (R) and the
time of evaluation (E) are in the past. In (3.45), both S and R are present, while only E is
in the past. This scenario is depicted in Figure 3.4.2.
Unfortunately, Reichenbach's work has been underutilized by logicians working with tem-
poral systems. Prior says that it is
[...] unnecessary and misleading to make such a sharp distinction between the
point or points of reference and the point of speech; the point of speech is just the
ﬁrst point of reference. [...] This makes pastness and futurity always relative to
some point of referencemaybe the ﬁrst one (i.e. the point of speech) or maybe
some other. Because Reichenbach's analysis fell short of this generalization, it
was in some ways a hindrance rather than a help to the construction of a logic of
tenses; at all events, no such logic could get going until this generalization had
been made.10
Even if Reichenbach's analysis is not itself as general as a temporal logic, some of his obser-
vations can be integrated into a more general system. Ironically, temporal standpoints are
especially important to Priorian branching time systems.
Temporal standpoints and related notions have made appearances in the literature since
Prior. In his seminal 1970 article introducing supervaluationist temporal logic, Richmond
Thomason developed a little bit of semantics leaning towards a theory of temporal stand-
points.11 Ultimately, he utilized his observations to create a temporal rendition of supervalu-
ationism, not accommodate temporal standpoints. Later, in 1989, John Lucas acknowledged
10[Prior(1967)], p. 13
11[Thomason(1970)], §3–4
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the importance of Reichenbach's proposal and set up some machinery to represent temporal
standpoints, but standpoints were not adequately built into the logic Lucas constructed and
their ramiﬁcations for other important systems were unmentioned.12 Recent work on rela-
tivism acknowledged something like temporal standpoints in the context of two-dimensional
systems.13 These studies typically focused on issues apart from temporal logic, like whether
or not a particular sandwich is tasty and to whom. A theory of temporal standpoints has
yet to be satisfactorily applied to branching time semantics.
This project utilizes Reichenbach's observations and integrates them into the temporal
logics developed here, enabling those systems to better handle statements like (3.38) and
(3.39). This task is accomplished in more detail for particular views in their respective
chapters and formally in Section 8.3. The remainder of the current section provides a more
general and less technical explanation of the logic of temporal standpoints.
In modal and temporal logics, one (metaphorically) hops from moment to moment (or
world to world) in order to evaluate propositions. For example, in order to evaluate whether
or not (3.44) is true today, one must (metaphorically, in the model) step back to yesterday
to see whether or not Jones drank coﬀee. If she did, the proposition is true; otherwise, it is
false.
Recall that necessity per accidens involves changes associated with a certain kind of
modality, here called ATC (all-things-considered) modality. Yesterday, Jones' coﬀee-drinking
may have been contingent; but today it is resolved that she drank coﬀee yesterday. ATC
possibility changes over time.
The term temporal standpoint is supposed to conjure images of how someone would view
the world from a particular moment. The past is unalterable from that standpoint, but the
future may be open. A temporal standpoint designates a part of the great tree of possible
moments, the part containing that standpoint's past and possible future.
12[Lucas(1989)]
13These systems have a world parameter and a time parameter. See [MacFarlane(2008),
MacFarlane(2012)].
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Figure 3.4.3: Standpoint tree pruning. The standpoint (s), analogous to Reichenbach's
reference point (R), may occupy various positions in the ATC modality tree. Each standpoint
designates a subtree. The standpoint may be distinction from both the moment at which
truth value is assigned and those at which sub-propositions are evaluated.
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The structure of ATC possibility is tree-like. Over time, options (branches) that were
once accessible are no longer so. Jones might not have drunk coﬀee, but that is no longer
an option given that she drank coﬀee. A given tree eﬀectively shrinks as time passes, as
depicted in Figure 3.4.3. In typical branching time systems, this pruning only occurs with
respect to points at which propositions are evaluated, for those points function as successive
standpoints. Standpoint inheritance generalizes this notion, introducing a standpoint pa-
rameter by which a proposition can receive a truth value at one moment but utilize another
moment as a standpoint while a third moment may serve as a point of evaluation, just as
Reichenbach proposed. Notice that from a given standpoint, the past is linear. This fact
ensures that whatever is was going to be.
True futurism (TF) eﬀectively designates timelines, so-called thin red lines, across the
underlying tree structure. In this case, temporal standpoints pertain to the relationships
between those timelines in addition to the underlying tree structure. Temporal standpoints
are of little help to TF otherwise.
Recall (3.44) and (3.45). In the ﬁrst case, the standpoint R is contemporaneous with
E; in the second case, R is instead contemporaneous with S. Generally, respective trees
designated by various standpoints might be quite diﬀerent in the context of a branching
time semantics (or any system of representing ATC modality), as indicated in Figure 3.4.3.
A diﬀerence in moment-speciﬁc trees occurs whenever the earlier standpoint has access to a
node that the later standpoint does not; that is, whenever future-contingency is involved.
Suppose that Jones drank coﬀee but it was not inevitable that she would drink coﬀee.
Figure 3.4.4 illustrates the scenario for open futurism. Recall (3.42) and (3.43) (was: will:
coﬀee). The initial standpoint of (3.42) is this moment, a today-moment in which Jones
drank coﬀee. The corresponding subtree is represented in Figure 3.4.4 (a). The outer was
of (3.42) projects the point of evaluation to a past moment, labeled p in Figure 3.4.4. The
question is, what is the standpoint of the interior temporal statement:
(3.46) will:coﬀee
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Figure 3.4.4: Coﬀee with standpoints and open futurism. (a) illustrates the subtree with
the standpoint before Jones drank coﬀee and her coﬀee-drinking is still future-contingent.
That subtree contains the moment at which Jones does not drink coﬀee. (b) illustrates the
subtree from todays standpoint in which Jones is drinking or just drank coﬀee. That subtree
does not contain the node at which Jones did not drink coﬀee. In (c), the standpoint is
the node in which Jones did not drink coﬀee. The subtree does not include the the node in
which Jones drank coﬀee.
Traditional temporal logics treat (3.46) as if the standpoint were the last point of evaluation,
namely, the past moment before Jones drank coﬀee. The corresponding subtree is depicted
in Figure 3.4.4 (a). Under OF, (3.46) is not true from that earlier standpoint. Thus, (3.42)
is not true from the standpoint shown in Figure 3.4.4 (b).
TF suﬀers from a related diﬃculty. In the counterfactual scenario in which Jones did not
drink coﬀee, (3.42) turns out true although Jones was not going to drink coﬀee given that
she did not. Again, the outer was shifts the point of evaluation to before Jones drank coﬀee.
The standpoint follows. Since Jones actually drank coﬀee, (3.46) is true when evaluated
from the past standpoint.
All traditional branching time logics switch standpoints in the middle of (3.42), yielding
similar issues for of those theories. The theory-speciﬁc issues described above and are dis-
cussed further once particular theories have been introduced in more detail.14 Suﬃce it to
say for now that all major views miss (3.38), (3.39), or both. Such analyses are untenable.
The right answer is achieved when the standpoint of (3.46) is not (3.43)'s point of evaluation,
node p, but (3.43)'s standpoint. The standpoint should remain as in Figure 3.4.4 (b) when
evaluating the sub-proposition (3.46), not switch to node p as shown in Figure 3.4.4 (a).
14For open futurism, see Section 7.3.2. Generating the problem forTF requires the initial point of utterance
to be counterfactual. See Section 6.3.2
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There is no need to abandon the initial standpoint when moving from the outer statement,
(3.43), to the inner statement, (3.46). Traditional theories eﬀectively change standpoints
wantonly, leading to mistaken accounts of propositions like (3.43).
English no doubt allows many ways to aﬀect standpoints. The simpliﬁed mechanism
given here may be called standpoint inheritance. OF uses the ATC possibility tree to
account for temporal statements, so standpoints pertain to that tree. TF employs timelines
overlaying the tree to handle temporal statements. In that case, standpoints must aﬀect
the relations between those timelines. Standpoint inheritance is fundamentally the same for
both OF and TF despite the fact that those views use diﬀerent temporal relations.
Standpoint inheritance divides operators into two categories. The ﬁrst category includes
those operators that use moment-speciﬁc accessibility relations. Temporal operators (like
will, was, will-always, and was-always) are standpoint-sensitive. The speciﬁc temporal rela-
tion used by an operatora subtree in the case of OF and a timeline in the case of TFis
designated by a standpoint. Operators that are not standpoint-sensitive still transmit stand-
points to sub-propositions. The rule for standpoint transfer is:
(3.47) Only change standpoint when absolutely necessarywhen evaluation is only
possible by shifting standpoint.
For example, given that Jones drank coﬀee,
(3.48) Had Jones not drunk coﬀee ...
requires a standpoint shift. Without changing standpoints, the initial standpoint at which
Jones drank coﬀee combined with the counterfactual clause by which Jones did not drink
coﬀee yields that Jones both did and did not drink coﬀee, which is absurd. In terms of
Figure 3.4.4, the inconsistency is represented by the fact that the non-coﬀee node is not
on the subtree of Figure 3.4.4 (a). Meaningful evaluation is impossible until this conﬂict is
resolved, which can be accomplished by switching the standpoint to a counterfactual node.15
15Technically, there may be a whole collection of such counterfactual nodes.
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The result of the standpoint shift is illustrated in Figure 3.4.4 (c). Of course, counterfactual
clauses serve this kind of node-switching function by default, but there are other ways to
force a standpoint shift. As an example,
(3.49) Jones was inevitably going to drink coﬀee
is not true. The statement is not true because
(3.50) Jones might not have drunk coﬀee.
(3.50) holds because there is a today-momentthe same counterfactual node picked out by
(3.48)in which Jones did not drink coﬀee. As above, evaluations at that node require a
standpoint shift. Granting explosion,16 the following would hold without a standpoint shift:
(3.51) It was inevitably going to be the case that either Jones drank coﬀee coﬀee or
carnivorous elves are attacking Jerusalem.
(was:will-inevitably:(coﬀee ∨ elfAttack))
The assumption that Jones drank coﬀee yields absurdity when considering a node at which
Jones is not drinking coﬀee. So, at the inner points of evaluation (for will-inevitably), either
Jones drank coﬀee or there is an absurdity. The absurdity disappears with a switch in
standpoint, removing the problematic hypothesis that Jones is drinking coﬀee.
In traditional branching time systems, standpoints eﬀectively shift to the point of evalu-
ation. This tactic avoids statements like (3.51), yet it was mentioned at the beginning of this
section that traditional systems fail to accommodate a number of other important results.
The rule (3.47) is general and implements standpoint shifts as needed, but does so more
conservatively than traditional branching time semantics to handle statements like (3.42).
It may also be argued that (3.47) accords with the psychology of ordinary speech. Speakers
do not seem to switch perspectives as long as the one they are using works just ﬁne.
16Explosion aside, this is not an appropriate place to find a truth glut.
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Several results of accounting for temporal standpoints are view-speciﬁc. Those points are
reserved for Part II. A few elementary results common to all views are given here. Suppose
again that Jones is drinking coﬀee, that she might not have been drinking coﬀee, and that
Smith predicted that she would drink coﬀee. Whether or not this coﬀee-drinking scenario is
counterfactual, standpoint inheritance yields correct results for the following statements.
(3.52) True: Jones was going to drink coﬀee. (was: will: coﬀee)
(3.53) False: Jones was inevitably going to drink coﬀee. (was: will-inevitably: coﬀee)
(3.54) True: Jones might not have drunk coﬀee. (was: possibly: ¬coﬀee)
(3.55) True: Smith correctly predicted that Jones would drink coﬀee.
(3.56) True: Had Jones not drunk coﬀee, Smith's prediction would have been incor-
rect.
(3.57) True: God believed that Jones was going to drink coﬀee.
It is not entirely clear how to handle (3.41). From the counterfactual standpoint at which
Jones did not drink coﬀee, the following holds:
(3.58) Jones was going to not drink coﬀee. (was: will: ¬coﬀee)
God believes all and only truths. So the following holds from that same counterfactual
standpoint:
(3.59) God believes that Jones was going to not drink coﬀee.
(God believes: was: will: ¬coﬀee)
(3.41) is more like the subtly diﬀerent:
(3.60) God believed that Jones would not drink coﬀee.
(was: God believes: will: ¬coﬀee)
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(3.59) pertains to God's current beliefs. (3.41) and (3.60), meanwhile, has to do with God's
past beliefs taken from the current standpoint. Ockhamists want statements like (3.41) and
(3.60) to be true while open theists may reject those statements.
BeliefsGod's, Smith's, or anyone else'sare formed with respect to a given perspective
or standpoint. This is usually not a diﬃculty. God's beliefs are peculiar because they are
truth-tracking. Taken simply, omniscience is the characteristic of believing all and only
truths. One can ﬁnd out what God believes at this or that node by looking at what is true
at that node. Considerations leading to standpoint inheritance indicate that there is more
going on than truth at a node. There is truth at a node from a standpoint. That is why
(3.46) varies in truth depending on whether or not it is in the context of (3.43). Likewise
from the standpoint at which Jones did not drink coﬀee. (3.58) holds. The inner statement:
(3.61) Jones will not drink coﬀee. (will: ¬coﬀee)
inherits the standpoint of the outer was, namely, the scenario in which Jones did not drink
coﬀee. (3.61) is true at the past node from the standpoint, so (3.58) is true. Consider the
corresponding interior statement of (3.60):
(3.62) God believes that Jones will not drink coﬀee. (God believes: will: ¬coﬀee)
God did not form his belief with respect to the node in which Jones did not drink coﬀee. On
true futurism, that node is counterfactual; so, if anything, he believes that Jones will have
coﬀee. God formed his belief from the perspective of that past node, before Jones skipped
the coﬀee.
Open futurists will be happy with that result. Those who want God's beliefs to be
properly soft need (3.62) to be true in (3.60) just as (3.61) holds in (3.58). Thus, open
theists aﬃrm while Ockhamists deny:
(3.63) From any standpoint, God's beliefs at a moment are evaluated with that mo-
ment as the standpoint.
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(3.63) seems plausible in branching time systems. The topic will be discussed further when
dealing with open- and true futurism in particular.
Even without going into much detail about particular views, it is already evident that
something like temporal standpoints must be considered to account for many temporal state-
ments. The theory of standpoint inheritance proposed here is very general, applying to all
major varieties of branching time systems. In addition to its generality and fruitfulness,
standpoint inheritance is simple and intuitive. The theory is simple because it can be en-
capsulated by designating standpoint-sensitive (in this case, just temporal) operators and
stipulating that one should only change standpoints when necessary. Traditional branching
time logics eﬀectively change standpoints too frequently, although these theories do not in-
corporate a standpoint parameter. Standpoint inheritance intuitively accords with ordinary
speech granting that speakers do not switch perspectives as long as the ones they are us-
ing work just ﬁne. Using standpoint inheritance to account for temporal standpoints is an
important part of this project and is developed more rigorously in later chapters.
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Chapter 4
Freedom and Fatalism
One pervasive reason for rejecting logical fatalism is that fatalism should not follow merely
from an analysis of will. That is, if an account of will is incompatible with future-contingency,
then that account is mistaken. Sometimes, concerns about freedom and responsibility also
motivate scholars to care about fatalism. There are notions of accountability, especially
those held by many contemporary theists, requiring that actions of persons are neither fated
nor determined. Indeed, freedom is presupposed by formal and informal analyses of how
we should act. Even freedom/determinism compatibilists must strive to secure coherent
decision-making procedures although these compatibilists might not worry that fatalism
threatens accountability.
Section 4.1 individuates libertarian freedom and epistemic freedom. Libertarian freedom
requires contingency and is therefore incompatible with fatalism and determinism. Contin-
gency is irrelevant to epistemic freedom. Section 4.2 contains a discussion about how freedom
is important to responsibility and decision-making procedures. While physical determinism
might not worry freedom/determinism compatibilists, logical fatalism still poses signiﬁcant
diﬃculties. Compatibilism, if true, grants accountability independently of determinism or
fatalism. Nevertheless, compatibilism requires that there is a consistent process by which
agents may decide what to do, and that consistency is what logical fatalism threatens.
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Two related challenges are the problems of logical and theological fatalism. Indeed, many
scholars think that the two issues are fundamentally the same. The consensus is that logical
fatalism, the position that the semantics of time renders a particular future unavoidable,
does not hold. Even if some sort of determinism or fatalism obtains, the ﬁxity of the future
does stem from mere temporal semantics. Not all thinkers, however, reject the position that
God's infallible, comprehensive foreknowledge (or eternal apprehension of all events) leads
to a fatalism similar to the logical variety. A common tactic, and the one used in this essay,
is to argue for a particular solution to logical fatalism, then see whether theological fatalism
is avoidable under the proposal in question. Given the branching framework used here, the
way out of logical fatalism does not escape theological fatalism.
Sections 4.3 and 4.4 respectively inspect logical and theological fatalism in more detail,
sketching out arguments for those positions. The arguments given there are further clariﬁed
throughout this essay. Various ways of addressing those fatalisms are given. For logical
fatalism, the two responses emphasized here are true futurism and open futurism. True
futurists maintain that will is non-modal while open futurists hold that no particular future
will occur insofar as contingency is involved. Theists may either accept or reject theological
fatalism. Providentialists accept a stronger doctrine than theological fatalism, so the latter
may not be a concern for them. Many contemporary theists deny theological fatalism using
theistic eternalism, Ockhamism, or open theism. Theistic eternalism is the view that God is
outside of time. Ockhamism, in the sense used here (as in the future contingents literature),
draws from true futurism. Finally, open theists hold that God does not have comprehensive
foreknowledge when future contingents are involved.
4.1 Libertarian and Epistemic Freedom
Before discussing logical and theological fatalism, it is important to explain how freedom
comes into the picture. It is enough for this project that the reader understand that there is
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an important notion of freedom, typically dubbed libertarian freedom, entailing that there
are future contingents. Consider two well-known types of freedom. The ﬁrst is libertarian
freedom, which may be called freedom of action. The second is epistemic freedom, also
known as compatibilist1 freedom or freedom of will.
libertarian freedom a type of freedom by which it is possible for the freely acting agent
to do otherwise, perhaps with some other conditions.
epistemic freedom a type of freedom by which the freely acting agent does what s/he
elects to do, perhaps with some other conditions
John Locke provides an illustrative example distinguishing between libertarian freedom and
epistemic freedom:
[S]uppose a man be carried, whilst fast asleep, into a room where is a person he
longs to see and speak with; and be there locked fast in, beyond his power to get
out: he awakes, and is glad to ﬁnd himself in so desirable company, which he stays
willingly in, i.e. prefers his stay to going away. I ask, is not this stay voluntary?
I think nobody will doubt it: and yet, being locked fast in, it is evident he is not
at liberty not to stay, he has not freedom to be gone. So that liberty is not an
idea belonging to volition, or preferring; but to the person having the power of
doing, or forbearing to do, according as the mind shall choose or direct.2
The man in Locke's example does not have libertarian freedom. It is not possible for him
to leave the room. Since he cannot do otherwise than stay in the room, he lacks libertarian
freedom. The happy prisoner, as Locke points out, stays in the room by his own volition.
The man exercises his free will in the sense that he does what he wants to do. He has
epistemic freedom, as it is deﬁned above.
Libertarian freedom entails that some eventsin particular, some agents' actionsare
contingent. Recall from Section 2.4 that a future-contingent event is an event that, at some
point before the would-be time of the event, the event can occur and it can fail to occur. It is
1Compatibilist freedom is not compatibilist in the primary sense used in this essay, namely, the view
that God’s omniscience is compatible with freedom. Rather, compatibilist freedom is compatible with
determinism.
2[Locke(1690)], II.XXI.10
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Jones wants
coffee
(a)
Jones wants
coffee
(b)
Jones doesn't
want coffee
(c)
Figure 4.1.1: Libertarian and epistemic freedom. (a) Jones has libertarian and epistemic
freedom. (b) Jones has epistemic freedom, but not libertarian freedom. (c) Jones has neither
libertarian nor epistemic freedom.
necessary (although not suﬃcient) for libertarian freedom that there are future contingents,
for a freely acting agent can elect to perform the given action and s/he can also decide to
do otherwise. As such, libertarian freedom is at odds with fatalism.
To the contrary, epistemic freedom is independent of contingency and thus fatalism. An
agent with free will can do what s/he wants to do. The agent's actions or volitions might
be, on the one hand, free in the libertarian sense and they could be, on the other hand,
determined or fated. Thus, although libertarian freedom might be suﬃcient for epistemic
freedom (assuming that libertarian freedom requires that agents elect their own actions),
libertarian freedom is not necessary for epistemic freedom.3
The following examples may help illuminate the relationships between contingency, lib-
ertarian freedom, and epistemic freedom. The various cases are illustrated in Figure 4.1.1.
Suppose that Jones has libertarian freedom with respect to drinking coﬀee tomorrow.
She can drink coﬀee tomorrow and she can abstain from drinking coﬀee tomorrow; that is,
whether or not she drinks coﬀee tomorrow is a contingent matter depending on what Jones
elects to do. In this case, Jones has both libertarian and epistemic freedom. This situation
is depicted in Figure 4.1.1 (a).
3Epistemic freedom may be thought to include or constitute a belief on the part of the agent that s/he
is free, or at least a lack of certain belief regarding what s/he will do. In this case, it would be important
to know whether or not Locke’s prisoner believes he is imprisoned. No argument will be given here for or
against this view of epistemic freedom because the exact nature of freedom and its relationship to moral
responsibility are beyond the scope of this project.
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Next, consider a case in which Jones' coﬀee-drinking is determined independently by a
third party. In this scenario, Jones does not have libertarian freedom because her coﬀee-
drinking is not contingent. More information is required to determine whether or not Jones
has epistemic freedom. Jones has epistemic freedom if she wants to drink coﬀee, as in
Figure 4.1.1 (b). She can do what she wants to do in this case. As far as Jones is concerned,
it is as if there were no interfering third party.4 If the third party forces Jones to drink coﬀee
against her will, she lacks epistemic freedom. This case is shown in Figure 4.1.1 (c).
4.2 The Importance of Freedom
Many scholars are concerned with fatalism on account of its challenge to accountability.
Such worries are evident in the writing of many thinkers, like Prior. Libertarian freedom
requires that there are future contingents and is therefore contrary to fatalism. If fatalism
holds, then either moral responsibility is farcical or it does not require libertarian freedom
in the sense deﬁned here.
Compatibilists about freedom hold that libertarian freedom is not necessary for account-
ability, that responsibility and either fatalism or determinism are compatible. Accountability
itself need not serve as the primary reason for why logical fatalism, at least, should be avoided.
Even if the future is in fact determined or fated, it is epistemically indeterminate for agents
in that they do not know which future will come to pass. Agents use a decision procedure to
select one of various possible options. Decisions are made presupposing future-contingency
on an epistemic level. Logical fatalism threatens to render this picture incoherent by forcing
there to be only one possible option. If logical fatalism holds, then future-contingency is
inconsistent on any level, metaphysical or epistemic. So even freedom/determinism com-
patibilists must be concerned about fatalism for reasons pertaining to morality; if not for
accountability, then at least to ensure that there is a coherent decision-making process.
4This explanation is given for the sake of convenient illustration, serving the purpose of this essay. The
statement should not be mistaken for an adequate explication of epistemic freedom.
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The preceding concerns may be instantiated in several important theories. Adequately
representing libertarian freedom is crucial for decision theory, game theory, and mechanism
design. These systems presuppose indeterministic models in which agents can select one
of various courses of action. Such tools continue to prove their fruitfulness in individual
decision-making, analysis of social welfare, and other applications. The coherence of these
analyses should not be threatened simply by an inadequate representation of will.
4.3 Logical Fatalism
The problem of logical fatalism is one of many philosophical challenges dating back to
antiquity. Aristotle formulated the issue in On Interpretation 1.9. Here is a similar, more
compact rendition of the problem. Consider the following statements.
(4.1) Either there will be a sea battle tomorrow or there will not be a sea battle
tomorrow.
(4.2) Tomorrow's sea battle is future-contingent. That is, it might happen and it
might not.
Suppose that (4.1) is true. Without loss of generality5, suppose that there will be a sea battle
tomorrow. If there might not be a sea battle tomorrow, then it is false that there will be a
sea battle tomorrow (because should there not be a sea battle tomorrow, it would be false
that there will be one). Hence, it cannot be that the sea battle does not occur given that
it will. It follows that there must be a sea battle tomorrow. It is therefore either necessary
that the sea battle occur or necessary that it not occur. Thus, (4.2) is false.
Aspects of the preceding argument will be explicated and analyzed throughout this essay.
One facet of the argument that can be clariﬁed now is the type of modality involved in the
5Without loss of generality, WLOG for short, is an expression commonly used in demonstration. When
disjuncts are relevantly symmetric, there is little point in deriving analogous results from each because such
derivation amounts to recreating essentially the same proof multiple times. It is enough to show that a
conclusion follows without loss of generality from one disjunct. This subproof indicates that corresponding
results follow from the other disjuncts using subproofs correlating to the one given.
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argument and in (4.2). It was seen that all-things-considered (ATC) modality is what is
relevant to future contingency.6 Recall that ATC modality forms the tree structure under-
lying branching time systems. The argument for logical fatalism begins with instances of
S-FLEM7 like (4.1) and derives corresponding instances of ATC fatalism.
Below is a semi-formal version of the argument that will be discussed throughout this
essay. This version lacks formalizations of temporal and modal operators, which are included
in Chapter 8, but the formal structure is evident. Let s represent There is sea battle.
ArgLF Argument for Logical Fatalism (Generalizable)
(ArgLF.1) will:s ∨ will:¬s [premise, an instance of S-FLEM]
(ArgLF.2) will:s [WLOG assumption from (ArgLF.1)]
(ArgLF.3) If ATC-possibly:¬s, then ¬will:s [premise]
(ArgLF.4) ¬ATC-possibly:¬s [by (ArgLF.2) and (ArgLF.3)]
(ArgLF.5) ATC-necessarily:s [by (ArgLF.4), given that ¬possibly:¬s is equivalent to
necessarily:s]
(ArgLF.6) ATC-necessarily:s ∨ ATC-necessarily:¬s, and whichever is necessary corre-
sponds to what will be. [by (ArgLF.1), (ArgLF.2), and (ArgLF.5)]
If ArgLF or something like it is correct, then everything that will happen must happen.
Given that any given proposition either will be true or will not be true, as in (ArgLF.1),
there are no future contingents. This position is logical fatalism.8
An important way in which ArgLF diﬀers from some related arguments is that ArgLF
has no extraneous present-past-future hopping. There are a couple of reasons why one might
6See Chapter 2, especially Sections 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5.
7See Section 3.2 for more on S-FLEM.
8See Section 2.4 for specific definitions of future-contingency and logical fatalism.
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use present-past-future hops.9 First, the hops might bring out the role of the ﬁxedness
of the past. The ﬁxedness of the past is to some extent incorporated in ATC modality.10
Temporal standpoints also play a role in explicating the ﬁxedness of the past because the
ﬁxed past is standpoint-relative. Second, and not independently, past-present-future hops
can be used to substantiate (ArgLF.3). This is how Aristotle seemed to use such hops in
On Interpretation 1.9.
(ArgLF.3), which draws a connection between will and ATC necessity, warrants some
explanation and may even be the crux of ArgLF. A common intuition behind (ArgLF.3)
is that should there fail to be a sea battle, then it cannot have been the case that there was
going to be a sea battle. So it is impossible for the sea battle to not occur given that it will;
hence, (ArgLF.3). One of the primary tasks of this essay is to shed light on the relationship
(or lack thereof) between will and ATC necessity.
Aristotle and many others rejected logical fatalism. This type of response to logical
fatalism goes by various names, including Aristotelian, Peircean, and open futurist.
The latter term, designated by the acronym OF, will be used here. Friends of OF, including
(but hardly limited to) Prior and Belnap11, reject (ArgLF.1), the statement that either
there will be a sea battle or there will not be one, while aﬃrming (ArgLF.3), the premise
connecting will to ATC necessity. (ArgLF.1) is not an instance of the law of excluded
middle (LEM) due to the presence of future temporal operators, nor does (ArgLF.1) follow
from LEM. (ArgLF.1) is rather an instance of a stronger proposed truism, S-FLEM, for
Strong Future Law of Excluded Middle.12 OF is discussed further in Chapter 7.
S-FLEM does have some intuitive plausibility. Another inﬂuential response accepts S-
FLEM while rejecting the derivation of (ArgLF.5) from (ArgLF.2) on the grounds that
(ArgLF.3) is false. This true futurist (TF) solution, associated with medieval scholars like
9For a recent example, see Merricks’ Main Argument on p. 33 of [Merricks(2009)]. Pike’s classic argument
for theological fatalism, found in [Pike(1965)], also involves present-past-future hops. In this essay, see
especially the analysis in Sections 6.3.3.
10See Section 2.3.1.
11See [Prior(1967), Belnap and Green(1994), Belnap(2005)].
12See Section 3.2.
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William of Ockham and Richard of Lavenham, has a number of recent adherents, including
Peter Øhrstrøm and Alvin Plantinga.13 TF is the topic of Chapter 6.
A third response, supervaluationsim (Sup), avoids logical fatalism by rejecting (ArgLF.3),
as does TF. Sup in fact takes TF as a foundation, building a more complex logic from TF.
In this project, a new form of Sup will be developed based on OF.14 This OF-based Sup
opens the door for Sup to use the OF rejection of logical fatalism.
4.4 Theological Fatalism
Suppose that God exists and is omniscient. Since God is omniscient, he infallibly knows
all and only truths. Assume that God has infallible foreknowledge of all that will occur,
including knowledge of what people will choose to do in the future. God knows whether or
not Jones will drink coﬀee tomorrow, for example. Without loss of generality, suppose that
God knows that Jones will drink coﬀee. It follows that Jones will drink coﬀee tomorrow.
The next phase of the argument is like the case for logical fatalism. From Jones will drink
coﬀee, it is derived that Jones cannot not drink coﬀee, and hence Jones must drink coﬀee.
In general, no future actions are contingent.
Following is a more oﬃcial version of this argument for theological fatalism. Let j repre-
sent Jones has a cup of coﬀee.
ArgThF Argument for Theological Fatalism (Generalizable)
(ArgThF.1) For any proposition, φ, if God believes that φ, then φ. [premise: infallibility]
(ArgThF.2) For any proposition, φ, either God believes that will:φ or God believes that
will:¬φ. [premise: comprehensive foreknowledge]
(ArgThF.3) Either God believes that will:j or God believes that will:¬j. [by (ArgThF.2)]
13See [Øhrstrøm(1984), Plantinga(1986)]. Note that branching time semantics represent Øhrstrøm’s posi-
tion, but not Plantinga’s.
14See Section 7.2.3 and Section .
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(ArgThF.4) God believes that will:j. [WLOG assumption from (ArgThF.3)]
(ArgThF.5) will:j [by (ArgThF.1) and (ArgThF.4)]
(ArgThF.6) will:j ∨ will:¬j [by (ArgThF.3), (ArgThF.4), and (ArgThF.5)]
(ArgThF.7) ATC-necessarily:j ∨ ATC-necessarily:¬j, and whichever is necessary corre-
sponds to what God believes will be. [by (ArgThF.6) and ArgLF]
Libertarian freedom requires that some future actions are such that the actors can do
otherwise, and hence those actions are contingent. As with logical fatalism, it follows from
theological fatalism that no one is free in the libertarian sense. Many contemporary theists,
most notably Christians, Jews, and Muslims, insist that libertarian freedom is necessary for
responsibility. Responsibility, in turn, is necessary for Judgment, especially in Islam. For
Christians, that a person may be fated for salvation or damnation prior to existence strikes
many as absurd or unfair. Fatalism may thus pose a substantial threat to mainstream
theism. Many theists are freedom/foreknowledge incompatibilists, but there are important
exceptions and compatibilism does not directly conﬂict with theism.
Fatalism need not challenge theism generally, but only some now-popular types of theism.
Some Christian reformers, like Luther, reject libertarian freedom.15 Reformers like Luther
hold that belief in libertarian freedom is outright heretical, stemming from deep misunder-
standings of the Divine. Sects like traditional Lutheranism, Calvinism, and Presbyterianism
strive to account for predestination or providence, by which all events are determined by
God's Will. As a comparatively weaker position, theological fatalism arguably poses no
threat to belief systems already incorporating providentialism.
Another position that may render theism compatible with theological fatalism is free-
dom/determinism compatibilism. Freedom/determinism compatibilists hold that libertarian
freedom is not necessary for moral accountability. Although theists may turn to such an al-
ternative account of responsibility to reconcile fatalism (or determinism) with responsibility,
15See especially [Luther(1525)].
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logical fatalism is still a problem. As discussed in Section 4.2, there are other important
reasons why freedom/determinism compatibilists need to address fatalism, considerations
which hold just as well for theistic compatibilists. On an epistemic level, libertarian freedom
plays a crucial role in decision-making processes, both formally and informally. Although
freedom/determinism compatibilists may not rely on libertarian freedom for an account of
responsibility, they must ensure that libertarian freedom remains intact on an epistemic level
in order to retain formal accounts of decision-making processes.
ArgThF is closer to versions of the argument given by thinkers like Edwards and Prior.16
Philosophers in the freedom/foreknowledge literature (with some exceptions, especially re-
cently) tend to reject logical fatalism as true futurists (TF), denying (ArgLF.3). The infer-
ence from (ArgThF.6) to (ArgThF.7), which relies on (ArgLF.3), would be considered
unreasonable by those scholars. Incompatibilists in that tradition provide diﬀerent reasons
for accepting the incompatibility thesis that God's comprehensive, infallible foreknowledge
conﬂicts with libertarian freedom.17 As far as theological fatalism is concerned, the approach
taken here is to bring out concerns associated with ArgLF and show that both ArgLF and
ArgThF ought to be taken seriously. The argument for the thesis that TF still engenders
freedom/foreknowledge incompatibility is beyond this discussion.
There are three popular ways by which scholars reject theological fatalism: theistic eter-
nalism (ThEtrn), Ockhamism, and open theism. ThEtrn is the position that God is some-
how outside of time. The eternal God does not have foreknowledge per se, so (ArgThF.2) is
false. Many thinkers have argued either that ThEtrn is incoherent or that it fails to avoid
theological fatalism. Nevertheless, ThEtrn has been around for a long time, has impor-
tant connections to other facets of Western theism, and continues to have worthy advocates.
ThEtrn is the topic of Chapter 5.
Ockhamists may reject theological fatalism for other reasons. For this project, Ock-
hamism may be seen to have two main ingredients. The ﬁrst is TF. TF is often called
16[Prior(1967)]
17See, for instance, [Pike(1965)] and, more recently, [Hasker(2001), Cowan(2003)].
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Ockhamism in the future contingents literature, although the term is not used so liber-
ally in the freedom/foreknowledge literature. Some freedom/foreknowledge incompatibilists
adhere to TF but no incompatibilist is called an Ockhamist in that literature. TF is a
position by which S-FLEM is valid and a particular future will come to pass. The future is
speciﬁed by the thin red line in the future contingents literature and, equivalently, by com-
prehensive sets of soft facts in the freedom/foreknowledge literature. TF defeats ArgLF
and ArgThF by rejecting the connection between will and possibility/necessity given in
(ArgLF.3). TF is the topic of Chapter 6 and a critique of TF's response to fatalism is
given in Section 6.4. This project primarily emphasizes the ﬁrst tenet of Ockhamism.
The second facet of Ockhamism, the one emphasized in the freedom/foreknowledge lit-
erature, is the tenet that characterizations of God's past and present beliefs are themselves
soft facts. The softness of God's beliefs is required to track the true future. The second
tenet is required for the following commonly held thesis:
(4.3) For any proposition, φ, if φ, then God has always believed that φ.
(4.3), like (ArgThF.2), is a way of specifying comprehensive foreknowledge. (ArgThF.2)
is forwards-looking in the sense that it is about what God now believes about what will be.
(4.3) is backwards-looking since it emphasizes what God believed about what is now the case.
Standpoint inheritance clariﬁes what it is for God's beliefs to be soft and what accepting
comprehensive foreknowledge requires. This issues is discussed further in Section 6.3.4.
Another way to avoid theological fatalism is open theism (OT). OT amounts to a
rejection of the view that God has comprehensive foreknowledge of the future; that is,
(ArgThF.2). OT may be associated with true futurism, although it is increasingly popular
to derive OT from open futurism. Open theism is the topic of Section 7.2.4.
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Part II
True Futurism and Open Futurism
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Chapter 5
Theistic Eternalism
Theistic eternalism (ThEtrn) is a cluster of views by which God is outside of time,
eternal. ThEtrn has a long history in the Abrahamic religions and inﬂuences from classical
thought. Western scholarly work near the end of the twentieth century has often empha-
sized Boethius's contributions, to a point at which ThEtrn has been called Boethianism.
Despite the focus on Boethius, similar views were popular among other medieval scholars,
including Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas. The interested reader may ﬁnd a number of
survey articles discussing ThEtrn in the context of the freedom/foreknowledge problem;
for instance, [Helm(2010), Zagzebski(2011b)].
Section 5.1 describes some basics about temporal and atemporal existence. Only temporal
entities can hold properties with respect to times and only temporal entities can have certain
temporally relational properties. These facts introduce challenges to accounts of atemporal
entities. Such views must show how atemporal entities can have properties at all, and in
particular how atemporal entities can have properties corresponding to temporally relational
properties. Those issues are addressed by the end of Section 5.1.
Several varieties of ThEtrn have appeared over the centuries in which the view has been
around. Three such accounts are given in Section 5.2. The section concludes with discussions
of various criticisms that have heckled ThEtrn.
90
The punchline of the chapter is that ThEtrn entails true futurism, a fact brought out
in Section 5.3. Ontologically, God's direct apprehension or knowledge of events speciﬁes
an actual timeline. Semantically, although the eternal God directly apprehends or knows
about events as either present or atemporal, someone in time can truly say that God ap-
prehends/knows the future. Thus, since God apprehends/knows all and only truths, true
futurism follows from ThEtrn in both an ontological and a semantic sense.
5.1 Temporal and Atemporal Entities
This section provides a broad description of ThEtrn and how eternity diﬀers from
everlastingness. Section 5.1.1 points out that only temporal entities can have properties
at times and only those entities can have temporally relational properties. Section 5.1.2
describes the senses in which atemporal beings can have properties at all, and properties
that have something to do with time (including beliefs about what occurs when). Some
details of how ThEtrn addresses theological fatalism are covered in Section 5.1.3.
5.1.1 Temporal Existence
Familiar objects like Jones and her cup of coﬀee are in a sense temporal entities. Temporal
existence has both metaphysical implications and logical/linguistic facets. Two important
characteristics of temporal entities are that only temporal entities can hold properties at
times, and that only temporal entities can hold certain temporally relational properties. The
discussion here draws from the accounts of temporality/atemporality proposed by Friedrich
Schleiermacher and Nelson Pike.1
Many objects that exist can in some sense or other change over time, even coming in
and out of existence. For instance, Jones can change by becoming hyper after drinking a
1See [Schleiermacher(1968), Pike(1970)]. Schleiermacher and Pike emphasize temporal location and du-
ration. See [Schleiermacher(1968)], p. 203–5 and [Pike(1970)], p. 6–8.
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cup of coﬀee.2 Jones and other temporal entities hold properties with respect to time. For
any property, it makes sense to ask, When did Jones have that property, if ever? When
was she hyper? Perhaps this afternoon, perhaps always, perhaps never. The ability to have
properties with respect to times, whether or not those properties change, is characteristic of
temporal entities.
Some properties and relations involve more complex temporality. Suppose that Smith
believes that Jones will drink coﬀee tomorrow. Smith has a belief today, but the content
of that belief relates to another time, namely, tomorrow. Smith has a temporally relational
property, a characteristic involving a temporal relationship between the property holder and
a time. Tomorrow is the day after today. Smith's belief relates the current time to tomorrow.
Smith's having that belief is temporally relational because the time that the belief is about,
tomorrow, is speciﬁed relative to the time at which Smith holds the belief. If Smith holds
the belief on a Tuesday, the belief is about what Jones will do on Wednesday; if he3 holds the
belief on a Friday, the belief is about what Jones will do on Saturday; and so forth. Smith
must have the belief on some day if the belief is to make any sense because having a belief
like Smith's presupposes that Smith is in time. The tomorrow that the belief is about would
be underspeciﬁed if no day were given for tomorrow to be after. Such examples show that
only beings in time can have temporally relational properties or relations involving a now or
current time.
In slightly more formal terms, philosophers tend to explicate temporal statements using
either the A-theory, preferred in this analysis, or the B-theory, to use McTaggart's now-
standard terminology.4 Either approach may be used for this example. In A-theory terms,
one would use a metric temporal operator to express the content of Smith's belief, yielding:
(5.1) will (in one day): Jones drinks coﬀee.
2Endurantists and perdurantists explicate change in different ways, but those ontological differences are
unimportant for this part of the discussion. (Cf. [Rogers(2007)]) The exposition is given in endurantist
terms because that is the approach assumed in this project.
3Recall that for this project, Jones is female while Smith is male.
4[McTaggart(1908)]
92
Using the B-theory, the belief looks something like:
(5.2) Jones drinks coﬀee one day later than whatever today is.
Both the A-theoretic temporal operator and the B-theoretic later than are relational. Thus,
Smith's belief has relational content. The A-theoretic temporal operator, will, is inherently
relational. In this case, the later than has as one of its relata an indexical term (like now)
referring to the time at which Smith holds the belief. The relational content of Smith's belief
cannot be eliminated without changing the belief's content. For instance, Smith's belief may
be stated in absolute terms by specifying today's date, but that would be a diﬀerent belief
given that Smith does not require any information about the date to have the original belief.
That Smith has such a belief is a temporally relational property. It only makes sense to
ascribe this property to Smith because he is in time.
Not all temporally relational properties/relations require that all parties involved are in
time.5 The number 2 can be Jones's favorite number today even if 2 is not in time. Similarly,
Jones can love God today even if God is outside of time. That Jones loves God today requires
that Jones is in time, but it is not clear that God must also be in time. So atemporal entities
may play some roles in temporal properties and relations, but not others.6
Thus, two important characteristics of temporal entities are:
(5.3) Only temporal entities can hold properties at or with respect to times.
(5.4) Only temporal entities can hold certain temporally relational properties.
Some beings may come into existence and later cease to exist, but ﬁnitude is not necessary
for temporality. In principle, a temporal entity may have always existed or may henceforth
always exist. Its duration or temporal extension, in other words, can be unbounded from be-
low or above. A temporal being whose duration is unbounded in both directions is everlasting
5If holding a temporally relational property requires existence in time, then atemporal entities cannot
hold any temporally relational properties. See also the discussion in Section 5.2.2.
6This observation is related the the distinction between real and apparent change. See [Geach(1969)], p.
71 and [Kenny(1979)], p. 40–4.
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or sempiternal.7 God is everlasting provided that he exists in time.
Another characteristic that is often ascribed to God is immutability. His traits do not
change over time. If God exists in time, he can be immutable in a weaker or stronger sense.
In the ﬁrst case, his temporally non-relational traits can remain static while his temporally
relational properties can change as time passes. Today he might believe that Jones will drink
coﬀee tomorrow while two days from now he would believe that Jones drank coﬀee yesterday.
A stronger sense of immutability requires that not even God's substantive temporally
relational traits can change. That God is everlasting and immutable in the strong sense
entails that he has few, if any, temporally relational properties. Suppose that Jones had a
cup of coﬀee on Wednesday, but not on Thursday. Jones had a cup of coﬀee yesterday is
true on Thursday, but not on Friday. If, on Thursday, God believes Jones had a cup of coﬀee
yesterday, and God's temporally relational beliefs cannot change, then God would believe
Jones had a cup of coﬀee yesterday on Friday. God would this have a false belief on Friday,
which is impossible. So God must not have had such a belief in the ﬁrst place.
The question of which type of immutability is correct depends on what it means for
God's temporally relational characteristics to change substantively. The point to grasp for
this analysis is that there is a sense of immutability, the stronger sense, that requires a
non-relational account of God's properties. If he has knowledge about events or things that
change in time, that knowledge must be temporally absolute instead of relational. This view
of God and immutability takes him a step away from temporality and towards atemporality.
5.1.2 Atemporal Existence and Two Logical Challenges
An atemporal entity is something that exists outside of time. Something that is eternal
is atemporal, perhaps with some additional traits. This section focuses on two important
7One may elect to add life or other criteria to the necessary conditions of everlastingness. Such
a criterion would ensure that abstracta like numbers, if they exist, would not be everlasting. In
their explication of Boethius, Stump and Kretzmann include life and other criteria to eternality. See
[Stump and Kretzmann(1981)].
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logical characteristics8 of atemporality. Atemporal beings can neither hold properties at
times nor hold temporally relational properties. ThEtrn must account for how atemporal
entities like God can have properties at all, and how such entities can have characteristics
pertaining to times (like beliefs about events that occur in time) without having temporally
relational characteristics.
Spatial metaphors have often been helpfulalthough sometimes misleadingin explain-
ing issues involving time. Like time, space is extended. Time also serves as a parameter in
many formulas, just as space does. Space is therefore a good place to start learning about
time, although one should keep in mind that there are some relevant diﬀerences.
Property attribution tends to be independent of spatial location. One can meaningfully
attribute properties to Jones, as in:
(5.5) Jones is drinking coﬀee.
(5.6) Jones is hungry.
and so forth, regardless of where one makes such assertions or where Jones happens to be.
She would not even need to be anywhere if not for the fact that, presumably, she is the sort
of thing whose existence requires a spatial location (and perhaps being hungry and drinking
coﬀee require having a spatial location). Space is likewise irrelevant to other properties and
relations, except those reducible to forms explicitly bringing space into the picture. Examples
of the latter type include:
(5.7) Jones is at home.
(5.8) Jones is studying at the café.
Temporality is akin to spatiality in some regards, although the two are not perfectly anal-
ogous. Human beings can roam about a spatial landscape, but not a temporal one. This
arbitrariness of spatial location encourages, if not necessitates, separating spatial location
8Here, logical characteristics are traits pertaining to adequate representation within a formal system.
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from property attribution in the general case. Temporal location is not so arbitrary. Jones
can pace back and forth across a room, but she cannot shift time from today to tomorrow
and back to today again. It is thus no surprise that languages tend to oﬀer more spatial
versatility then temporal. Tokens of (5.5) and (5.6) assert something about Jones in the
present time. A particular instance of (5.5) evaluated now indicates that Jones is drinking
coﬀee now, not that she was, is or will be drinking coﬀee.
Whatever the extent to which property attribution is bound to time by standard usage,
one might attempt to create an artiﬁcial temporally-independent mode of attribution, in
analogy with the spatial case. However, there is a notable obstacle to such endeavors. Jones
does not (wholly) exist at multiple spatial locations at once, enabling her to hold a speciﬁc
set of properties at a given time, regardless of her spatial location. The temporal situation
is diﬀerent, for Jones can have diﬀerent characteristics at diﬀerent times. (5.5) is logically
equivalent to:
(5.9) Wherever Jones is (if anywhere) she is drinking coﬀee.
Jones' spatial location is irrelevant to evaluating (5.9). Jones occupies at most one spatial
location at the time of evaluation, so ignoring space does not run the risk of contradiction.
Time cannot be removed from the attribution because Jones has diﬀerent traits at diﬀerent
times, even with respect to a particular spatial location. She may go to the same café every
day and sit in the exact same spot, but one day she drinks coﬀee and on another she drinks
tea. Time could be the only diﬀerence between the coﬀee-drinking scenario and the tea-
drinking scenario. Thus, time must be speciﬁed either as a parameter of the truth function
or as part of the attribution.
Jones is a changeable entity. If Jones were immutable in the strong sense, then she would
either have or not have any given property throughout her existence. Property attribution
for strongly immutable entities is arbitrary with respect to time. As such, space and time
are relevantly similar when it comes to property attribution for strongly immutable entities.
The analogy holds just as well for atemporal entities since, like strongly immutable entities,
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atemporal ones do not change over time. It is therefore possible to attribute properties and
relations independently of time, but it only makes sense to use such attribution for beings
that are either immutable with respect to the properties being attributed or not in time at
all.
One might think that every temporally relational property or statement is logically equiv-
alent to some temporally absolute property or statement. For example, suppose that today
is Tuesday and Smith believes that Jones will have a cup of coﬀee tomorrow. The content
of Smith's belief can be restated as:
(5.10) Jones (atemporally) drinks coﬀee on Wednesday.
Notice that the content of Smith's new belief does not tie him to a particular time. The
restatement does change the content of Smith's belief, but the two versions are logically
equivalent: they have the same truth value. Any meaningful temporally relational property
or statement can be transformed in the same way, yielding a temporally absolute property
or statement.
A lingering issue is that the transformation may not successfully eliminate all oﬀ the
troublesome temporal content. Prior argues that specifying the times at which events occur
requires a temporally relational verb.9 For instance, (5.10) can only be explicated using
something like:
(5.11) Jones (atemporally) drinks coﬀee and today is Wednesday.
The right conjunct fails to be atemporal, according to Prior. For the purpose of this discus-
sion, it will be assumed that Prior is wrong and that temporally relational properties can
be reduced to temporally absolute properties. Whether or not the transition works, true
futurism still follows from ThEtrn, as discussed in Section 5.3.
The result that absolute temporal operators are needed to represent eternity has its
adherents in the contemporary literature, most notably Paul Helm and Katherin Rogers.10
9[Prior(1957), Prior(1967)]
10[Helm(1997), Helm(2010), Rogers(2000), Rogers(2007)]
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These scholars argue that eternity is best represented using a B-series. Ignoring Prior's
criticism mentioned above, an A-series (which is inherently relational) that is equipped with
a metric and a (somewhat arbitrary) zero point can be transformed into a B-series.
The discussion in this section indicates that two basic logical challenges to representing
atemporality can be met. Beings that are atemporal or immutable in the strong sense can
be attributed properties atemporally. Although atemporal or strongly immutable entities
cannot have temporally relational properties per se, every meaningful temporally relational
property can be transformed into a logically equivalent temporally absolute property, as-
suming that Prior's challenge can be met.
5.1.3 Theistic Eternalism Against Fatalism
How ThEtrn handles logical and theological fatalism depends to some extent on the
particular variety of ThEtrn in question. A discussion of thoroughgoing eternalism and
perdurantism is beyond the scope of this project, although some allies of ThEtrn advocate
such views.11 Here, the emphasis is on forms of ThEtrn that acknowledge genuine temporal
existence.
When friends of ThEtrn as such talk about fatalism, they are primarily (if not exclu-
sively) worried about theological fatalism. If God is eternal, then he does not hold beliefs
about events in time before (or after, or at the same time as) those events occur. The eternal
God hence does not have foreknowledge, at least in some sense. (ArgThF.2) is false, so
ArgThF is unsound.
Many scholars attempt to show that ThEtrn fails to avoid theological fatalism, after
all. Some of these critiques are discussed further in Section 5.2. One type of argument
challenges ThEtrn's coherence. If ThEtrn is incoherent, then of course it fails to address
anything whatsoever, including theological fatalism. Two other responses are more directly
relevant to ThEtrn's response to theological fatalism. One popular route is to rephrase
11See Section 5.2.3.
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an argument for theological fatalism in atemporal terms. This method brings the argument
for theological fatalism to ThEtrn. Another tactic, the one emphasized here, is to bring
ThEtrn to the argument for theological fatalism. This is done by showing that there is an
important and relevant sense in which foreknowledge can be attributed to an eternal God.
Details are given in Section 5.3.
5.2 Varieties and Criticisms of Theistic Eternalism
This section outlines three types of eternalism: duration (DurEtrn), point (PtEtrn),
and perdurantist (PrdEtrn). Some but not all of these views are mutually exclusive.
DurEtrn and PtEtrn are incompatible. Both of those views tend to be given an enduran-
tist reading. Nevertheless, those types of eternalism can be nurtured under perdurantism, as
well. Some criticisms of particular views are mentioned along the way. The section concludes
with a brief overview of general challenges to ThEtrn.
5.2.1 Duration Boethianism
In their landmark analysis, Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann identiﬁed two pas-
sages in which Boethius described God's eternality.12
What is said of God, [namely, that] he is always, indeed signiﬁes a unity, as if
he had been in all the past, is in all the presenthowever that might be[and]
will be in all the future. That can be said, according to the philosophers, of
the heaven and of the imperishable bodies; but it cannot be said of God in the
same way. For he is always in that for him always has to do with present time.
And there is this great diﬀerence between the present of our aﬀairs, which is
now, and that of the divine: our now makes time and sempiternity, as if it were
running along; but the divine now, remaining, and not moving, and standing
still, makes eternity. If you add `semper ' to `eternity', you get sempiternity, and
the perpetual running resulting from the ﬂowing, tireless now. (De trinitate, Ch.
4, 20.6422.77)
That God is eternal, then, is the common judgment of all who live by reason.
Let us therefore consider what eternity is, for this makes plain to us both the
12[Stump and Kretzmann(1981)]
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divine nature and knowledge. Eternity, then, is the complete possession all at
once of illimitable life. This becomes clearer by comparison with temporal things.
For whatever lives in time proceeds as something present from the past into the
future, and there is nothing placed in time that can embrace the whole extent
of its life equally. Indeed, on the contrary, it does not yet grasp tomorrow but
yesterday it has already lost; and even in the life of today you live no more fully
than in a mobile, transitory moment. [...] Therefore, whatever includes and
possesses the whole fullness of illimitable life at once and is such that nothing
future is absent from it and nothing past has ﬂowed away, this is rightly judged
to be eternal, and of this it is necessary both that being in full possession of itself
it be always present to itself and that it have the inﬁnity of mobile time present
[to it]. (The Consolation of Philosophy, Bk. V, Prose 6, 422.5424.31)13
Using Boethius's description as a foundation, Stump and Kretzmann enumerated four criteria
for eternality.
Life. Numbers, truth, and corpses cannot be eternal.
Illimitibility. The life of an eternal being is either unbounded or unextendable. (Stump and
Kretzmann argued that eternal life is unbounded rather than unextendable.)
Duration. The life of an eternal being has extension.
Complete possession of all its life at once. Every portion of an eternal being's life is imme-
diately present to it.
That is how Stump and Kretzmann developed and explicated Boethius' view, which was
also endorsed by Brian Leftow.14 What characterizes this notion of eternity is that it is
not point-like, but has duration and arguably extension. The duration of eternity, however,
cannot be divided into substantively distinct parts. This type of ThEtrn will be called
duration theistic eternalism (DurEtrn) and the corresponding eternity, duration eternity.
Stump and Kretzmann described eternity as an unbounded line parallel to the universe's
timeline.15 In the former line, everything is present; in the latter, only a single point is
13The translation given here is from [Boethius(1973)].
14For Stump and Kretzmann’s view, see [Stump and Kretzmann(1981), Stump and Kretzmann(1987),
Stump and Kretzmann(1991), Stump and Kretzmann(1992)]. For Leftow’s work, see [Leftow(1991a),
Leftow(1991b)].
15[Stump and Kretzmann(1987)], p. 219
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present, as indicated in Figure 5.2.1 (a). The analogy between eternal existence and a line is
weak in some respects (as those authors admit), but the illustration brings out two important
characteristics of Stump and Kretzmann's notion of eternity: duration and ever-presence.
One may capture this eternity's indivisibility by specifying that the line is more like the
intuitionistic continuum than a typical line. Every non-empty subset of the intuitionistic
continuum is identical to the whole.
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Figure 5.2.1: Duration theistic eternalism. (a) Eternity is likened to an inﬁnite line parallel
to the temporal timeline. Every point on the eternal line is present, while only one point
on the temporal line is present. (b) Any point on the temporal line is simultaneous (or
ET-simultaneous, as Stump and Kretzmann would say) with all eternal points. Likewise for
all temporal points, be they past, present, or future from a given temporal perspective.
The logical characteristics of a duration-eternal being are in certain respects like that
of an everlasting, immutable entity. As Rogers pointed out, if eternity has duration, then
eternity can be made to correspond to the temporal timeline.16 The correspondence may
be arbitrary in two ways. First, there is no a priori reason to relate the present moment to
one point of eternity over another. Second, there is no a priori way to relate eternity's scale
to the actual timeline. The arbitrary character of the bijection is irrelevant since eternity is
eﬀectively immutable. The origin and scale of the correspondence do not make a diﬀerence
because there are no diﬀerences for the eternal or immutable.
Despite some notable similarities, duration eternity is not quite a variety of temporal
immutability. An important diﬀerence is that no more than one moment can be present to
16[Rogers(1994)]. Note that if the universe did not have a timeline to begin with, one will be designated
by the correspondence.
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a temporal entity, even an immutable one. On the contrary, every moment is present to an
eternal entity. This is the relevant sense in which God is atemporal for DurEtrn.
Historically, ThEtrn has been fueled by the presumption that divisibility is an imper-
fection (and, similarly, change is bad). God, being perfect, is therefore indivisible. Yet it is
diﬃcult to see how eternity can have a kind of duration, even atemporal duration, without
having extension. Extension is divisible. Thus, divine eternity cannot have duration, and
DurEtrn is incoherent.
One way out for DurEtrn is to reject the premise that eternity is divisible. It may
be that the duration of eternity does not really have extension, or that eternity has a type
of extension that is not divisible. There is an independent example of such an entity: an
abstract structure with extension but that cannot be separated into diﬀerentiable parts is
the intuitionistic continuum. That there is such an abstractum may be enough to show that
DurEtrn is at least structurally plausible. If divine eternity has a similar structure, then
divine eternity can have duration or extension without being divisible, thus retaining the
perfection of divine simplicity.
5.2.2 Point Theistic Eternalism
Contra Stump, Kretzmann, and Leftow, Rogers argued that DurEtrn is not the correct
interpretation of Boethius.17 According to Rogers, Boethius, Augustine and Aquinas held
that eternity has no duration. Eternity is instead point-like, a view that will henceforth be
called point theistic eternalism (PtEtrn). Rogers cited various analogies used by Boethius,
Augustine, and Aquinas. Perhaps the most famous is Aquinas' comparison between, on one
hand, eternity and its relation to moments in time; and, on the other hand, the center of a
circle and its relation to points on the circumference.
We may see an example of sorts in the case of a circle. Let us consider a deter-
mined point on the circumference of a circle. Although it is indivisible, it does
17[Rogers(1994)]
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not co-exist simultaneously with any other point as to position, since it is the
order of position that produces the continuity of the circumference. On the other
hand, the centre of the circle, which is no part of the circumference, is directly
opposed to any given determinate point on the circumference. Hence, whatever
is found in any part of some other time it be past or future. Something can be
present to what is eternal only by being present to the whole of it, since the eter-
nal does not have the duration of succession. The divine intellect, therefore, sees
in the whole of its eternity, as being present to it, whatever takes place through
the whole course of time.18
PtEtrn is more challenging to formalize than DurEtrn. As discussed in Section 5.2.1,
DurEtrn allows for a correspondence between eternity and the actual timeline. The bi-
jection makes duration-eternity logically (although not in all other respects) similar to im-
mutable everlastingness. There is no such correspondence in the case of PtEtrn.
One concern about PtEtrn was discussed by Pike.19 Temporal beings should be able to
say that God exists. Suppose that God exists at some actual moment. One might propose
that if God exists at all, He exists necessarily; where the necessity in question is either logical
(a matter of mere consistency) or metaphysical (broad logical necessity, as Plantinga calls
it20). Whether or not God's existence is conditionally necessary in either of those senses, at
least he cannot come into existence or cease to exist. Thus, God is conditionally necessary
in any linear or branching chronological structure of momentshis existence is conditionally
ATC-necessary. If he exists at all, he has always existed and will, inevitably, always exist.
God's existence at one moment in a chronological structure or ATC tree entails that he exists
at every moment within that structure. His existence at a single moment yields that His
existence stretches out across time, giving His existence duration. Either PtEtrn collapses
into DurEtrn or PtEtrn entails atheism.
There are at least two options left for PtEtrn. First, one might argue that God's
existence does not have duration, regardless of appearances, when his existence is embedded
within a chronological structure. That is, the embedding is somehow misleading on a level
18Summa Contra Gentiles I, 66, 7. [Pagis(1997)]
19[Pike(1970)], p. 10–4
20[Plantinga(1974)]
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beyond its representation within a formal system. The burden of proof is on PtEtrn to
explain how the embedding is misleading, describing how one should interpret the apparent
duration of eternity without genuine duration.
Second, friends of PtEtrn might construct a model in which God's existence is not
stretched out in time. God might be outside of time in the sense that he does not exist at
(or in the domain of) any moment, but in some other way or at some distinct node to which
either all or no times are present. After all, a circle's center does not exist on the circle,
a surveyor at a distant height does not inspect the landscape below from that landscape
below, and so forth.21 A problem with this approach is the diﬃculty in explaining God's
existence and his various relations to temporal things in a way that is not ad hoc. Formally,
whether or not something exists at a node (moment) depends on whether or not the object is
represented in the domain at that node. If God does not exist in any moment, yet it is true
at those moments that he exists, God exists cannot have a typical meaning. PtEtrn must
explain how God exists can be true at a moment although God is not represented within the
domain of that moment.22
5.2.3 Perdurantist Theistic Eternalism
According to Rogers, Anselm's eternalism has some distinguishing characteristics.23 Other
medieval scholars, like Boethius, take an endurantist (three-dimensionalist) and maybe
even presentist approach. Anselm's notion of eternity, by contrast, is perdurantist (four-
dimensionalist, with eternity as a ﬁfth dimension). Perdurantist theistic eternalism (PrdE-
trn) has gained some contemporary adherents, most notably Rogers.24 Although a full
discussion of endurantism/perdurantism is beyond the scope of this paper, some points are
21The surveyor analogy is from Boethius’ De Consolatione Philosophaie, Book V, Prose VI, lines 27–8.
22Some advocates of PtEtrn attempt to avoid this criticism by relating time to space. For instance,
Rogers (following Anselm) used this approach for A.4 (see Section 5.2.3) in [Rogers(2007)], p. 29. However,
if nodes are parameterized with respect to spatial location, the problem simply reappears, now in terms of
space instead of time: either God is spatially extended or he does not exist.
23[Rogers(2006), Rogers(2007)]
24Cf. [Helm(1997)].
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worth mentioning.
One characteristic of perdurantism is that it describes time fundamentally using absolute
time in terms of a B-series (that is, with at, later than, earlier than). Instead of using
temporal operators (was, will, and so forth) as a basis for characterizing time, absolute
time is the core of perdurantism. Time behaves just like another spatial dimension. The
discussion in Section 5.1.2 shows that absolute time is crucial for any eternalism, perdurantist
or not. Absolute time is primary whether or not any particular eternalist, like Boethius,
acknowledges its importance in accounting for eternity. That PrdEtrn emphasizes absolute
time is something that this form of eternalism has in common with the others. At least,
other kinds of ThEtrn must also use absolute time to maintain coherence.
A perdurantist takes all temporal objects as four-dimensional entities. Objects do not
change over time or endure. Rather, they consist of various temporal parts, static sub-objects
that are parameterized with respect to time. Jones, for instance, has a yesterday part, a
today part, a tomorrow part and so forth, all of which are static entities. The account given
here does not, at least without further reduction, adequately represent perdurantism with
respect to all objects. In particular, ATC-necessity (necessity per accidens) is assumed to
be a characteristically endurantist notion.25
Rogers was quite clear about the fact that PrdEtrn entails that there is a unique actual
timeline. That is, PrdEtrn entails true futurism (TF). She also realized that designating a
particular future creates a sort of necessity, which she called consequent necessity. Rogers
held that consequent necessity does not interfere with the sort of contingency required for
libertarian freedom. The accessibility relation behind consequent necessity appears to be
the TRL, the temporal relation of TF corresponding to soft facts; although friends of TF
are typically at pains to keep from associating the TRL with any sort of necessity. Since
25See Section 2.3 for more on ATC-modality. ATC-modality characterizes how some events, things, or
propositions become necessary over time. If events, things, or propositions are four-dimensional, then they
cannot become anything. That said, it may be possible to give a formal account of ATC-modality using
static terms; if not for branching time, then certainly within a two-dimensional system like the one described
in [MacFarlane(2012)]. The tricky part would be giving a philosophical account of ATC-accessibility.
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PrdEtrn is itself beyond the scope of this analysis and consequent necessity seems related
to the TRL, Rogers' particular arguments will not be critiqued here. Some criticisms that
are relevant to her analysis are given discussions of true futurism Section 6.4.26
PrdEtrn may be the most promising variety of ThEtrn. Unlike DurEtrn and
PtEtrn, PrdEtrn is compatible with a thoroughgoing absolutist approach, including
perdurantism, general eternalism, and the B-theory. Because PrdEtrn takes such a diﬀer-
ent basis from the one used in this essay, PrdEtrn cannot be given an adequate treatment
here. One of the goals of this essay is in fact to push TF to absolutism and theism to either
open theism or PrdEtrn. It would be another project altogether to show that absolutism
is inadequate.
5.2.4 Additional Criticisms
It may (and probably should) seem peculiar that there could be entities that are not
merely changeless, but outside of time itself. Some exploration is required to discover whether
or not eternalism is somehow incoherent. The literature is not lacking in debate. Some
challenges toDurEtrn and PtEtrn are mentioned in Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, respectively.
More general criticisms of ThEtrn are brieﬂy discussed here.
Two logico-linguistic challenges to ThEtrn are discussed in Section 5.1.2. Some scholars
argue that ThEtrn is incoherent on other grounds.27 According to ThEtrn, everything,
all events and entities at all times, are immediately present to God. If God apprehends all
things at once, then he apprehends them simultaneously. Hence Anthony Kenny's infamous
remark about Aquinas's eternalism:
But, on St. Thomas' view, my typing of this paper is simultaneous with the
whole of eternity. Again, on his view, the great ﬁre of Rome is simultaneous
26Consequent necessity seems akin to the formal necessity generated by the TRL. The arguments in
Section 6.4 indicate the necessity of the TRL is either philosophically baseless or has genuinely modal
characteristics that interfere with future-contingency. The discussion in Section 6.4 presupposes dynamic or
branching time; however, Rogers’ position appears closer to thorough absolutism.
27[Kenny(1969), Kenny(1979), Swinburne(1977)]
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with the whole of eternity. Therefore, while I type these very words, Nero ﬁddles
heartlessly on.28
And Geach:
Misperception is involved if God is supposed to perceive what really is future not
as future but as present: ﬂat self-contradiction, if what God sees is both future
and simultaneously (since in itself it is just as God sees it) also present.29
Two events are simultaneous if and only if they occur at the same time, and God apprehends
all events simultaneously. Simultaneity is an equivalence relation30. Thus, all events occur
at the same time. This conclusion is unacceptable. There is no sense in which Jones had
breakfast at the same time at which she had lunch. Of all entities, a perfect, eternal observer
should realize that.
There are various replies in the literature.31 Any response must explain how two non-
simultaneous events can be at once present to or directly apprehended by God while avoiding
conﬂict. God observes events simultaneously, not as simultaneous.32 Helm even argues that
it does not make sense for anything to be present to an eternal God or simultaneous for
him.33 What is important, however, is that God does not apprehend the events at diﬀerent
times because there are no diﬀerent times from the eternal perspective. For example, God
may know that
(5.12) Jones is having breakfast
(5.13) Jones is having lunch
or directly apprehend Jones doing those things. How can God diﬀerentiate between contrary
events that occur at distinct times?
One might disentangle events that occur at diﬀerent times by encoding those events
together with some identifying absolute temporal information. For instance,
28[Kenny(1969)], p. 264
29[Geach(1977)], p. 57
30Equivalence relations are reflexive, symmetric, and transitive.
31For instance, [Stump and Kretzmann(1981), Helm(1997)].
32Kenny is aware of the distinction.
33[Helm(1997)]
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(5.14) Jones has breakfast at 8 AM
(5.15) Jones has lunch at noon34
God apprehends those events simultaneously (from the standpoint of eternity), or at least
not at distinct times. He knows that Jones had breakfast (not lunch) at 8 AM and lunch
(not breakfast) at noon. There is at least no contradiction in the content of His apprehen-
sion/knowledge.
There is still the matter of explaining how God apprehends events like that or how he
comes about such knowledge. Consider:
(5.16) (Smith observes Jones eating breakfast) at 8 AM
(5.17) Smith observes (Jones eating breakfast at 8 AM)
Smith observes Jones eating breakfast. If Jones were to do the exact same thing at noon,
then Smith would observe the exact same thing. At 8 AM is an adverb aﬀecting when Smith
makes the observation, not part of what Smith observes. (5.16) captures a familiar type of
observation, but (5.17) does not. If observes is to be understood atemporally, adverbs of the
form at time t cannot apply to the atemporal verb. So God's apprehension must be more
like (5.17), not (5.16). (5.17), however, is unlike familiar cases and needs some explaining.
A related obstacle for ThEtrn is that it is not clear how to explicate the relation between
an atemporal being and temporal ones. For instance, how does God perform miracles or
sustain life in diﬀerent ways at distinct times if he is outside of time and everything is
simultaneous for him? (Similar concerns apply to immutability.) Pike gave an often-cited
argument:
Let us suppose that yesterday a mountain, 17,000 feet high, came into existence
on the ﬂatlands of Illinois. One of the local theists explains this occurrence by ref-
erence to divine creative action. He claims that God produced (created, brought
about) the mountain. Of course, if God is timeless, He could not have produced
34One must also address Prior’s claims that there is temporal information hidden within the at operator,
and that an eternal being cannot know temporal information. See Section 5.1.2.
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the mountain yesterday. This would require that God's creative-activity and thus
the individual whose activity it is have position in time.35
Pike, elaborating on Schleiermacher,36 maintained that there is a temporal relation between
the creator and the created. Advocates of ThEtrn rejecting Pike's position must expli-
cate creation diﬀerently, allowing God to atemporally create something in time. The usual
analysis of creative activity amounts to something like:
(5.18) (God created a mountain) yesterday
or the grammatically interchangeable:
(5.19) Yesterday, God created a mountain.
The speciﬁcation of time applies to the main verb; designating the time at which God created
the mountain. If God is outside of time, this explication of creation is inadequate because it
is impossible that atemporal creation occurs in time. The adverb cannot apply to the main
verb. Additionally, consider the statement without the adverb:
(5.20) God created a mountain.
Mountains are temporal objects. It always makes sense to ask questions like:
(5.21) When did God create the mountain?
(5.22) When did the mountain appear?
The answers may be given in the context in which tokens occur, or someone might need
to ask questions like (5.21) and (5.22). Either way, those questions always have an answer.
There is no answer if creative activity does not occur in time. Pike agreed that the temporal
speciﬁcation must play a role, but the usual role does not work for ThEtrn. A diﬀerent
account of creative activity is needed.
35[Pike(1970)], pp. 104–5. Neither Pike nor Schleiermacher before him reject eternalism due to this type of
argument. Their method is to reduce creation to preservation or sustenance. Contra Pike and Schleiermacher,
preservation/sustenance may require a temporal relation if creation does.
36[Schleiermacher(1968)]
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A ﬁrst attempt to reevaluate creative activity is to simply change the scope of the tem-
poral speciﬁcation, moving the adverb into the object so that the verb can be atemporal, as
in:
(5.23) God created (a yesterday-mountain).
This solution is not generally acceptable. There is no such thing as a yesterday-mountain.
Just as (5.16) is natural and (5.17) seems ad hoc, (5.18) and (5.19) are the familiar cases
and it is not clear that (5.23) even makes sense.
A second attempt to handle Pike's argument adds another term to creative activity.37
Logically, this analysis makes creative activity into a three-place relation, such as:
(5.24) creates(creator, object created, creation time)
This explication allows the creator to be atemporal. Here is an analogy to clarify this
notion. Suppose there is a magical creation apparatus. To use the machine, one must input
two pieces of information, the object to be created and the time at which the object will
appear. Similarly, God creates objects by his Word, but he must specify both the object
and when it is to appear. This analysis of creation can be generalized to other atemporal
activity. However, some argument is required to show that the explication is not ad hoc.
Familiar temporal creation (by mutable entities) occurs in time, but time is not a part of
creative acts.38
Some scholars worry that atemporality limits God's knowledge. If God's knowledge
cannot have temporal content, he cannot really understand what it is like to be in time.
Prior said,
Many reputable philosophers, e.g. St. Thomas Aquinas, have held that God's
knowledge is in some way right outside of time, in which case presumably the
verb `knows' in our translation would have to be thought of as tenseless. I want to
argue against this view, on the ground that its ﬁnal eﬀect is to restrict what God
37Stump and Kretzmann used a similar approach in [Stump and Kretzmann(1981)], p. 448.
38Even when using a microwave to create unfrozen vegetables, one inputs a duration, not an absolute time.
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knows to those truths, if any, which are themselves timeless. For example, God
could not, on the view I am considering, know that the 1960 ﬁnal examinations
at Manchester are now over; for this isn't something that He or anyone could
know timelessly, because it just isn't true timelessly. It's true now, but it wasn't
true a year ago (I write this on August 29th, 1960) and so far as I can see all
that can be said on this subject timelessly is that the ﬁnishing-date of the 1960
ﬁnal examinations is an earlier one than August 29th, and this is not the thing
we know when we know that those examinations are now over.39
As mentioned in Section 5.1.2, Prior rejected a general reduction of temporal state-
ments/properties to fully atemporal correlates.40 So even if God's knowledge has atemporal
content that is logically equivalent to the relevant temporal statements, there is some missing
content if one takes time seriously. Prior's famous example is
(5.25) Thank goodness that's over!
The speaker is thankful that the event in question was present and is now past, no longer
present. According to Prior, there is no way to explicate this shift using only absolute terms.
One can at best describe how the event occurred at some earlier time than now, not that it is
no longer present. Many scholars have come to disagree with Prior's view that the A-theory
is irreducible to B-theoretic terms.41 The issue will not be pursued further here because it is
beyond the scope of this project. It is nevertheless worth noting that saving ThEtrn from
Prior's criticism seems to necessitate reducing the A-theory to the B-theory.
Conversely, atemporal renditions of temporal statements may require content that the
temporal versions do not. For example, consider:
(5.26) The 1960 ﬁnal examinations at Manchester are now over
To start, the following is not the sort of thing that can be known by an eternal God:
(5.27) The ﬁnal examinations are (atemporally) occurring at some time earlier than
now and are not now occurring.
39[Prior(1962)]
40[Prior(1957), Prior(1967)]
41For a recent challenge to Prior’s view, see [Sider(2003)].
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God cannot know (5.27) because (5.27) takes the current time as a reference point, as
indicated by the use of now. There is no current time for an eternal being. To eliminate all
temporal relations, something like the following is required:
(5.28) On August 29 of 1960, the 1960 ﬁnal examinations at Manchester are (atem-
porally) over.
(5.28) is the sort of thing that can be known by God because (5.28) does not require a
reference point in time. Oﬃcially, time is picked out using only the at operator; like in at
August 29 of 1960. The speciﬁcation of time given in (5.28) is not contained in the temporal
version, (5.27). Atemporal statements that can be known by an eternal God that are about
mutable temporal events require a time speciﬁcation, but not all true statements have the
content of a time speciﬁcation. Thus, an eternal God cannot know all truths. At best, the
content of his knowledge contains a complete description of the universe at all times, and
even that requires that statements like (5.25) are reducible to strictly atemporal terms.
Some authors have criticized ThEtrn on the grounds that it does not avoid theological
fatalism. There are two ways to propose such an argument. One route is to rephrase an
argument for theological fatalism in absolute terms. A second strategy is to argue that an
argument for theological fatalism that is in temporal terms still applies to ThEtrn. If
beings in time can truly say that God knows what will happen, God's eternality makes no
diﬀerence.
Linda Zagzebski emphasized the ﬁrst avenue.42 She reformulated an argument for the-
ological fatalism using absolute instead of relative times. The content of the eternal God's
knowledge or apprehension is in the relevant ways just as it is in the temporal case except
expressed in terms of absolute times instead of relative times. Zagzebski switched the terms
in the argument to match the atemporality of God's knowledge, creating a parallel argument.
This project emphasizes the second path.43 Section 5.3 shows that TF follows from
42[Zagzebski(1991), Zagzebski(2011a)]
43Cf. [Helm(1997)]
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ThEtrn. Section 6.4 argues that if TF is tenable at all, it is not the best option for
avoiding fatalism given a dynamic view of time. Zagzebski's route may be a little bit more
direct. An upshot is that the account given here does not require a separate argument to
show that ThEtrn entails theological fatalism.
5.3 Theistic Eternalism and True Futurism
An important criticism of ThEtrn is that the view does not avoid theological fatalism.
ThEtrn entails TF, and the latter yields fatalism. This section elaborates on the connec-
tion between ThEtrn and TF. In addition to TF as an ontological position, ThEtrn is
committed to certain statements about future events and God's knowledge of those events.
These statements, associated with TF generally, are what open the door to fatalism. That
TF does not avoid fatalism is discussed in Section 6.4.
5.3.1 The True Future
ThEtrn designates an actual timeline. This fact can be derived in one of two ways,
using God's direct apprehension of events or his propositional knowledge of events. In the
ﬁrst case, the eternal God directly apprehends all events as immediately present. He must
somehow diﬀerentiate between actual events and non-actual ones. Insofar as he apprehends
merely possible circumstances at all, he does not directly perceive, conceive, or will them to
be in the same way as actual happenings; for otherwise those merely possible scenarios would
be actual. As such, actual events are distinguished from merely possible ones. Assuming
that there can be only one complete description of the world at a given time, ThEtrn picks
out a timeline of actual events.
For the second case, suppose that God's knowledge has propositional content. Given his
omniscience, comprehensive foreknowledge, and infallibility, the content of God's knowledge
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constitutes a full description of the actual world at every moment in time.44 He may also
know everything about merely possible scenarios. As is the case for his apprehension, he
must know what is actual as distinct from what is merely possible. He could not know the
future, otherwise. His knowledge therefore designates a unique timeline of actual events.
Thus, ThEtrn entails TF. Although the eternal God does not apprehend events as past
or future, his direct apprehension or knowledge designates an actual timeline. This variety
true futurism will be called ontological true futurism (OnTF)45 because of its ontological
commitments. The actual timeline, represented by the TRL, is not just an epistemic or
semantic mechanism.
5.3.2 Temporal Statements about God and the Future
ThEtrn entails OnTF, but it has not been clariﬁed how ThEtrn should account
for statements given from temporal perspectives. OnTF involves semantic commitments.46
That there is an actual timeline indicates some kind of semantic true futurism (SmTF). How-
ever, ThEtrn is not committed to a particular account of propositions within a temporal
framework involving past or future times. An advocate of ThEtrn could be a semantic ab-
solutist, using one and only one TRL; or a semantic indexicalist, employing moment-speciﬁc
TRLm.
For ThEtrn, God apprehends or knows everything about both the past and the future,
but as present or timeless rather than as past or future.47 So a little bit of caution is
required when interpreting statements given at moments in time about God's apprehension
or knowledge. Consider, for instance:
(5.29) God knows that Jones will drink coﬀee.
The content of the eternal God's knowledge cannot be:
44God’s knowledge contains a full description of the actual world at every moment even if atemporality
limits his knowledge in the ways mentioned in Section 5.2.4.
45See Section 6.2.3 for more on OnTF.
46See Section 6.2.3 for more on OnTF and its semantic commitments.
47[Helm(1997)] contains more analysis on temporal statements about an eternal God.
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(5.30) Jones will drink coﬀee,
as discussed in Section 5.1.2. Understanding the temporal operator as part of the content of
God's knowledge is not the only way to interpret (5.29). Instead of indicating that the content
of God's knowledge or apprehension is temporal, where his apprehension may not even be
propositional, the statement reports that the object of God's apprehension/knowledge is
Jones drinking coﬀee at some time that is future with respect to the standpoint (or context
of utterance) of (5.29).
Consider a spatial analogy. Suppose that Jones is visiting a distant friend. The day
that Jones was initially scheduled to return, she decides to stay for a few more days. Jones
renders the following proposition true from her own standpoint:
(5.31) I am staying here for a few more days.
Jones then calls Smith and says, I'm staying here for a few more days. From Smith's
standpoint, it is true that:
(5.32) Jones told me that she is staying there for a few more days.
That (5.32) is true from Smith's standpoint does not imply that Jones's report to Smith or
the proposition that Jones rendered true from her own standpoint, (5.31), are about a place
other than where she is. (5.31) and (5.32) are not about a place that would be there rather
than here from Jones's standpoint. Moreover, that (5.32) is true from Smith's standpoint
does not imply that someone other than Jones is staying, a person that would be a she rather
than an I from Jones's standpoint. Similarly, (5.29) does not imply that God's knowledge is
of the future from his own standpoint, for it could be that Jones' act is future with respect
to the time at which the proposition is assigned a truth value.
Three observations can be made at this point. First, ThEtrn entails S-FLEM48 ev-
erywhere along the actual timeline and that a particular future will be. Second, although
the content of the eternal God's knowledge cannot involve past or future times from his
48See Section 3.2 for an introduction to S-FLEM.
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perspective, his apprehension or knowledge can be described using temporal language from
a temporal perspective. Third, that there are such descriptions does not even require that
God's apprehension or knowledge has propositional content, as long as the objects of his
apprehension/knowledge can be described with propositions. These three observations yield
that ThEtrn is a variety of TF, the topic of the next chapter.
116
Chapter 6
True Futurism
True futurism (TF) is one of the most popular responses to logical and theological fa-
talism. Even many freedom/foreknowledge incompatibilists adhere to the view.1 So TF
warrants a careful analysis along with criticisms. This project inspects TF under the dy-
namic framework althoughTF can be absolutist, too. One of the primary claims made here
is that TF is incompatible with the dynamic framework.
This chapter describes TF in some detail. TF's history and rejection of fatalism are
given in Section 6.1. Section 6.2 provides a useful taxonomy of various kinds of TF.
Section 6.3 discusses TF's linguistic facets. The validity of the strong future law of
excluded middle (S-FLEM) is one of TF's selling points. TF is the simplest branching
temporal logic (of those that anyone uses nowadays) by which S-FLEM is valid. There
have been challenges to TF as a semantic view, some of which have never been met in the
literature. Even the toughest of these problems dissipates when TF is enhanced with an
account of temporal standpoints.
TF cannot avoid a number of philosophical problems, given in Section 6.4. On one hand,
there is a set of arguments by which TF yields fatalism. On the other hand, TF succumbs
to the general grounding problem, by which TF either is ad hoc or entails fatalism. Theistic
1Two notable examples are Pike and Hasker. [Pike(1965), Hasker(2001)] (Note that Pike is not an
incompatibilist when it comes to an eternal God.)
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considerations add to the grounding problem. When God is involved, TF must explain how
God knows soft facts in addition to soft facts themselves. Ultimately, these challenges are
insurmountable within the framework of this analysis.
6.1 A Brief History of True Futurism and Ockhamism
This section provides a very brief account of TF's history, emphasizing it's contemporary
development from Prior onwards. TF's current form was developed largely by Øhrstrøm,
who furthered branching-time representations of TF. The section concludes with a discussion
of how TF aims to dismantle both ArgLF and ArgThF.
6.1.1 History
TF gained notoriety through some medieval scholarship, like that of William of Ockham
and Richard of Lavenham, although the position can be traced back to antiquity. These
thinkers hold that there is always a fact of the matter about what the future holds, yet
there are future contingents. According to this view, there are some things that will be
although they are not necessary. TF seeks to retain, on the one hand, that there are future
contingents, or that agents are free in the libertarian sense; on the other hand, that any
given proposition either will be true or will be false, or (sometimes) that God has infallible
and comprehensive foreknowledge.
TF has found many adherents in the last several decades. Prior gave one of the ﬁrst
systematic accounts of the view.2 Systems like Prior's are known as Priorian Ockhamist.
Prior describes a system in which, for φ representing a proposition, necessarily:φ does not
follow from will:φ. For example, suppose that Jones will have a cup of coﬀee tomorrow.
Jones' coﬀee drinking might still be contingent: she could refrain, but she will not.
2[Prior(1967)]
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(a) (b)
Figure 6.1.1: Jones will contingently drink coﬀee, as designated by the TRL. (a) Jones will
contingently drink coﬀee. The non-linear branching indicates that Jones' coﬀee-drinking is
contingent. The bold red line indicates the TRL sitting atop the underlying ATC tree. The
bigger picture in (b) shows the linearity of the TRL.
TF aside, Prior holds that if an event will come to pass, then there must be some present
facts that make it so. Many thinkers since Prior, most notably Øhrstrøm, observe that
Priorian Ockhamism3 fails to capture a central tenet of Ockham's actual view.4 In particular,
Ockham's account leads to a semantics of time quite diﬀerent from Prior's. Øhrstrøm and
other true futurists propose a device called the thin red line (TRL). The TRL consists
of one or more chains of moments. These chains are often called chronicles or histories.
What will be the case is designated by what occurs on the TRL and likewise with what was
the case. Priorian Ockhamism represents only the divorce of time from modality without a
genuinely Ockhamist temporal semantics. The TRL is designed to provide such a semantics.
Consider again the example of Jones and her beloved coﬀee. Figure 6.1.1 illustrates a
branching-time version of the scenario. The non-linear branching of the tree makes it so
that Jones might drink coﬀee and she might not, where possibility is understood as ATC-
possibility. Thus, whether or not she drinks coﬀee is a contingent matter. The bold red
line represents the TRL. In this case, the TRL is a single chain along the tree. The TRL
designates what will occur: Jones will drink coﬀee.
Since Prior's exposition, thinkers have proposed several varieties of TF. Some of these
3Ockhamism in this context does not necessarily include the view that characterizations of God’s beliefs
about the future are soft facts.
4[Øhrstrøm(1984), Øhrstrøm(2009)]
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types are discussed in Section 6.2, including distinctions that appear underdeveloped in the
current literature. Formal versions are given in Chapter 8.
As they occur in the literature, the names of these various systems can be confusing. TF
also goes by Ockhamism in the future contingents literature. In the freedom/foreknowledge
literature, Ockhamism picks out a view related to but more speciﬁc than TF by which
statements characterizing God's beliefs are soft facts. In some more recent work,5 indexical
systems are called Molinist although that term will not be used here. Speciﬁc varieties of
TF are discussed in Section 6.2.
6.1.2 True Futurism Against Fatalism
In an inﬂuential article on Ockhamism, Plantinga makes the following bold claim.
[N]o one, presumably, except for the most obdurate logical fatalist, will hold that
[There is (i.e., is, was or will be) such a time as eighty years ago, and Paul will
mow in 1999] is incompatible with Paul's being free to mow in 1999.67
An argument for logical fatalism, ArgLF, is outlined in Section 4.3. This ArgLF hinges on
the thesis that will:φ entails ¬possibly:¬φ, put forth in the logically equivalent (ArgLF.3).
Plantinga and other advocates of TF reject this premise of the argument.
TFmaintains that the TRL is not a modal relation between moments in time. Indeed, the
TRL does not correspond to a set of principles, setting it apart from familiar propositional
modalities like the physical and metaphysical sorts.8 Recall that ATC-modality captures
future contingency. The TRL accounts for temporal operators like will. If the TRL is non-
modal and only modal relations can be meaningfully associated with possibility and necessity,
then temporal operators cannot be associated with possibility and necessity, including ATC-
possibility and necessity. (ArgLF.3) is therefore false and ArgLF is unsound.
5For instance, [Malpass and Wawer(2012)]
6That is, no one except perhaps Aristotle, Prior, Belnap, and a host of others who are not logical fatalists.
Plantinga’s decision to use “presumably” is a good one, for the claim is alarmingly presumptuous for such
an otherwise careful thinker.
7See [Plantinga(1986)], p. 250.
8See Section 2.2 for more on propositional modalities.
120
Thus, TF rejects logical fatalism. The same maneuver, denying the modality of temporal
operators, may be used to dismantle the argument for theological fatalism represented in
Section 4.4 by ArgThF. It makes no diﬀerence to suppose that God or anyone else infallibly
knows what the future holds. Such knowledge only shows that there is a particular true
future. TF designates such a future regardless of God's foreknowledge. In terms of ArgThF,
(ArgThF.7) does not hold because it relies on the soundness of ArgLF, which TF denies.
So far, so good; but advocates of TF have some explaining to do. If temporal operators
are non-modal, what exactly do they amount to? If God exists and has complete, infallible
foreknowlege, what is the source of that knowledge? TF must provide reasonable answers to
such questions without opening the door to fatalism. These issues are given further treatment
in Section 6.4.
6.2 Varieties of True Futurism
The future contingents literature is full of many varieties of TF. Only branching types are
given here. The ﬁrst division is between absolute and indexical TF, given in Section 6.2.1.
While absolute TF uses a single, unparameterized TRL, indexical TF uses moment-speciﬁc
TRLs that are deﬁned for every moment. The core of TF, semantic TF, is described in
Section 6.2.2. Semantic TF is a view about how to account for temporal language, asserting
that the future will turn out one way over others as captured by soft facts or, equivalently, the
TRL. Semantic TF is typically coupled with ontological TF, by which there is a real or actual
timeline. Ontological TF is described in Section 6.2.3. Instead of ontological TF, semantic
TFmay be coupled with epistemic TF. According to epistemic TF, the TRL designates what
a given agent thinks the future holds. Epistemic TF is the topic of Section 6.2.4. The view
is defended against Malpass and Wawer's recent criticisms, although other considerations
may rule it out as a viable alternative to ontological TF.
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(a) (b)
Figure 6.2.1: True futurism: absolute and indexical. (a) Absolute true futurism. There is a
unique, unparameterized (absolute) TRL. This TRL marks the actual timeline. (b) Indexical
true futurism. TRLs are parameterized with respect to moments as TRLm. Note that the
TRLm have no starting point but some TRLm overlap others (they eﬀectively have a priority
ranking).
6.2.1 Absolute and Indexical True Futurisms
In Øhrstrøm's ﬁrst TF systems, the TRL is unique.9 This view may be called absolute
true futurism (AbsTF) because there is a single TRL that is unparameterized, and thus in
a sense warrants the title, absolute. See Figure 6.2.1 (a). AbsTF is fueled by ontologies by
which there is one and only one actual worldor, in the case of moments, a unique timeline.
The TRL represents this actual timeline.
One can describe the way temporal statements work in terms of diagrams as in Fig-
ure 6.2.1. The truth of future statements involving will and will-always is determined by
following the TRL upwards, forwards in time. The TRL serves to distinguish the true
future from merely possible ones. Whatever happens at moments along the red TRL in Fig-
ure 6.2.1 (a) designates what will be the case, such as Jones' coﬀee-drinking in Figure 6.1.1.
The same rule holds when there are multiple TRLs, as in Figure 6.2.1 (b). From the blue line,
the future is determined by following the blue line upwards, and likewise for the other lines.
Unlike the contingent future, the past is backwards linearthat is, uniquein branching
systems, eliminating the need for disambiguation. So TRLs make no diﬀerence to evaluations
of past-time statements (those involving operators like was and was-always).
9[Øhrstrøm(1984)]
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Most scholars agree that AbsTF is deﬁcient, at least as a semantic thesis. As indicated
in Figure 6.2.1 (a), AbsTF does not deﬁne a TRL for counterfactual moments. The TRL
is the temporal relation, crucial for evaluating statements involving will and other temporal
operators. The main problem is accounting for temporal statements at counterfactual nodes.
There is no TRL through those moments, so either temporal statements are undeﬁned or
another account, like open futurism, must be used for temporal statements at counterfactual
nodes. These criticisms of AbsTF are presented in more detail in Section 6.3.2. On account
of these issues, AbsTF has few contemporary adherents.10
In light of arguably insurmountable criticism against AbsTF, scholars developed in-
dexical true futurism (IdxTF). In IdxTF, TRLs are moment speciﬁc, designated TRLm.
Eﬀectively, the TRLm are prioritized so that they overlap, as shown in Figure 6.2.1 (b). The
use of moment-speciﬁc TRLm ensures that the temporal relation is deﬁned at all moments,
avoiding problems with AbsTF.
6.2.2 Semantic True Futurism
The heart of TF is semantic true futurism (SmTF). SmTF is a view about how to
explicate the content of temporal language, which may be accompanied by one of various
ontological or epistemological positions. SmTF employs the TRL to account for the mean-
ings of propositions involving temporal relations. The TRL consists of one or more chains
spanning time. As such, SmTF entails that for any φ representing a proposition, either it
will be the case that φ or it will the case that ¬φ. This principle is S-FLEM (not to be
confused with W-FLEM or M-FLEM).11 As an example, either it will be the case that Jones
drinks coﬀee or it will be the case that Jones does not drink coﬀee. S-FLEM is also valid
in supervaluationism, but it may turn out that neither disjunct is true. SmTF goes a step
further by designating either will:φ or will:¬φ as true. Thus, SmTF is a view that uses the
TRL to aﬃrm the following:
10Semantic absolute true futurism was recently endorsed in [Malpass and Wawer(2012)].
11These future excluded middles are introduced in Section 3.2 and further disambiguated in Section 3.3.
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(6.1) S-FLEM is valid (along the TRL):
⊧ will:φ ∨ will:¬φ
(6.2) At any moment, either will:φ or will:¬φ is true
SmTF yields that S-FLEM is valid along the TRL. In general, S-FLEM is valid within
and only within temporal structures in which moments are temporally connected in chains,
including deterministic and fatalistic structures. Using the notation of Section 2.4, SmTF
is TRL-fatalistic, although friends of TF would prefer to avoid associating their view with
fatalism. Indeed, if the TRL is non-modal, then SmTF is fatalistic in a merely formal,
innocuous sense.
At this point in the discussion, the focus has been on accounting for temporal language.
Ontological and epistemological concerns are addressed in the next sections. Note that it is
possible to employ IdxTF as a semantic thesis, then designate a special TRL, perhaps to
distinguish real moments from merely possible ones, an absolutist reality from an semantic
indexical actuality. One may think of this absolutely real TRL as the one with the highest
precedence. More speciﬁcally, the only one in a given tree such that for any distinct moments
m and m′ on the TRL, TRLm is identical to TRLm′ (and both are just the special TRL).
6.2.3 Ontological True Futurism
SmTF is often (although not necessarily) associated with corresponding ontological com-
mitments. Ontological true futurism (OnTF) is the view that, despite contingency, some
course of events is privileged. In the terms used in the freedom/foreknowledge literature,
OnTF is the view that there is a hard/soft fact distinction and that soft facts pick out a
real or actual future.12
Eternalism is the view that the future exists or is real in some sense or other. Being
12For a description of the hard/soft fact distinction, see Section 2.7.
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real is one way in which a given course of events can be special. Despite the various uses of
eternalism in the literature, general eternalism should not be confused with theistic eter-
nalism (ThEtrn), discussed in Chapter 5.13 General eternalism is one of several related
absolutist views, along with perdurantism and the B-theory. Unlike ThEtrn, general eter-
nalism does not commit one to the existence of God. Contra Boethius, ThEtrn turns out
to be suﬃcient for general eternalism. It will be argued later in this chapter that TF is
inadequate under the dynamic, branching view of time. If viable at all, TF requires general
eternalism. Since ThEtrn entails TF, ThEtrn can only make sense with general eternal-
ism. Additionally, several of the criticisms of ThEtrn mentioned in Chapter 5 presuppose
the dynamic approach and can be avoided within a broader eternalist framework.
Recall that ThEtrn entails OnTF, as discussed in Section 5.3. Whether by his direct
apprehension of all events as present or his propositional knowledge of them, the eternal God
shows that there is a real timeline. Such a God does not apprehend or know what will occur
as future; nevertheless, it is true from a temporal perspective that he apprehends/knows
what has occurred, is occurring, and will occur.14
Not all advocates of OnTF are eternalists. Øhrstrøm, for instance, is not an eternalist;
and in general advocates of branching time are not eternalists, true-futurist or not. The
non-eternalist view of OnTF is that a particular future will come about. The actual future
is not seen as atemporally real. This non-eternalist view is the primary focus of this chapter.
The position is infeasible for reasons discussed later in the chapter.
OnTF may be understood absolutely or indexically. Taken absolutely, OnTF designates
a unique timeline. The term real is sometimes used to pick out this one and only privileged
timeline. Absolute OnTF should probably not be labeled as a type of realism, however, since
realism in other modal contexts is the Lewisian view that all nodes (possible worlds) are
13Both Boethius and Anselm endorsed ThEtrn. Compare Rogers’ accounts of Boethius’ view in
[Rogers(1994)] and Anselm’s view in [Rogers(2006), Rogers(2007)]. Anselm may have adhered to generic
eternalism, but Boethius did not. So not all advocates of ThEtrn are general-eternalists. That said, Rogers
argued that a more thoroughgoing absolutism like Anselm’s yields a superior variety of ThEtrn.
14See also [Helm(1997)].
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equally real. Lewisian realism is therefore quite opposed to absolute OnTF, but is instead
similar to the indexical interpretation of OnTF by which actuality is node-dependent. That
is, what counts as the actual timeline is moment-speciﬁc. The actual timeline of moment m
is TRLm.
OnTF is about ontology, not directly about how to represent time as it occurs in lan-
guage. However, given that OnTF designates some actual timeline, SmTF is not far behind.
The actual timelines of OnTF form the TRL, the temporal relation of SmTF. The converse
implication, that SmTF entails OnTF, is false. One might have independent reasons to ac-
cept TF as an account of language. Such reasons could, for example, be linguistic or perhaps
derived from the fruitfulness of a TF system in game theory, model checking, or some other
endeavor. One might have other reasons for denying OnTF. In this case, the TRL carries
no ontological commitment, but rather is just a linguistic or epistemic apparatus.
6.2.4 Epistemic True Futurism
John Burgess provided the following description of TF (in terms of branching time).
We picture time as a tree. If x represents the present, its predecessors represent
the past, and the x-branches our possible futures. The truth-value of a future
tense statement depends on which x-branch we think of as representing the course
of events which is actually going to turn out to happen.15
On this view, the TRL is designated by an internal process, as by stipulation, instead of
what will actually be the case. This approach is epistemic true futurism (EpTF). EpTF
provides an alternative counterpart to SmTF, aside from OnTF.
Some scholars maintain that SmTF only makes sense with OnTF. Alex Malpass and
Jacek Wawer recently gave an argument to this eﬀect. In their argument, an Inner Baptist
is an advocate of EpTF.
Samantha and Jonny are in a betting shop. Samantha picks a horse called `Knob-
bly Knees' which is scheduled to run in the next race, and places a bet. As she
15[Burgess(1979)], p. 575, emphasis added.
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makes the bet, she says to Jonny Knobbly Knees will win, and while she does
so she makes the `internal supposition' to use a history in which he wins as the
value of the history parameter. They sit and watch the race, only to see Knob-
bly Knees come last. Nevertheless, as a good Inner-Baptist, Sam maintains that
she spoke the truth. Who cares what actually happened? My prediction was
associated internally with a winning history, so what I said was true. When
she goes to collect her money, the bookie (quite rightly) refuses to pay. This is
because bookies do care about what actually happened, and not about what she
was thinking of at the time of the bet. It is what `actually happens,' and not any
type of inner association, that decides whether the bet would be paid out. Our
ﬁrst complaint then, is that it seems odd that bet payouts do not correspond
to the (Inner Baptist's) truth of predictions. We think that if you make a true
prediction, then a bet about the content of the prediction should (perhaps later
on) also pay out. This intuitive idea about the relation between true predictions
and successful bets seems to be just incorrectly handled by Inner-Baptism. In
fact, making true predictions of future contingents is almost as easy as thinking
that your prediction is true.16
In Malpass and Wawer's example, EpTF allows Sam to designate a TRL of her choice before
the race. She speciﬁes the TRL in which Knobbly Knees will win. Thus, Knobbly Knees
will win is true. At this point, open futurists object that the statement is not true. OnTF
agrees, adding that Knobbly Knees will lose is true. Truth may not be the right criterion to
apply regarding EpTF. That concern can be put oﬀ for now. It will be discussed below.
As it turns out, Knobbly Knees loses. Sam is aware of the loss because she watched the
race. After the race, it is false that it was the case that the horse will win. Malpass and
Wawer claimed that EpTF sanctions the contrary: it was the case that Knobbly Knees will
win. Thus, EpTF yields an unacceptable consequence.
Malpass and Wawer missed a great advantage of EpTF: agents' ability (or obligation)
to revise the TRL. Revisions should be made based on temporal standpoints. An explicit
implementation of temporal standpoints like standpoint inheritance is unnecessary for this
purpose. Recall from Section 3.4 that traditional branching time systems eﬀectively switch
standpoints with every new point of evaluation although standpoints play no explicit role in
the semantics of those theories.
16[Malpass and Wawer(2012)], p. 7–8
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KK won KK lost
S
before the race
after the race
KK won KK lost
Standpoint: 
before the race
(a)
Standpoint: 
after the race
(b)
KK won KK lost
!!! Standpoint not
on TRL !!!
(c)
S S
Figure 6.2.2: The surprising failure of Knobbly Knees. TF structures representing (a) Sam's
designation before the race, (b) what her designation should be after the race, and (c) the
designation that Malpass and Wawer ascribed to her. The S nodes represent the standpoints
or contexts of utterance, and the bold red lines represent the TRL.
The TRL at any moment (standpoint) should always contain that moment in the sense
that, with respect that moment, it had always been the case that what holds at that moment
will occur. This stipulation ensures that TRL chains select the correct past since TRL chains
are backwards linear. The future, however, may be open to designation by the agent under
EpTF. (Some future must be speciﬁed; otherwise, EpTF would not be true futurism at all.)
Consider the TRL designations presented in Figure 6.2.2. The left structure is attributed
to Sam before the race, for she supposes that Knobbly Knees will win. As it turns out,
Knobbly Knees loses. Given that the standpoint must be on the stipulated TRL, Sam
should revise her beliefs. After revision, the TRL should point to the standpoint or context
of utterance, the node in which Knobbly Knees has lostnot that in which the horse won.
Sam maintains that the TRL points to the node at which Knobbly Knees won; and since
the horse lost, the standpoint lies apart from the TRL. Malpass and Wawer charged that
EpTF sanctions Sam's epistemic irresponsibility, but one need not presume any such thing.
Advocates of EpTF need only maintain that the TRL should contain the standpoint or
context of utterance.
There is a delicate issue of scope. Once standpoints enter the scene, it is important to
be clear about which standpoint applies to which temporal operator. In the scenario given
by Malpass and Wawer, all temporal operators should follow the outermost designation of
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context. Consider:
(6.3) Knobbly Knees was going to win,
where the context is after the horse has lost. This statement may be truncated as:
(6.4) was: will: KK wins
The standpoint of the outermost temporal operator (namely, was) is that in which the horse
has already lost. If the standpoint of the innermost operator is the past moment picked out
by was, the node before the race, then the proposition is true just as Malpass and Wawer
claimed. That is because from that earlier standpoint, Sam stipulated a TRL in which
(6.5) Knobbly Knees will win
(6.6) will: KK wins
is true. To get the truth value of (6.3) and (6.4) right, the inner will must use the same
context as the outer was. (6.5) and (6.6) are subtely diﬀerent when taken alone on the one
hand and when embedded in (6.3) and (6.4) on the other hand.
The need for temporal standpoints is not limited to EpTF. The idea has independent
support. A variety of branching temporal logics can use temporal standpoints to handle com-
binations of temporal operators. Temporal standpoints are discussed further in Section 3.4
and formally in Section 8.3. The theory of standpoint inheritance given in those sections is
not necessary to handle Malpass and Wawer's example. It suﬃces for EpTF to stipulate
that that agents ought to revise their beliefs to include the context of utterance.
Malpass and Wawer provided a second alleged counterexample to EpTF.
Imagine that Jonny countered Sam's prediction by saying Knobbly Knees will
not win, and that he associated his utterance with a future in which the horse
loses. Then, he and Sam will both have spoken the truth, even though they
sound very much like they have contradicted each other. We ﬁnd this situation
counter-intuitive. Our complaint here is that it seems that only one of Sam or
Jonny could have spoken the truth, and the other falsity.17
17[Malpass and Wawer(2012)], p. 8
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This allegation conﬂates standards for EpTF with those for OnTF. It is not the truth of
propositions that is internally baptized, nor does it generally make sense to ask about which
proposition is objectively the right one. A fan of EpTF might reject OnTF. In this case,
there is no objective truth of the matter regarding whether or not Knobbly Knees will win
until the horse either wins or loses. EpTF associates the content of Sam's and Jonny's
respective assertions with internal states. So it does not make sense to ask whose assertion
is objectively true unless there is an objectively true picture in terms of which to evaluate
the individual pictures of Sam and Jonny. Both of their assertions can be represented and
associated with internal suppositions using separate models, and that may be all a friend of
EpTF is interested in.
Although objective truth may not be an issue, there is still room for discussion about
justiﬁcation. Sam and Jonny make incompatible assertions and have corresponding incom-
patible models of the world. One might ask, Who's assertion is justiﬁed? or Who's picture
is justiﬁed? One could even inquire about who is right by combining OnTF and EpTF.
Despite the virtues of EpTF, true futurists seem uninterested in the position. One
reason may be that the future can be epistemically indeterminate and agents may withhold
judgment about the future. Such epistemic considerations are often taken to support open
futurism or supervaluationism against TF. Agents do not have to designate a particular
future as the one that is going to happenthat sounds like a lot of pressure. Sometimes,
agents do designate such a future, and perhaps an EpTF understanding would be helpful
for those cases. Even granting that there may be such cases, EpTF does not seem to apply
to most realistic situations.
6.3 True Futurism and Language
SmTF has seen mixed reviews. In SmTF's favor, many thinkers and other English
speakers acknowledge S-FLEM's validy. SmTF is the simplest theory in which S-FLEM is
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valid.18 Section 6.3.1 discusses S-FLEM's validity, explaining S-FLEM's intuitive character
as a particular type of LEM.
Most scholars hold that AbsTF is implausible. An important reason why is described
in Section 6.3.2. AbsTF involves only a single TRL. There is no TRL at counterfactual
moments. The TRL is the relation used to evaluate propositions involving temporal oper-
ators: will, was, and company. So AbsTF has problems evaluating temporal operators at
counterfactual moments; and there is no appealing way around these issues.
That leaves IdxTF. Section 6.3.3 describes a criticism given by Belnap and Green against
IdxTF. Standard IdxTF logics are incapable of resolving the problem. Temporal stand-
points, however, allow IdxTF to get the correct result, as shown in Section 6.3.4. The
resolution brings out the extent to which God's beliefs are standpoint-dependent, unlike
normal beliefs. At least, either God's beliefs depend on standpoints or fatalism wins the day.
6.3.1 For S-FLEM's Plausibility
As far as accounting for natural language goes, two connected reasons favoring S-FLEM's
validity are intuitive plausibility and actual use. Many scholars ﬁnd S-FLEM intuitively
plausible. The vote for S-FLEM may be close to unanimous for other English speakers. Just
as English speakers agree with instances of LEM such as:
(6.7) Jones is either drinking coﬀee or not drinking coﬀee,
they ﬁnd corresponding instances of S-FLEM equally obvious:
(6.8) Either Jones will drink coﬀee or she will not.
Thus, intuitive plausibility and actual use prima facie favor S-FLEM.
One reason why instances of S-FLEM look like truisms just as much as corresponding
instances of LEM is that will and not appear to commute. For example:
18S-FLEM is also valid under supervaluationism, but supervaluationism has some quirks that many
thinkers are unwilling to accept. Supervaluationism is explained in Section 7.2.3.
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(6.9) Jones will drink coﬀee.
This proposition may be formalized as:
(6.10) c ∶= Jones drinks coﬀee
(6.11) will:c
English speakers reject (6.9) with a proposition like:
(6.12) Jones will not drink coﬀee.
This proposition may be symbolized as:
(6.13) will:¬c
That (6.9) is rejected using (6.12) and conversely indicates that the two are logical opposites.
That is:
(6.14) will:c and will:¬c are logical opposites.
Generalizing on this example yields the following result:
(6.15) For any proposition φ, ¬will:φ and will:¬φ are logically equivalent.
This is the promised result that will and not commute. Given bivalence, it immediately
follows that S-FLEM and M-FLEM are equivalent, and that both are special cases of LEM.
For instance, (6.8) is equivalent to the following instance of M-FLEM:
(6.16) Either Jones will drink coﬀee or it is not the case that Jones will drink coﬀee.
W-FLEM also follows from LEM and is typically equivalent to M-FLEM. It is no wonder
that English speakers ﬁnd instances of S-FLEM just as plausible as instances of LEM.
A second argument for S-FLEM is ex post in ﬂavor and is especially plausible when put
in terms of predictions or bets. This argument aims to show that exactly one disjunct is true
for a given instance of S-FLEM. Suppose that LEM is valid, at least pertaining to atoms.
For instance,
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(6.17) Jones is either drinking coﬀee or she is not.
(6.17) holds at all moments, including right now. Yesterday, Smith and Brown placed bets
on Jones' coﬀee drinking. Smith bet that:
(6.18) Jones will drink coﬀee.
Brown bet that:
(6.19) Jones will not drink coﬀee.
Exactly one of Smith and Brown won the bet because (6.17) holds. As such, exactly one of
(6.18) and (6.19) was true at the time when the bets were placed. Again, S-FLEM appears
to follow from LEM.19
6.3.2 Temporal Operators at Counterfactual Moments
Early versions of TF, the absolute variety, involve a single TRL. This TRL is moment-
independent and, more generally, has no parameters at all. It is the TRL. Ontologically, the
TRL corresponds to the real timeline. AbsTF encounters severe diﬃculties. As a result,
most advocates of TF now reject AbsTF in favor of its indexical counterpart.
Consider:
(6.20) Had Jones not drunk coﬀee, she would have a headache, although it would
have been possible that she would not have a headache.20
(6.20) shifts the temporal standpoint from an actual moment to a counterfactual moment
in which Jones did not drink coﬀee.21 In Figure 6.3.1, the absolutely actual moment that
19This argument is critiqued in Section 7.3.4
20Despite some differences in portrayal, this example is designed to emphasize the point made with the
coin example in [Belnap and Green(1994)], p. 379.
21Although making the right point with the example does not require such pedanticism, (6.20) is perhaps
best understood as shifting the temporal standpoint to a class of counterfactual moments in which Jones
did not drink coffee. From those counterfactual moments, it should be evaluated whether or not Jones will
have a headache.
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real
moment
counterfactual
standpoint
no
TRL
Figure 6.3.1: Absolute true futurism: Jones' counterfactual headache. Really, Jones had
coﬀee and does not have a headache (left branch). No TRL is deﬁned from the counterfactual
standpoint, creating diﬃculty for evaluating temporal operators there.
serves as the starting point is on the upper-left, featuring a happy illustration of Jones. The
counterfactual standpoint picked out by the antecedent of the conditional is the one in which
Jones did not drink coﬀee. (6.20) requires evaluating whether or not the following is true
from the counterfactual standpoint:
(6.21) Jones will have a headache.
In any sort of true futurism, temporal operators like was and will are deﬁned along the
TRL. The TRL does not run along counterfactual moments in absolute true futurism. As
such, temporal operators cannot be properly evaluated: they are undeﬁned, false, or vac-
uously true at counterfactuals. In the example above, (6.21) is false, vacuously true, or
cannot be evaluated from the counterfactual moment at which Jones did not drink coﬀee.
The truth value of (6.20) inherits this problem. In general, AbsTF does not account for
counterfactuals involving temporal operators. Such examples constitute a signiﬁcant class of
propositions, rendering AbsTF just as signiﬁcantly deﬁcient in its capacity to account for
relevant linguistic data.
Fans of AbsTF may accept the result, modify their theory, or abandon it. The ﬁrst
two options do not appear promising, although that has not stopped a few scholars from
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taking them.22 Those who accept the result must acknowledge that AbsTF is inadequate
as a general account of temporality in English. Most contemporary scholars agree that
alternative theories are more promising.
It is possible to deﬁne temporal operators with the TRL at actual moments and without
the TRL at counterfactual moments. The only temporal theory that does not require a
TRL is open futurism (OF). One could thus apply AbsTF at actual moments and OF at
counterfactual nodes. This suggestion, however, is quite unappealing for at least two reasons.
First, the proposed mixed theory is disparate if not inconsistent in its account of natural
language. The semantics applied to a given proposition may diﬀer, being TF at some
moments and OF at others. The semantics used is selected for non-linguistic reasons, but
instead on account of presumably ontological considerations. One signiﬁcant diﬀerence is
that will/not commutativity and S-FLEM hold along the TRL, but not elsewhere. The only
diﬀerence between moments where one account is employed over another is the reality of
moments at which a temporal operator is evaluated, but that distinction is not a linguistic
one. A uniﬁed semantic account is desirable, and it is important to ensure that analyses of
propositions are not determined by extra-linguistic or irrelevant factors.
Second, the mixed theory concedes too much to OF. If OF provides a good account
of temporal operators outside of the TRL; and if there is no linguistic diﬀerence between
temporal propositions occurring at actual moments on the one hand and counterfactual
moments on the other hand; then OF provides a good account of temporal operators, period.
There is no need to use AbsTF at all.
Together, these two criticism of the mixed theory indicate that an advocate of the mixed
theory should just adhere to OF. Advocates of TF are better oﬀ rejecting absoluteness.
That is exactly what most of them do.
22For example, [Malpass and Wawer(2012)].
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6.3.3 Counterfactual Past-Future Combinations
Most contemporary advocates of TF follow the indexical theory (IdxTF) at least on
a semantic level, their ontological and epistemological commitments aside.23 IdxTF easily
handles propositions like (6.20). Every moment m has a TRLm.24 As such, propositions
calling for a switch in temporal standpoint, like counterfactual propositions, and propositions
simply occurring at counterfactual moments can be evaluated uniformly using the TRLm.
Whenever future contingents are involved, some moment m has at least two incompatible
possible futures. TRLm designates exactly one of those futures as the (indexically) actual
future of m. Those possible futures not chosen by TRLm have pasts that do not lead back to
those counterfactual nodes. In general, the criticism is that IdxTF sanctions the following:
(6.22) Had some given counterfactual event occurred, then it would have been the
case that the event was not going to occur.
Belnap and Green provided an example. A coin was ﬂipped and came up heads. The
following comes out true from a counterfactual standpoint in which the coin came up tails.
The coin came up tails, but this is not what was going to happen. The coin was
going to come up heads. It's just that it didn't.25
To explain this example, let:
(6.23) mtails ∶= a counterfactual moment at which the coin came up tails,
(6.24) mpast ∶= a past moment at which the result of the toss is contingent, although
it will be heads, and
(6.25) mheads ∶= a moment in which the coin came up heads, and TRLpast points to
mheads .
23A description of IdxTF is in [Øhrstrøm(2009)], p. 29. Recent literature on true futurism seems to take
[Øhrstrøm(2009)] as providing the canonical description.
24Distinct moments can have the same TRL; that is, TRLm1 = TRLm2 for m1 ≠m2.
25[Belnap and Green(1994)], p. 380
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(a)
heads tails
past
was: will: ???
will: ???
(b)
heads tails
pastwill: ???
??? = heads
(c)
Figure 6.3.2: Indexical true futurism: The coin came up tails, but it was going to be heads.
(a) clariﬁes the initial (counterfactual) standpoint and the dominant red TRL = TRLpast =
TRLheads . To evaluate what was going to be the case, as in (b), the outer was directs one
backwards in time. In (c), the inner will follows the dominant TRL to mheads , which is not
the desired result.
The scenario is depicted in Figure 6.3.2 (a). The questionable statement in Belnap and
Green's example is:
(6.26) The coin was going to come up heads.
(6.27) was: will: heads
Starting from the counterfactual nodemtails , Belnap and Green evaluated the outer temporal
operator, was, shifting from mtails to mpast as in Figure 6.3.2 (b). Doing so leaves:
(6.28) will: heads
This statement is evaluated from mpast . mpast points to mheads because mtails would not be
counterfactual otherwise. Hence, Belnap and Green's result.
6.3.4 Standpoint Inheritance and God's Beliefs
A true futurist may object to Belnap and Green's example on the grounds that it does not
adequately consider temporal standpoints.26 Temporal operators (was, will, and so forth) are
26Temporal standpoints are introduced in Section 3.4 and treated formally in Section Temporal Standpoints
and Standpoint Inheritance.
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standpoint-sensitive. In IdxTF, temporal operators are evaluated using the TRLm. That
m is a standpoint is equivalent to that temporal operators are to be evaluated using TRLm.
Belnap and Green took mpast to be the appropriate standpoint of the inner temporal
operator, will. Their interpretation is in accordance with standard practice in temporal
logic, but is nevertheless mistaken. In (6.27), the temporal standpoint of both the outer was
and the inner will is mtails . That is because the inner operator, will, inherits the temporal
standpoint of the outer operator, was. Recall the rule for standpoint inheritance given in
Section 3.4:
(6.29) Only change standpoint when absolutely necessarywhen evaluation is only
possible by shifting standpoint. Evaluation is impossible if what holds at the
standpoint is inconsistent with what holds at the point of evaluation.
This type of shift is required for moving to the counterfactualmtails from the factualmheads in
the ﬁrst place, in the example setup. No such change in standpoint is required for evaluating
the inner future operator. The standpoint for that will ismtails , so the future operator should
be evaluated using TRLtails . Since TRLtails contains mtails , the inner will is directed back to
mtails as it should be, not mheads . IdxTF thereby avoids the awkward result. Had the toss
yielded tails, then it was going to be tails, after all.
Related to Belnap and Green's worries are various statements involving predictions and
God's beliefs. Suppose the following hold:
(6.30) Jones drank coﬀee.
(6.31) Smith predicted that Jones would drink coﬀee.
Thus,
(6.32) Smith correctly predicted that Jones would drink coﬀee.
(6.33) God believed that Jones would drink coﬀee.
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Considering the counterfactual scenario in which Jones did not drink coﬀee, the following
should obtain:
(6.34) Had Jones not drunk coﬀee, then she was going to abstain from drinking coﬀee.
(6.35) Had Jones not drunk coﬀee, then Smith's prediction would have been incorrect.
(6.36) Had Jones not drunk coﬀee, then God would have believed that she was going
to abstain from drinking coﬀee.
The example in Belnap and Green's criticism, given Section 6.3.3, pertains to (6.34). The
same problem applies to (6.35), which relies on (6.34). It was shown above that IdxTF can
handle such propositions using standpoint inheritance. Since (6.34) holds, (6.35) is also true.
(6.36) is the peculiar case. Ockhamists in the freedom/foreknowledge literature have
repeatedly endorsed propositions like (6.36).27 Had Jones not drunk coﬀee, then the following
would obtain (entailed by (6.34)):
(6.37) God believes that Jones was going to abstain from drinking coﬀee.
(God believes: was: will: ¬coﬀee)
(6.36) requires that a subtly diﬀerent statement obtains at the counterfactual standpoint:
(6.38) God believed that Jones would not drink coﬀee.
(was: God believes: will: ¬coﬀee)
The diﬀerence between (6.37) and (6.38) is that (6.37) is about what God now believes while
(6.38) is about what he believed. The distinction is also indicated in the semi-symbolic
representation in parentheses.
Statements like (6.38) may be generalized to:
(6.39) For any proposition, φ, if φ, then God has always believed that φ.
27As in the infamous [Plantinga(1986)].
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(6.39) is plausible expression of comprehensive foreknowledge. (6.39) is backwards-looking in
that it emphasizes what God believed about what is now the case. By contrast, (ArgThF.2)
focuses on what God now believes about what will be the case.
Omniscience does not entail (6.39). That God believes all and only truths does not by
itself yield that any proposition, φ, can be substituted into just any instance of God believes
that φ, no matter where φ occurs. Ockhamists want statements like (6.36) to come out
true, so that kind of unlimited substitutability needs to hold, at least to the extent required
by (6.39). It is the standpoint-dependence of God's beliefs that enable substitution as in
(6.38). The softness of God's beliefs is especially pronounced when IdxTF is augmented
with temporal standpoints. His beliefs adapt perfectly to the standpoint and are very supple
as a result. Hence, the following noun phrase is underspeciﬁed if taken without qualiﬁcation:
(6.40) That which God believed
An implicit qualiﬁcation when no other is speciﬁed is from this standpoint. (6.40) is not
incoherent if there is an implicit standpoint. The important observation here is that (6.40)
requires qualiﬁcation, explicit or implicit, because what God believed changes from one
standpoint to another, indicated in the diﬀerence between (6.33) and (6.36). What Smith
believed, on the other hand, is standpoint-independent. What changes based on standpoint
is whether or not Smith was correct, as in from (6.32) to (6.35). God's beliefs are always
correct. His beliefs are unique, suspiciously so, in that they are standpoint-dependent.
Typical agents believe what they do with respect to the standpoint at which they hold
beliefs. Yesterday, Smith believed that Jones would drink coﬀee. Smith held that belief
from yesterday's perspective. If God's beliefs were like normal beliefs, then his belief that
Jones would drink coﬀee would also be from yesterday's perspective. To get (6.38) right in
the counterfactual scenario in which Jones did not drink coﬀee, God's belief cannot be from
today's perspective.
TF is left with a choice between three options. First, one might follow Ockhamists in
the freedom/foreknowledge literature in maintaining the softness of God's beliefs. Doing so
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requires that God's beliefs are as standpoint-dependent as the facts that those beliefs are
about. That is the only way to ensure that God's beliefs track soft facts. As a result, God's
beliefs are drastically unlike normal beliefs. The standpoint-dependence of God's beliefs
needs some explaining. Without a viable explanation, this route seems ad hoc and is not
compelling.
Another path is to claim that God's beliefs are like everyone else's. That is,
(6.41) From any standpoint, God's beliefs at a moment are evaluated with that mo-
ment as the standpoint.
(6.41) ensures that (6.38) is false from the counterfactual standpoint at which Jones did not
drink coﬀee. That is not a problem if God is out of the picture. Otherwise, this is a hard
bullet for TF to bite on the usual understanding of omniscience. The following holds at the
counterfactual standpoint:
(6.42) Jones did not drink coﬀee although God believed that she would.
(was: God believes: will: coﬀee)
(6.42) indicates that it is possible for God to hold false beliefs. He is fallible. Of course, God
will in fact not hold any false beliefs. God could be wrong, but he never is.28 Statements
like (6.42) can only obtain at counterfactual moments. So theists could maintain that God's
beliefs are like everyone else's, settling for God's correctness instead of infallibility.
Finally, one could propose that God's beliefs are like everyone else's and sacriﬁce the
typical understanding of omniscience to retain infallibility. On this view, there are truths
that God does not know. Given his infallibility, he cannot consistently know all truths in a
world with future-contingents. Electing to create a world with future contingents, including
free agents, amounts to creating a world in which God does not know all soft facts. So God
28That God is never wrong requires that there is a dominant TRL in the IdxTF model. For this to
happen, the ATC tree must have root moment or segment. That is, forking must have a chronological lower
bound. The TRL of the root will dominate other TRLs.
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does not have comprehensive foreknowledge, but only because he chooses not to in favor of
contingency and freedom. This position is where TF and open theism overlap.29
6.4 True Futurism and Fatalism
Critics of TF maintain that it does not successfully avoid fatalism. These challenges
come in various forms, two of which are emphasized here. First, there is a class of arguments
by which TF entails fatalism. Some arguments along these lines stemming from interpreting
will as will-actually are given in Section 6.4.1.
The second type of critique amounts to a general version of the grounding objection
usually stated against Molinism. The general grounding problem may be speciﬁed as follows:
grounding objection TF is either fatalistic or ad hoc, arbitrarily designating futures
To avoid being ad hoc, TF must provide some meaningful account of the TRL or, equiva-
lently, soft facts. The problem is that any attempt to ground the TRL attaches the TRL to
modality in a way that entails fatalism. The challenge for TF is to provide an account of
the TRL that is neither ad hoc nor yields fatalism. The grounding objection is described in
terms of modalities in Section 6.4.2 and soft facts in Section 6.4.3.
Theistic considerations add another diﬃculty to the grounding problem. TFmust explain
how God comes to know soft facts in addition to soft facts themselves. This issue is discussed
in Sections 6.4.3 and 6.4.4. The latter section emphasizes considerations speciﬁc to Molina's
approach.
The grounding problem seems unavoidable within the dynamic framework used here.
The discussion in Section 6.4.5 indicates that eternalism or a more thorough absolutism is a
natural choice for TF. Eternalism grounds soft facts by given them something to describe. A
diﬀerent set of worries may come along with eternalism, but those concerns are not addressed
here.
29Open theism, including this variety, are discussed further in Section 7.2.4.
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6.4.1 Will-Actually
Some advocates of TF maintain that the TRL represents the actual course of history.30
In this case, will might be interpreted as will-actually. (For consistency in notation, actually-
will is used instead of will-actually.) At least a couple of observations make it problematic
to interpret will as actually-will.
Some clariﬁcation is in order before proceeding. The notion of actuality used here is
not absolute, but indexical. There is no such thing as the actual moment simpliciter, as if
there were a special moment, α, speciﬁed in each branching time model. Absolute actuality
may be popular in some circles, but it is not ultimately viable for the those who take time
seriously. A full discussion of this issue is beyond this project since the dynamic view is
assumed here, but here is a rough synopsis. If each model has a unique actual world, α,
then there is an equivalence class of models representing a given tree structure such that the
models diﬀer only in their assignments of α (plus all and only diﬀerences that follow from
that assignment). There is no ﬂow inherent in the equivalence class, which is more like a deck
of cards than a river. At best, time ﬂow is extra metaphysical baggage that Priorians add to
the way they interpret their models; at worse, the non-ﬂowing nature of the equivalence class
shows that time does not ﬂow. Hence, it is necessary to reject absolute actuality to avoid
compromising time ﬂow. Indexical actuality is the only viable option. Actually works more
like I and now in that those indexicals do not universally pick out a particular individual or
time, respectively.
If will cannot feasibly be interpreted as actually-will, then what exactly does will amount
to under TF? The arguments in this section are designed to show that under TF, will cannot
amount to actually-will.
First, the TRL's formal modality enables one to use TRL-speciﬁc modal operators.31
Just as will is interpreted as actually-will, the modal operators along the TRL may be called
30For instance, [Malpass and Wawer(2012)], p. 8.
31Recall that a formal modality is a relation that can be depicted using an accessibility relation. See
Section 2.2.
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actually-possibly and actually-necessarily. Actual possibility and actual necessity are such
that actually-will is equivalent to not actually-possibly not. That is,
(6.43) actually-will:φ is logically equivalent to ¬actually-possibly:¬φ
(6.43) holds on account of two facts that obtain in TF systems:
(6.44) ¬actually-will:φ is equivalent to actually-will:¬φ
(6.45) actually-will:φ is equivalent to actually-possibly:φ
Some preliminary clariﬁcation is in order before explaining (6.43) in more semantic detail. In
logics for which the temporal relation is linear, like TF, will is like a future-possibly operator.
There is in general no inconsistency in both φ and ¬φ being possible at once. This fact also
holds for will, but for the wrong reasons. This scenario occurs when φ is true at some future
moment and ¬φ is true at some diﬀerent, earlier or later, future moment. The result is that
statements like:
(6.46) Jones will drink coﬀee and she will not drink coﬀee
turn out true, although (6.46) looks absurd. There is an implicit assumption that the
conjuncts of statements like (6.46) are about the same time.32 Under that supposition,
(6.46) and its ilk are false because they violate the law of non-contradiction. Jones cannot
both drink coﬀee and not drink coﬀee at the same time. Section 8.1.3 describes this issue
and how it can be addressed formally. For now, it is enough to assume that token statements
about what will occur are about particular future times. In what follows, suppose for clarity
that (6.47)(6.50) are corresponding tokens pertaining to tomorrow.
Returning to an explanation of (6.43), start with:
(6.47) actually-will:φ
32See Section 3.2.
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(6.47) holds at moment m just in case φ is true tomorrow on some (the one and only)
TRL-accessible branch.33 The negation of (6.47) is:
(6.48) ¬actually-will:φ
holds just in case φ is untrue tomorrow on all TRL-accessible branches. Additionally:
(6.49) actually-will:¬φ
is true if and only if ¬φ holds tomorrow on some TRL-accessible branches. Since there is
only one such branch, (6.49) is equivalent to (6.48). That is the will-not commutativity
result celebrated by TF. The truth conditions for (6.49) are the same as those for:
(6.50) actually-possibly:¬φ
(6.47) and (6.50) are logical opposites. Hence, (6.43).
Even taken alone, (6.43) is problematic for TF. Prima facie, the actually-possibly oper-
ator means something like actualizably. If something is genuinely possible, then it is actu-
alizable. (6.43) shows that if φ will hold (at a given time), then ¬φ is not actualizable (at
that same time) and hence not genuinely possible. (Recall that ATC-possibility, whatever
exactly it amounts to, represents genuine possibility by deﬁnition.) To avoid this fatalistic
conclusion, TF must select one of these options:
(6.51) Deny that will amounts to actually-will
(6.52) Deny that actually-possibly amounts to actualizably
(6.53) Deny that actualizability is required for genuine possibility
(6.51) requires TF to explain what exactly will means, if not actually-will. (6.53) does not
seem viable unless interpreted as (6.53). (6.52) may therefore be the best option. It is left
to TF to show how actually-possibly is relevantly distinct from actualizably.34
33This definition, which uses some rather than all, is equivalent to the one given in [Øhrstrøm(2009)],
p. 29. This equivalence holds because the TRL is linear and unbounded.
34
145
An apparent way out for TF is that actually-possibly equivocates on possibly. That
actually-will amounts to not-actually-possibly-not takes possibility in a merely formal sense.
It requires a non-formal, genuinely modal sense of possibility to get from actually-possible to
actualizable. That response is not very convincing. It is the nature of will that requires the
linearity of the TRL to avoid statements like Jones will drink coﬀee and she will not coming
out true when about the same future time. Setting that concern aside and ignoring its
source, will, suppose the TRL has a fork on which Jones drinks coﬀee on one branch and she
does not on the other. (There may still be other ATC branches that are not TRL-accessible,
so the TRL is not identical to the ATC tree.) Then Jones actually-possibly drinks coﬀee
and Jones actually-possibly doesn't drink coﬀee are true. Here, actually-possibly does not
seem merely formal, but indicates that Jones' coﬀee-drinking and her non-coﬀee-drinking
are actualizable.
A second consideration leads to similar worries but does not require interpreting actually-
possibly as it stands. One might instead drop actually and obtain a relevant sense of possibly.
What enables this move is that actually tends to be redundant when it comes to truth value.35
For example:
(6.54) It is raining.
(6.55) It is actually raining.
(6.56) Actually, it is raining.
Speakers may utter (6.54)(6.56) under diﬀerent circumstances, perhaps using actually for
emphasis or to highlight a literal interpretation. Taken as propositions and focusing on
truth value, however, (6.54)(6.56) are logically equivalent. At least, (6.55) and (6.56) entail
(6.54). Analogous results hold for the following:
(6.57) It might be raining.
35See [Brogaard(2008)].
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(6.58) It might actually be raining.
(6.59) It actually might be raining.
(6.60) Actually, it might be raining.
There is a problem for TF for those who hold that actually is redundant.36 Combined
with (6.43), the eliminability of actually resuscitates the argument for logical fatalism. The
TRL's formal modality connects temporal operators to modal operators. The redundancy of
actually shows that those modal operators are not merely formal, but relevant to fatalism.
The supposed disparity between temporal operators and relevant modalities is baseless.
ArgLF-Act Argument for Logical Fatalism using Actually-Will (Generalizable)
(ArgLF-Act.1) Either Jones actually-will have coﬀee or she actually-will not. [premise, an
instance of S-FLEM]
(ArgLF-Act.2) Jones actually-will have coﬀee. [WLOG assumption from (ArgLF-Act.1)]
(ArgLF-Act.3) If Jones actually-will have coﬀee, that Jones does not have coﬀee is not actually-
possible. [premise37]
(ArgLF-Act.4) That Jones does not have coﬀee is not actually-possible. [by (ArgLF-Act.2)
and (ArgLF-Act.3)]
(ArgLF-Act.5) Actually is redundant. [premise]
(ArgLF-Act.6) That Jones does not have coﬀee is not possible. [by (ArgLF-Act.4) and
(ArgLF-Act.5)]
36The argument given below, ArgLF-Act, might be reformulated for other notions of actually. A full
discussion of actually and other indexicals like now is beyond this project. Note that the arguments against
TF given elsewhere in this chapter do not hinge on the redundancy of actually.
37The discussion above explains how TF yields this result. Of course, the result holds in formal settings,
both in the TF systems given in Chapter 8 and in canonical renditions like [Øhrstrøm(2009)].
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(ArgLF-Act.7) That Jones has coﬀee is necessary. [by (ArgLF-Act.6), given that ¬possibly:¬φ
is equivalent to necessarily:φ]
(ArgLF-Act.8) It is either necessary that Jones has coﬀee or necessary that she does not,
and whichever is necessary corresponds to what will be. [by (ArgLF-Act.1),
(ArgLF-Act.2), and (ArgLF-Act.7)]
ArgLF-Act diﬀers substantively from ArgLF only with respect to the two proposals
discussed above. (ArgLF-Act.3) is unavoidable in true-futurist logics. Whatever the TRL
amounts to, will is equivalent to not-possibly-not along that relation. That fact is not
problematic in itself. Possibly in this case is formally modal, as is the corresponding necessity.
As discussed in Section 2.2, formal modality does not in itself have any bearing on other
senses of modality, like the kinds that might infringe upon contingency. Permissibility, for
instance, is formally modal although what is impermissible or obligatory does not aﬀect
contingency.
(ArgLF-Act.5) makes the TRL modally threatening to contingency. Contingency in-
volves a particular sort of possibility, all-things-considered (ATC) possibility, that is at least
as stringent as physical possibility. The redundancy of actually indicates that the term does
not modify the kind of possibility/necessity involved. Something is actually logically possible
if and only if it is logically possible, actually physically possible if and only if it is physically
possible, and so forth. In the arguments for logical fatalism, possibility is understood to be
of the type relevant to contingency. Since actual-possibility reduces to possibility simpliciter,
actual-possibility is of the same type in this context.
The concern may also be expressed by taking the possibility tree metaphorically as a
forking path. Considering the tree sans TRL, contingencies generate forks in the path such
that each branch might be actualized from their respective temporally antecedent moments.
For example, Jones may elect to follow the coﬀee-drinking path tomorrow or the coﬀee-
deprived path. Introducing the TRL ﬁxes the actualized paths. Perhaps the TRL speciﬁes
that the coﬀee-drinking path is actual and not its counterpart. The TRL is static with
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respect to a given model. From the perspective of any given moment in a particular model,
the TRL cannot be altered. It is not within Jones' power to follow/actualize the coﬀee-
deprived path, thereby changing the path of the TRL. In general, positing an actual future
restricts which futures can be followed/actualized.
One might attempt to counter as follows. The TRL was deﬁned separately from the
underlying tree structure representing ATC possibility. A prima facie reasonable hypothesis
is that ATC possibility is just physical possibility. The TRL does not amount to physical
possibility. The former is generally stricter than (is extensionally a proper subset of) the
latter and there are notable modal diﬀerences between the TRL and physical possibility.38
Unlike physical possibility and hence ATC possibility, the TRL is not modal in any sense
that threatens contingency.
By assumption, the TRL is not intensionally the same thing as physical possibility. It is
also agreeable that physical possibility is a good candidate for ATC possibility. The issue,
however, is that ArgLF-Act shows that introducing the TRL makes a diﬀerence. The
presence of the TRL changes ATC possibility so that, whatever else warrants consideration,
the TRL is also relevant. With the TRL around, ATC possibility cannot just be physical
possibility. ATC possibility is extensionally identical to the TRL.
ArgLF-Act concludes that the TRL is genuinely modal. The TRL is not propositional.
On the one hand, if not all genuine modalities are propositional (perhaps some are ontologi-
cal), then the TRL is genuinely modal in a non-propositional sense. Linear genuine modality
yields fatalism, in which case TF is fatalistic. On the other hand, if all genuine modalities are
propositional, then the TRL is not genuinely modal because the TRL is not propositional.
So TF is incoherentboth genuinely modal and not. TF must dismantle ArgLF-Act or
choose between fatalism and absurdity.
38Section 6.4.2 discusses the ways in which the TRL and is not modal.
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6.4.2 The Modality of the Thin Red Line
Advocates of TF claim that will is not modal, at least not in any way that aﬀects
future contingency. There are, however, senses in which will is modal and the TRL can be
associated with possibility and necessity. Many scholars have criticized TF, claiming that
either the TRL is modal in an interesting sense, in which case true futurism leads to fatalism,
or TF is baseless. (This is a general version of the grounding problem faced by Molinists.)
For instance, Belnap and Green condemned AbsTF and IdxTF:
Let us note also that each of these forms of actualism about the future involves
commitments to facts that do not supervene upon any physical, chemical, bio-
logical or psychological states of aﬀairs. The fact, if it is one, that at a given
indeterministic moment m there is some history such that it is the one that will
occur, is not a state of aﬀairs that supervenes upon what is true of particles,
tissues or organisms that exist at m. Those of us who do not postulate a Thin
Red Line have no need of such a mysterious realm of fact. (We hope you join us
in regarding as spurious a reassurance having the form, but it's only a logical
fact. That's bad logic.) 39
Section 2.2 enumerates four senses in which something can be modal. These types of modal-
ity are grammatical, formal, propositional, and ontological. Section 3.1 notes that will is
grammatically modal, placing will into the same grammatical category as can and should.
Like can and should, will is representable using modal operators. The TRL can be
depicted with an accessibility relation. As such, the TRL is a formal accessibility relation
and will is formally modal. Being formally modal is not suﬃcient for having any relation to
genuine possibility and necessity.
The dangerous types of modality, the kinds from which TF wants to steer clear because
of their relevance to contingency, are propositional and ontological modality. Recall from
Section 2.2 that a propositional modality is one that can be captured using a set of principles
expressed as propositions. The structure and path of an ontological modality is dictated by
some mechanism, physical or otherwise.
39[Belnap and Green(1994)], p. 381.
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The TRL is not propositionally modal. This fact may be part of Belnap and Green's
criticism against TF. The TRL cannot be depicted by a set of laws. There is no rule or
formula specifying the TRL's path. Granted, one can learn the TRL's path by inspecting
God's beliefs if he has maximally speciﬁc, infallible foreknowledge. As emphasized by many
commentators, however, God knows what will happen because it will happen, not the other
way around. God's beliefs about the future do not in any sense cause a particular future
to occur. The future does not take God's beliefs as its source, but conversely: that a given
future will be is the source of God's beliefs. A rule like
(6.61) An event will occur if and only if God believes that it will occur,
while logically true, is ultimately circular as an explanation of what will occur (although the
rule is not circular as an explanation of God's beliefs).
Belnap and Green observed that there is no material state of aﬀairs determining what will
be the case in situations of genuine future contingency. Indeed, there is no mechanism of any
sort, no principle in the ontological sense, selecting one timeline over another as designating
the actual future. So the TRL is not ontologically modal, either. (As noted above, God's
beliefs should not be understood as the future's source.) Nevertheless, the TRL follows a
speciﬁc path, choosing exactly one future over many.
What, then, is the TRL? Øhrstrøm, a foremost adherent of TF in the future contingents
literature, asked a series of relevant questions:
But what makes the speciﬁed branch privileged? Is it merely that it represents
what is going to happen? Is there anything in the present situation [...] which
makes one branch ontologically special as opposed to the other branches?40
Fans of TF tend towards OnTF, but this leaves them in a quandary. Either there are
principles or mechanisms specifying the true future or there are not. If there are principles
or mechanisms specifying the true future, the TRL would be propositionally or ontologically
modal, respectively. TF would be unable to maintain the supposed divorce of time from
40[Øhrstrøm(2009)], p. 26. Øhrstrøm does not commit to particular answers.
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modality. Without any principles or mechanisms to specify what the future is, it is not
clear what direct evidence there could be for OnTF. Such ontology an is ad hoc, if not
outright baseless; unless there is are independent reasons for accepting OnTF. There must
be a reason why one future will be and others will not.
One way of endorsing OnTF is through SmTF. If SmTF is the best account of temporal
language and if consistency demands that someone who holds SmTF should hold OnTF,
then OnTF is a viable position, other factors being equal. This route seems popular in
the future contingents literature, but there are obstacles. First, insofar as S-FLEM is intu-
itively plausible, SmTF must contend with supervaluationism. Second, S-FLEM may not
be as unobjectionable as it seems, given the upcoming considerations in Section 7.3.1 and
Section 7.3.4. So endorsement for SmTF may not be enough to support TF against other
worries.
6.4.3 Grounding Soft Facts
Another point worth mentioning has to do with the ontological modality of the TRL.
Ockhamists in the freedom/foreknowledge literature insist that God's beliefs about the future
depend on what happens in the future. As Todd pointed out, scholars in that tradition have
not successfully analyzed that dependence relation and there is little reason to think that a
good analysis is forthcoming.41 Ockhamists in the freedom/foreknowledge literature tend to
classify propositions specifying God's beliefs about the future as soft facts.
For this discussion, it suﬃces that God believes all and only truths, in which case God's
beliefs depend on certain soft facts. This perspective helpfully distinguishes between two
separate issues:
(6.62) the dependence of soft facts on contingent futures, and
(6.63) the dependence of some of God's beliefs on present soft facts.
41[Todd(2012)]
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The ﬁrst dependence relation is relevant to both logical and theological fatalism, while the
second dependence relation pertains only to the latter. Problems arise in both departments.
TF needs to account for the dependence of soft facts on contingent futures. This depen-
dence relation runs against the ﬂow of time. Ex hypothesi, soft facts are facts prior to that
upon which at least some of their facthood depends. Backwards dependence (with respect
to time) seems anomalous, perhaps even inexplicable. TF is challenged to ﬁnd independent
examples of relevantly similar dependence relations. The dependence relation must be ex-
plicated so as to make sense of why soft facts depend on some possible futures rather than
others. That is, one must account for both why a particular course of events counts as the
true future and others do not, and how the dependence relation works.
It is often ﬁne for beliefs to depend on present facts. For example, Jones might believe
that she is sipping coﬀee since she is. Granted, this simple example involves the dependence
of Jones' belief on a hard fact, not a soft fact. There is no future content essential to the
fact that Jones is sipping coﬀee. Soft facts, which have essential future content, can neither
cause nor justify beliefs in the same way as hard facts. The events speciﬁed by corresponding
hard facts are or were observable but soft facts lack such a basis. Future events that are the
source of soft facts cannot be observed by agents in time. Take a paradigmatic soft fact,
(6.64) Smith correctly asserted that Jones will drink coﬀee
Assume once again that whether or not Jones drinks coﬀee is a contingent matter. Jones, who
has yet to decide whether or not she will drink coﬀee, does not know whether or not Smith's
assertion is correct. That is, Jones does not know the truth value (using a true-futurist
understanding) of:
(6.65) Jones will drink coﬀee.
Jones can, however, know that
(6.66) Smith asserted that Jones will drink coﬀee.
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(6.64) is equivalent to the conjunction of (6.65) and (6.66). (6.66) is known to be true as a
hard fact. The truth value of (6.65), on the other hand, cannot be known in any familiar
way until Jones decides once and for all. Since the truth value of (6.64) depends on not only
(6.66) but also (6.65), the truth value of (6.64) cannot be known in a familiar way, either.
So if God infallibly believes soft facts, he must come about that knowledge in an unfamiliar
way. To make sense of God's mysterious foreknowledge acquisition is to answer what Alfred
Fredosso and Christopher Kosciuk call the source question.42 One such answer, Molinism,
is discussed below in Section 6.4.4.
Theistic eternalists do not need to rely on soft facts to account for God's beliefs about
the future. Given that all eventspast, present, and futureare present to God, he can
form beliefs about them similarly to the way that Jones forms beliefs about her own coﬀee-
sipping or other happenings she observes around her. Events corresponding to soft facts are
observable by an eternal God.
6.4.4 Molinism and the Grounding Objection
Molinism has its roots in Luis de Molina's work.43 Molina claims that God has such inti-
mate knowledge of his creation that he knows what would happen in any given circumstance.
He even knows how free agents will freely act.
To clarify middle knowledge and its role, it may be helpful to look at other aspects
of Molina's view about God's knowledge. Molina separates God's knowledge into three
moments. These stages have a logical or conceptual order, although the stages are not
temporally ordered. The ﬁrst stage is a precondition of the second, which in turn is a
precondition of the third.
The ﬁrst stage of God's knowledge is his natural knowledge, depicted in Figure 6.4.1 (a).
He knows all logical and metaphysical truths. He may not know which physical laws he will
instantiate, but he knows what the options are and how each would play out. Such vast
42[Kosciuk(2010)], p. 4. See also [Freddoso(1988)].
43[Molina(1988)].
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natural knowledge
(a)
middle knowledge
(b)
free knowledge
(c)
Figure 6.4.1: Molinism: natural, middle, and free knowledge. (a) By God's natural knowl-
edge, he knows all of the possible universes (ATC trees) that he can create; and he knows all
of the possible scenarios that can occur in those universes. The various trees are speciﬁed by
diﬀerent creation/interaction options. (b) God's middle knowledge yields what will occur in
each possible scenario. Middle knowledge speciﬁes the TRL or, equivalently, all soft facts.
(c) God knows which possible universe he will create by his free knowledge.
natural knowledge is enough for an inﬁnite intellect to know all possible situations. In terms
of a branching temporal system, he comprehends all possible ATC trees in the ﬁrst stage,
but not the TRL. An underlying possibility tree is of course a precondition of the TRL.
The second stage constitutes middle knowledge. Here is Molina's description.
[I]n virtue of the most profound and inscrutable comprehension of each faculty
of free choice, He saw in His own essence what each such faculty would do with
its innate freedom were it to be placed in this or that or, indeed, in inﬁnitely
many orders of thingseven though it would really be able, if it so willed, to do
the opposite.44
The result of God's middle knowledge is illustrated in Figure 6.4.1 (b). Drawing from
Platonism, Molina views creaturely essences as partial or diluted instantiations of the divine
essence. Since God understands his own essence perfectly, he is intimately familiar with
each of its possible imperfect derivatives. Thus, he knows how free agents will act in any
given situation. God, by way of his middle knowledge, knows the path of the TRL in every
possible circumstance after the moment of creation.
For instance, suppose that it is contingent whether or not Jones will drink coﬀee tomor-
44[Molina(1988)], p. 168
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row. God knows Jones quite well, even better than she knows herself. He knows that she
loves coﬀee and that there will be no circumstances tomorrow to dissuade her from drinking
her favorite Guatemalan light roast in the morning. Thus, knowing Jones and the relevant
factors of the circumstances, God knows that Jones will freely decide have a cup of coﬀee,
although she is capable of doing otherwise. God can see himself in Jones' shoes, so to speak,
to forecast what she will do.
The third stage accounts for God's free knowledge. See Figure 6.4.1 (c). He knows which
of all possible universes he will create, which creatures (free and otherwise) will occupy that
world, and how he will be involved in that world's happenings. He will create a world in
which Jones exists, young Jones would grow to like coﬀee, a particular Guatemalan light
roast will be her favorite, and the circumstances will be ripe for her to choose to enjoy a cup
of it tomorrow.
The grounding objection is often considered the most serious threat to Molinism. This
criticism is stated in various ways. Steven Cowan, for instance, portrayed the issue as
tension between Molinism's commitment to libertarian freedom and true counterfactuals of
freedom.45 The grounding objection in its broadest form applies to all kinds of TF. A general
statement of the grounding objection is that TF is either fatalistic or ad hoc.
According to Molinists, God's middle knowledge includes his intimate knowledge of free
agents. God knows with absolute certainty what Jones will do any circumstance by his middle
knowledge and his natural knowledge of possible circumstances in which Jones may ﬁnd
herself. On the one hand, Molinism makes it seem that free agents like Jones are constituted
so as to yield absolutely certain output in every circumstance they could possibly be in.
Molinism portrays so-called free agents more like deterministic automata than genuinely
free agents. On the other hand, one might contend that free agents are not determined. It
just so happens that there are soft facts about them. In this case, the criticism is that agents
are not completely predictable and thus middle knowledge has no basis.
45[Cowan(2003)], p. 93
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Notice that the determinism horn of the grounding objection does not require that agents
are physically determined. Even if agents' characters are relatively independent of the phys-
ical world, agents must still be mechanistic on a mental level. There must be causes at
work even if those causes are not physical. Middle knowledge is baseless or deteriorates into
natural knowledge.
Molinists sometimes try to skirt the issue by rejecting this mechanistic view of free
agents. There are facts about the contingent future, soft facts, and middle knowledge just
amounts to knowing all of the soft facts about every possible circumstance. Koscuik, for
instance, used soft facts as examples to show that there can be a fact of the matter even
when contingencies are involved.46 The problem with this approach is that it presupposes
an explanation of soft facts (or, equivalently, the TRL). The general grounding problem for
TF, discussed in Sections 6.4.2 and 6.4.3, was seen to be non-trivial. Molinism cannot just
take soft facts for granted. Following Freddoso, Koscuik maintained that Molinism serves as
an explanation of the source of God's knowledge about soft facts.47 If Molinism is to avoid
the general grounding problem, Molinism should also explain soft facts themselves.
Freddoso and Kosciuk claim that middle knowledge includes, for example, knowledge
specifying the indeterministic behavior of subatomic particles.48 When such a particle ex-
hibits indeterministic behavior, God does not know by his natural knowledge alone what will
occur in some circumstances involving the particle. Unlike free agents, there is no person
(like Jones) to know intimately enough to specify how an indeterministic particle will behave.
Given that the particle's behavior is indeterministic, a Molinist would propose that there is
a soft fact of the matter about how the particle will behave. By his middle knowledge, God
comes to know the soft fact by understanding the fact's source. That by which the soft fact
is true is the same as the source of God's knowledge of that soft fact. In this case, God
knows how the particle will behave since he knows it intimately as part of his own essence.
46[Kosciuk(2010)], p. 175/+.
47[Freddoso(1988), Kosciuk(2010)]
48[Freddoso(1988)], p. 29; [Kosciuk(2010)], pp. 147–148.
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Anything about the particle that makes its behavior epistemically determinate would make
that behavior physically determined. Thus, the following entail one another:
(6.67) God knows how the particle will behave.
(6.68) There is a fact of the matter about how the particle will behave.
(6.69) The particle's behavior is determined.
TF is challenged to explain how (6.68) could be true while (6.69) is false. That is an instance
of the general grounding problem. Since the basis of God's knowledge about soft facts is
the source of their truth, an explanation of how soft facts are grounded would solve the
Molinist grounding problem. Freddoso and Kosciuk shifted the argument away from agents
to indeterministic particles, emphasizing soft facts generally. Their response to the Molinist
grounding problem presupposed a solution to the general grounding problem. That move
begs the question since the two problems are ultimately the same.
6.4.5 True Futurism and General Eternalism
The preceding discussions of the grounding problem, both for Molinism in particular and
for TF generally, pose signiﬁcant challenges to TF. There is no basis for assigning the TRL
and soft facts in terms of the dynamic framework used here. Some advocates of TF seem
aware of this fact. Øhrstrøm, for instance, acknowledged the arbitrariness of the TRL.49
Ockhamists in the freedom/foreknowledge literature do not appear to share Øhrstrøm's
concerns. They have frequently endorsed the notion that soft facts, not to mention the
content of God's beliefs, describe something. Even incompatibilists like Pike, Hasker, and
Cowan voiced their support for the view that facts about the contingent future will hold,
soft facts, although these scholars reject the Ockhamist view that statements characterizing
God's beliefs are soft.50
49[Øhrstrøm(2009)]
50[Pike(1965), Hasker(2001), Cowan(2003)]. Granted, Pike was a theistic eternalist at the end of the day,
so maybe he is not the best example. [Pike(1970)]
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According toOnTF, the TRL stems only from a description of what will occur as speciﬁed
by soft facts. That would be more sensible if the future were real, in which case there would
be something for soft facts to describe. This attempt to ground soft facts connects TF to
(general) eternalism. Øhrstrøm's careful discussions of TF indicate that he understands the
relationship and is wary of its consequences.
If the future is real, it must be so atemporally. What has happened, is happening, and
will happen is captured by a set of atemporal facts. There does not seem to be a need for
fundamentally temporal facts anymore. So eternalism opens the door to the B-theory. On the
B-theory, time loses its dynamic character and is instead more like another spatial dimension.
Without time ﬂow and with static representations of all facts, one might wonder about the
reality of change under its standard, endurantist portrayal. It requires further argument to
demonstrate that the B-theory and especially perdurantism follow from eternalism, but the
slope appears slippery.51 Thus, an eternalist grounding for soft facts and the TRL may lead
to thoroughgoing absolutism.
In conclusion, TF is not the best option in the framework used for this analysis. Eternal-
ism seems like the only way for TF to avoid the grounding problem. Eternalism, however,
may take TF down a very diﬀerent path than the one cleared by Øhrstrøm and others.
51The important relationships between eternalism, the B-theory, and perdurantism were discussed by Sider
in [Sider(2003)].
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Chapter 7
Open Futurism, Supervaluationism, and
Open Theism
Open futurism (OF) and related views have been around to heckle TF and eternalism at
least since antiquity. This chapter describes OF and company, including supervaluationism
and open theism. Section 7.1 gives a synopsis of OF's recent history, explains the core of OF
semantics, and describes OF's responses to both logical and theological fatalism. Section 7.2
provides additional details about bivalentOF, non-bivalentOF, supervaluationism, and open
theism.
Section 7.3 justiﬁes and enhances OF's position on linguistic use and theoretical analysis
thereof. Except for supervaluationism, OF rejects S-FLEM's validity. A host of arguments
are given (admittedly favoring bivalent OF) to show that S-FLEM is not as intuitive as it
might seem. Section 7.3 concludes with a discussion of predictions and temporal standpoints.
Traditional versions of OF do not handle predictions well, but this problem is alleviated with
standpoint inheritance. Standpoint inheritance also has a number of other advantages.
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7.1 The Basics of Open Futurism
This section introduces OF. Section 7.1.1 provides a brief history emphasizing OF's
contemporary philosophical development. Section 7.1.2 contains an important description of
OF semantics. There is a common misconception that at least bivalentOF conﬂates will and
will-inevitably. Granted, those terms are logically equivalent in bivalent OF. That logical
equivalence, however, stems from notably diﬀerent semantics for those terms. Additionally,
will and will-inevitably always diﬀer in truth value in non-bivalent OF and systems that
incorporate temporal standpoints, bivalent or not.
Section 7.1.3 describes epistemological and ontological commitments associated with OF.
If either epistemological or ontological indeterminism hold, corresponding renditions of sev-
eral other views follow. In particular, OF is closely related to presentism (or the growing-
block theory), time ﬂow, the A-theory, and endurantism.
A discussion of OF's response to fatalism is given in Section 7.1.4. Regarding logical
fatalism, OF avoids fatalism by rejecting the validity of S-FLEM. Open theists hold that
if God has comprehensive foreknowledge, then S-FLEM is valid and fatalism holds. One
may dismantle arguments for theological fatalism by rejecting that God has comprehensive
foreknowledge.
7.1.1 History
OF is a set of views characterized as Heraclitean, Aristotelian, or Peircean. Storrs McCall
used Heraclitean to describe the thesis that time ﬂows,1 a notion that is required by OF.
Time ﬂow is a popular notion in the future contingents literature and is hardly limited toOF.
Prior quite passionately endorsed the proposal, contra Jack Smart.2 A more recent debate
on the issue occurs between McCall and Graham Nerlich; and Theodore Sider provides
additional illuminating discussion.3 Time ﬂow was discussed in Section 2.5.
1[McCall(1998)]
2[Prior(1996), Smart(1949)]
3[McCall(1994), Nerlich(1998), McCall(1998), Sider(2003)]
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Aristotle considered logical fatalism in On Interpretation 9. Historically, many scholars
among them, notable schoolboys like Lavenham4thought that Aristotle proposed rejecting
S-FLEM. The standard contemporary view agrees that Aristotle rejected S-FLEM although
this interpretation is not without exception.5
Prior endorsed diﬀerent formulations of OF at various points in his career. On the non-
bivalent account, propositions about the contingent future are neither true nor false. In
his earlier writings, Prior supported a non-bivalent OF he associated with Peter de Rivo's
view.6 The position is not limited to Prior and was taken up by Geach other others, as well.7
Three-valued temporal logics continue to enjoy further developments.8
Prior endorsed a bivalent variety of OF in his later work.9 Prior characterized this view
as Peircean. Bivalent OF accommodates some intuitively plausible statements, like LEM
and bivalence, while sacriﬁcing will/not commutativity.
Richmond Thomason proposed that Bas van Fraassen's supervaluationist semantics yields
interesting results for temporal logics.10 Supervaluationism falls somewhere between TF
and OF. Like TF, supervaluationism acknowledges S-FLEM's validity and uses TRLs in its
semantics, at least traditionally. Like OF, supervaluationism rejects strong future bivalence,
that either will:φ is true or will:¬φ is true. In other words, supervaluationism does not
identify a particular future as the true future.
Some theistic views reminiscent of OF fall under the heading of open theism. Open
theism is the view that God does not have comprehensive foreknowledge because freedom and
foreknowledge are incompatible. One type of open theism, advocated by William Hasker and
others, accommodates TF but not freedom/foreknowledge compatibility.11 A second variety
of open theism stems from OF. Insofar as there are no facts about what the contingent
4[Øhrstrøm(1983), Tuggy(1999)]
5See [Øhrstrøm(1981)] for commentary.
6Prior characterized his view as such in [Prior(1967)], p. 128. See also [Prior(1953)].
7[Geach(1977)]
8For instance, [Akama et al.(2007)Akama, Nagata, and Yamada, Akama et al.(2008)Akama, Nagata, and Yamada]
9[Prior(1967)]
10[Thomason(1970)]
11[Hasker(2001)]
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future holds, God cannot have comprehensive foreknowledge simply because there is no such
knowledge to be had. A number of scholars have recently advocated this combination of
open futurism with theism, including Benjamin Arbour, Gregory Boyd, Alan Rhoda, and
Dale Tuggy.12
7.1.2 Wait and See Semantics
The semantics of OF can be somewhat elusive. OF provides an interesting case in which
formal systems may not adequately characterize the philosophical views they are supposed
to represent. That is, a full understanding of the semantics is not evident from a cursory
inspection of traditional OF logics.
OF uses a wait and see approach to evaluate statements about the future. This analysis
applies to statements like the following:
(7.1) Jones will have coﬀee.
(7.2) Smith guesses that Jones will have coﬀee.
(7.3) Smith predicts that Jones will have coﬀee.
and so forth.13 The general rule is that statements about the future have at least one foot
in the future, so to speak. OF need not diﬀer from TF in that statements about the future
depend on how the future turns out.
OF maintains that where future contingents are involved, there is no way to identify a
speciﬁc possible future to evaluate. One might evaluate all possible futures, but none of
those possibilities has precedence over the others. This notion is reﬂected by the fact that
OF does not introduce a mechanism like the TRL, a device used to specify a privileged
future. The ATC tree is as far as the temporal relation goes. So when it comes to future
contingents, what will happen is indeterminate until the contingencies are resolved. That
12[Arbour(2013), Boyd(2003), Rhoda et al.(2006)Rhoda, Boyd, and Belt, Rhoda(2003), Tuggy(2007)]
13There may be a difference between guesses and predictions, as discussed by Lucas in [Lucas(1989)], p. 65.
Such differences do not bear on this discussion.
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coffee ¬coffee
present
Figure 7.1.1: Open futurist semantics: Jones' coﬀee-drinking. OF does not specify a priv-
ileged future. So to determine what will happen from the present moment, the best one
can do is check all possible futures. From the standpoint of the present node, it is neither
the case that Jones will drink coﬀee nor that she will not. One must wait and see how the
contingency is resolved.
resolution occurs when the standpoint moves to a later node at which one of the previously
contingent options can be uniquely designated. Visually, the standpoint must be past the
fork to determine what will occur. Figure 7.1.1 illustrates and describes this aspect of OF
semantics in terms of Jones' contingent coﬀee-drinking.
Even if there is no particular future to evaluate, there are special propositions about
the future that do have a truth value. There are two ways to view such statements. The
ﬁrst perspective emphasizes the fact that will follows from will-inevitably. If there is a truth
maker for the future statement, then the statement is true. For example, if the laws of
physics determine that it will be sunny tomorrow, then it will be sunny tomorrow is true.
When an event is inevitable or ATC-necessary, the event will occur. There is no need to
wait and see if it will be sunny because tomorrow's sunniness is not contingent.
A second way to view the matter is to wait and seecheck the future. According to
OF, there is no such thing as the future when contingency is at play, so one must check
all possible futures. Even if there is not a particular designated future, there may be cer-
tain statements that turn out true no matter which possible future comes about. Thus,
will appears to be treated once again as will-inevitably, although there are some important
diﬀerences, mentioned shortly.
These two ways of understanding the special case in which there are true statements
about the future are illuminating. The ﬁrst proposal, which focuses on present truth makers
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rather than what will occur, appears to conﬂict with the notion that evaluating future
statements involves looking at the future. What the ﬁrst proposal characterizes is not will in
the general case, but something like will-inevitably. Nevertheless, if something will inevitably
be the case, then it will be the case: will-inevitably entails plain will. The reason for the
entailment is characterized by the second proposal. No matter which future turns up, it
will bear witness to that which is inevitable. ATC possibility trees are eﬀectively linear
with respect to inevitable propositions. It is as if a particular future were designated (by
present truth makers); but when contingents are involved not all aspects of the future are
determinate, only those that are not contingent. For instance, suppose that Jones' coﬀee-
drinking is contingent but the sun will inevitably rise tomorrow. Considering only that the
sun will rise, the future is linear. The ATC tree forks when Jones' coﬀee-drinking enters the
scene, but Jones' choice does not aﬀect the sun's behavior.
In simple cases, such as when p is a literal, will:p holds if and only if will-inevitably:p does,
making it look as if OF maintains that will and will-inevitably amount to the same thing.
In bivalent branching time systems that do not account for temporal standpoints, will and
will-inevitably always have the same truth value. Despite some appearances, even bivalent
OF does not confuse will and will-inevitably. The terms are logically equivalent yet they
do not have the same meaning. Will-inevitably focuses on present causes and will employs
wait and see semantics. In non-bivalent systems and systems that account for temporal
standpoints, will and will-inevitably diﬀer in truth value. The distinction is brought out by
the presence of future contingents.
Will-inevitably yields truth based on whether or not the future is present in its causes, so
to speak. Will, on the other hand, involves inspecting the future by waiting to see what hap-
pens. Insofar as what will be is now indeterminable, corresponding statements involving will
lack a determinate truth value under non-bivalent OF. Statements involving will-inevitably
are just false. Bivalence and the lack thereof are discussed further in Sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2,
respectively.
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Will not only requires inspecting the future, but also exhibits standpoint inheritance
with similar temporal operators. Will-inevitably involves evaluating whether or not an event
is present in its causes; that is, determined. When temporal standpoints are properly taken
into account, the contrast between will and will-inevitably yields a diﬀerence in truth value
for important statements with temporal operators. The signiﬁcance of temporal standpoints
for OF is discussed more in Section 7.3.3 through Section 7.3.5.
7.1.3 Epistemology and Ontology
Most scholars agree that OF and supervaluationism are compelling when interpreted
epistemically. The future is not observable, so the only way to tell what will occur is to
search for existing evidence. Such evidence is available only when the future is present
in its causes. Those causes are observable (in principle) although the future is never is.
Thus, statements about the future are only justiﬁable when their present causes make them
inevitable (or likely).
Many adherents of OF understand their view ontologically, as well. This is not to say
that they are indeterministsthey may or may not bebut they hold that OF is the best
way to represent an indeterministic system. Indeterminism requires several related tenets,
according to OF: presentism (or the growing-block theory), time ﬂow, the A-theory, and
perhaps also endurantism. OF views any designation of the future as an infringement on
genuine contingency. No particular future will occur, no particular future or future objects
exist atemporally or otherwise, and there is no timeline already spread out like a tapestry.
All true futurists hold that a particular future will occur, and OF rejects that view. Some
true futurists, like Øhrstrøm and Trenton Merricks, have agreed with OF up to that point.14
Eternalists, perdurantists, and B-theorists have less in common with OF. This disparity has
led to rather separate approaches to future contingents and related issues, making dialog
challenging on account of the lack of the common ground.
14[Øhrstrøm(1983), Merricks(2009)]
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7.1.4 Against Fatalism
Given that the only cases in which simple propositions about the future are true are those
scenarios in which will meets will-inevitably, instances of S-FLEM yield inevitability. Recall
Jones' future-contingent coﬀee-drinking.
(7.4) will:coﬀee ∨ will:¬coﬀee
is true if and only if
(7.5) will-inevitably:coﬀee ∨ will-inevitably:¬coﬀee
holds. Depending on which disjunct of (7.5) holds, it is either unavoidable that Jones will
drink coﬀee or unavoidable that she will not. Thus, it is not surprising that OF focuses its
attention on S-FLEM to dismantle arguments for logical fatalism. In terms of the version
of the argument given in this essay, OF avoids logical fatalism by rejecting (ArgLF.1) in
ArgLF. According to OF, S-FLEM is not valid, and in particular S-FLEM does not hold
for future contingents, so ArgLF is unsound.
OF endorses incompatibilism when it comes to theological fatalism. That is, OF main-
tains that libertarian freedom is incompatible with infallible, maximally speciﬁc foreknowl-
edge. Such foreknowledge yields instances of S-FLEM, as shown in ArgThF. By ArgLF,
S-FLEM is incompatible with contingency which, in turn, is necessary for libertarian free-
dom.
Detractors tend to interpret OF's incompatibility thesis as an unwarranted restriction of
God's omniscience, if not an outright assault on his divinity.15 An omniscient God, according
to them, knows every detail about what the future holds. OFin this case, open theism
does not propose a limitation or attack on omniscience. Omniscience is just believing all
and only truths. Opponents who think that, in order for God to be properly omniscient, he
must know everything about the future just beg the question against OF by assuming that
there is always something to know. If it is neither true that Jones will have coﬀee nor that
15[Ware(2000)] is a case in point.
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she will not, then to believe one way or the other is to believe that which is not true. An
omniscient being cannot believe that which is not true. Open theism is discussed further in
Section 7.2.4.
7.2 Varieties of Open Futurism
Several types of OF and related views have been mentioned throughout this essay: bi-
valent OF, non-bivalent OF, supervaluationism, and open theism. These positions are dis-
cussed in more detail in this section. Bivalent OF retains classical validities like LEM at the
cost of will/not commutativity. Non-bivalent OF respects will/not commutativity, but not
LEM. Supervaluationism manages to keep will/not commutativity, LEM, and even S-FLEM
without designating a privileged future. However, supervaluationism compromises bivalence
and symmetry between object- and meta- language. This section concludes with a discussion
of open theism, its motivations and variations.
7.2.1 Bivalent Open Futurism
The simplest OF system is bivalent (BivOF). That is, every statement is either true
or false in BivOF. Prior endorsed this approach, which he called Peircean, in his later
work.16 Familiar validities are respected by BivOF, such as LEM and non-contradiction.
The system and its characteristics are described more formally in Section 8.2.1. The price
of this relatively simple approach which keeps familiar results is that will and will-inevitably
have the same truth conditions in traditional systems that do not account for standpoints.
Notice that will-inevitably does not commute with not. That holds for any contemporary
temporal logic, not just BivOF. The following are not equivalent:
(7.6) It is not the case that Jones will inevitably drink coﬀee.
¬(will-inevitably:coﬀee)
16[Prior(1967)]
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(7.7) Jones will inevitably not drink coﬀee. (will-inevitably:¬coﬀee)
Perhaps Jones' future coﬀee-drinking is contingent, as in Figure 7.1.1. In this case, (7.6) is
true while (7.7) is false, demonstrating the inequivalence. Since will and will-inevitably have
the same truth conditions in BivOF,
(7.8) It is not the case that Jones will drink coﬀee
(7.9) Jones will not drink coﬀee
are not equivalent in BivOF. In other words, will/not commutativity is invalid in BivOF.
If Jones' coﬀee-drinking is contingent, then (7.8) is true while (7.9) is false.
M-FLEM and W-FLEM are valid in BivOF. Thus, statements like the following hold:
(7.10) It either is or is not the case that Jones will drink coﬀee. (M-FLEM)
(7.11) Jones will either drink coﬀee or not drink coﬀee. (W-FLEM)
S-FLEM, however, is not valid. The following may not hold:
(7.12) Jones will drink coﬀee or she will not.
Likewise, strong future bivalence does not hold. Both of the following may be false:
(7.13) Jones will drink coﬀee.
(7.14) Jones will not drink coﬀee.
Since BivOF denies the validity of will/not commutativity and S-FLEM, supporters of
BivOF may try to dismantle intuitions favoring those rules. Such arguments are inspected
in Section 7.3.1 and Section 7.3.4.
7.2.2 Non-Bivalent Open Futurism
A slightly more complicated OF view allows partial truth functions or, similarly, a third
truth value. Prior endorsed this kind of position in some of his earlier writings and others have
recently furthered his developments.17 That said, Prior later came to reject this approach
17[Prior(1953), Akama et al.(2007)Akama, Nagata, and Yamada, Akama et al.(2008)Akama, Nagata, and Yamada]
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in favor of BivOF.18 Even if non-bivalent open futurism (NBivOF) is ultimately not worth
it, the view is interesting and exhibits potential for additional development.
Recall that BivOF does not accommodate will/not commutativity. If this is too much
to bear, it is possible to obtain will/not commutativity at the cost of LEM and bivalence. In
NBivOF, will is true if and only if will-inevitably is, and not-will is true if and only if will-
inevitably-not is true.19 Thus, will-not and not-will have the same truth conditions (as long
as corresponding statements are about the same time). In cases of future-contingency, both
will and not-will have no truth value or are assigned a third value representing indeterminacy.
Will and will-inevitably turn out to have diﬀerent truth conditions. The distinction is
apparent when future contingents come into play. Suppose once again that Jones' future
coﬀee-drinking is contingent. Then the following are plain false:
(7.15) Jones will inevitably drink coﬀee.
(7.16) Jones will inevitably not drink coﬀee.
The negations of (7.15) and (7.16) are true. Statements corresponding to (7.15) and (7.16)
that involve will instead of will-inevitably have no truth value. In particular, the following
have no truth value.
(7.17) Jones will drink coﬀee.
(7.18) Jones will not drink coﬀee.
(7.19) It is not the case that Jones will drink coﬀee.
(7.20) It is not the case that Jones will not drink coﬀee.
18[Prior(1967)]
19To handle non-metric operators, it is necessary to stipulate that not-will can only be true if will-inevitably
does not hold. This requirement avoids a truth glut in situations like one in which Jones will inevitably
drink coffee tomorrow and she will inevitably not drink coffee two days hence. The truth conditions are
given formally in Section 8.2.5. As long as corresponding instances of not-will and will-not are about the
same time, will-not commutativity holds.
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As such, NBivOF respects the distinction between will and will-inevitably although one
might accuse BivOF of ignoring that diﬀerence. Some thinkers, like Tuggy, proposed
that separating will and will-inevitably is important enough to rule out BivOF in favor
of NBivOF.20 Standpoint inheritance, however, ensures that will and will-inevitably have
diﬀerent truth conditions in BivOF as well as NBivOF.
7.2.3 Supervaluationism
Supervaluationism is a type of system developed by van Fraassen.21 Thomason proposed
a supervaluationist temporal logic (Sup) which continues to enjoy discussion.22 Sup is an
attempt to capture the virtues of both TF and OF.
When considering a theory like Sup, one must be careful to diﬀerentiate between oper-
ators in the object language and their metatheoretic correlates. Material implication diﬀers
from semantic consequence, LEM diﬀers from bivalence, and so forth.
Here is a rough description of how Sup semantics works. Figure 7.2.1 illustrates the
semantics using the example of Jones' coﬀee-drinking. Sup diﬀerentiates between two kinds
of truth functions. The ﬁrst type of truth function pertains to incidental truth in particular
models, here called inner models, which are IdxTF models. This variety of truth is the
familiar kind deﬁned for semantic IdxTF, a system described in Section 6.2.1.
The second and primary type of truth function is deﬁned using the ﬁrst. To help with
clarity, true/false is used for truth determined by the second function and true/false for
the ﬁrst. There is an equivalence class of inner models corresponding to a given branching
structure of moments and a particular assignment of true/false to propositional literals.
Members of the equivalence class have the same ATC structure and diﬀer only in TRL
assignment. The equivalence classes may be called outer models. The second truth function
maps a sentence to true/false if and only if it is corrospondingly true/false in every inner
20[Tuggy(2007)], pp. 35/+.
21[van Fraassen(1968)]
22[Thomason(1970), MacFarlane(2003), MacFarlane(2008)]
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will:coffee
will:coffee or will:¬coffee
will:¬coffee
will:coffee or will:¬coffee
inner models
outer model
will:coffee or will:¬coffee
Figure 7.2.1: Supervaluationism: Jones' coﬀee-drinking (indexical true futurist basis). Both
inner models respect S-FLEM, so S-FLEM holds in the outer model. The inner models diﬀer
on whether Jones will drink coﬀee or she will not, so no particular course of action is assigned
to Jones in the outer modelstrong future bivalence fails.
model; otherwise, the sentence is neither true nor false. Validity is deﬁned in the typical
way using truth/falseness.
S-FLEM is valid under Sup. On Thomason's account, inner models amount to IdxTF
models. S-FLEM is valid in IdxTF and thus Sup, too. S-FLEM's metatheoric comrade,
strong future bivalence, fails in Sup. If the inner models in question involve a future con-
tingent, if they are non-linear, or if there is more than one element in the equivalence
class (all three of those conditions amount to the same thing), then there is a φ such that
will:φ holds in some inner models while will:¬φ holds in others. Due to the stipulation
that truth/falseness requires truth/falseness for every member of the equivalence class,
neither will:φ nor will:¬φ is true.
While Sup is designed to combine the advantages of both TF and OF, one may object
that some of their ﬂaws are also inherited. TF's allies may object that the primary type
of truth, the second type described above, generally fails to pick out true futures. That
is, strong future bivalence does not hold in Sup. So although S-FLEM is valid under Sup,
an important aspect of TF is left by the wayside. TF may thus view Sup as ultimately a
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ternary kind of OF that just manages to include S-FLEM.
While Sup could use TF arguments against fatalism, other routes are available. One
option is to block the elimination of S-FLEM disjuncts, the move from (ArgLF.1) to
(ArgLF.2). After all, S-FLEM is valid but when future contingents are involved, neither
disjunct is true.
OF fans may not be happy with Sup, at least given Thomason's semantics. Underlying
the second type of truth is the ﬁrst type, applied to inner models of IdxTF. OF may object
to the fact that the TRL still plays a role, for the TRL is questionable in its own right.
Someone with OF inclinations who ﬁnds Sup attractive might ﬁnd another way to generate
a Sup semantics. Here is one suggestion. From the perspective of OF, Sup emphasizes that
which shall be resolved. The past and present are resolved from the present standpoint. The
contingent future is unresolved. Sup looks at future standpoints to see what will later be
resolved. A Sup semantics can be given as follows:
(7.21) A proposition is true just in case it will inevitably be resolved as true, sooner
or later.
(7.22) A proposition is false just in case it will inevitably be resolved as false, sooner
or later.
Future-contingent propositions will inevitably be resolved, but not the same way in all pos-
sible futures. In one possible future, it will be resolved that Jones drinks coﬀee tomorrow; in
another, she does not. Hence, Sup assigns no truth value to future-contingents. Bivalence
fails. No matter how things turn out, Jones coﬀee-drinking will be resolved one way or
another. LEM is valid, as is will/not commutativity, S-FLEM, M-FLEM, and W-FLEM.
Standpoint inheritance allows Sup to be formalized using this notion of resolution from
future standpoints. In OF, the temporal relation, ATC accessibility, is tree-like. ATC
accessibility is backwards linear although it is not forwards linear. From a given temporal
standpoint, propositions with temporal operators relegating the context of evaluation to the
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standpoint's past involve the linear part of ATC accessibility from the standpoint. This
linear portion represents that which is resolved. In Sup, truth/faseness may be deﬁned
in terms of what will inevitably hold from future standpoints. For instance, it will inevitably
be the case that either Jones was going to have coﬀee or she was not. The matter may
be put in terms of predictions. Given that Smith predicted that Jones will have coﬀee and
Brown predicted that she will not, it will inevitably be the case that either Smith or Brown
was correct. This method uses temporal standpoints and the backwards linearity of ATC
trees to capture resolution, eliminating the need for a TRL. The technique is implemented
formally in Section 8.3.5.
Sup introduces new concerns, as well. One worry pertains not to the fact that Sup is
ternary, but rather that Sup accepts certain theses at the object level while rejecting their
metatheoretic correlates. Not all non-classical systems take this disparate approach. For
example, intuitionists hold that the non-classical interpretation of operators extends to the
metalanguage. In the case of Sup, the division between theses on the object and meta- levels
may lead to an absurdity when combined with the thesis that Sup adequately represents
certain portions of natural language.
In Sup, LEM is valid yet bivalence fails. S-FLEM is valid although strong future bivalence
does not hold. Sup is supposed to do good job of representing certain aspects of natural
language, like standard operators and temporal language. Perhaps Sup succeeds in this
goalat least that may be assumed for the sake of argument. So the validity of LEM and
S-FLEM reﬂect actual usage. To keep this argument simple, consider just LEM. In Sup, it
is generally (for any model of the system and any values assigned to the parameters of the
truth function) accepted that:
(7.23) For any proposition φ, ⌜φ ∨ ¬φ⌝ is true.
At the same time, the following is not accepted:
(7.24) For any proposition φ, either ⌜φ⌝ is true or ⌜φ⌝ is false.
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Metatheory is a special part of natural language, and it was supposed that Sup does a good
job of representing natural language. Granting that ⌜φ⌝ and ⌜¬φ⌝ can be replaced by any
corresponding speciﬁc propositions from natural language and that or may be interchanged
with ⌜∨⌝ in natural-to-object language mappings, Sup appears to come across an absurdity.
Despite these concerns, Sup temporal logic remains an interesting combination of TF
and OF, an attempt to retain S-FLEM without ﬁxing a particular true future. As such, it
has signiﬁcant appeal given that the view accounts for some basic linguistic intuitions.
7.2.4 Open Theism
Many theists are under the impression that arguments for theological fatalism likeArgThF
are somehow anti-theistic.23 ArgThF does not aim to show that God does not exist, that
he is not omniscient, or some other obviously anti-theistic conclusion. It is therefore impor-
tant to see what bearing theological fatalism really does have upon theism. Many reputable
theists hold that some argument for theological fatalism successfully demonstrates that in-
fallible, comprehensive foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom.
There are many arguments for theological fatalism. Practically every student of the
subject has a favorite rendition. Some of these arguments, like the version presented here,
associate theological fatalism with logical fatalism. Others take theological fatalism to be a
separate problem, perhaps distinguished by the accidental necessity of God's past beliefs or
his essential omniscience.24 One way or another, those who ﬁnd the argument convincing
maintain that the following are incompatible:
(7.25) Infallible, comprehensive foreknowledge (necessarily certain knowledge of the
future's every detail)
(7.26) Libertarian freedom (the sort that involves the ability to do otherwise)
23For instance, [Plantinga(1975)]
24For instance, [Hasker(2001), Pike(1965)]
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Some theists reject libertarian freedom. Traditional providentialists like Luther and Calvin
held that it is outright heretical, symptomatic of misunderstanding the divine in important
ways, to maintain that agents other than God are free in the libertarian sense.25 Regarding
theological fatalism, if comprehensive foreknowledge is incompatible with libertarian free-
dom, then providence certainly is. Thus, providentialists have nothing to gain (regarding
theological fatalism) by rejecting the foreknowledge end of the incompatibility.
Some theists deny that God has comprehensive foreknowledge, foreknowledge of the
future's every detail. This position open theism (OT). OT may be seen as the theistic
analog to OF. According to OT, God does not know every detail about the future. That
he does not have such knowledge is not due to a lack of omniscience, but rather because it
would be absurd for him to have it. The nature of this absurdity depends on just how one
understands OT.
OF combined with theism yields OT, but OT does not entail OF. Scholars like Hasker,
Lucas, Richard Swinburne, and Peter van Inwagen separate logical and theological fatalism.26
Hasker stated the matter boldly:
The argument for logical fatalism claims, in eﬀect, that all propositions that are
true at a given time are accidentally necessary at that timea claim that is quite
implausible and is fairly easily refuted.27
It is a shame to dismiss logical fatalism so quickly, but at least it enables one to spend time
addressing other important issues.
OT is just the view that God does not have comprehensive foreknowledge. For instance,
if Jones is free to drink coﬀee tomorrow, then:
(7.27) God does not believe that Jones will drink coﬀee tomorrow, and God does not
believe that Jones will not drink coﬀee.
For Hasker and company, one of the following is still true.28
25[Luther(1525)]
26[Hasker(2001), Lucas(1970), Swinburne(1994), van Inwagen(2008)].
27[Hasker(2001)], p. 100
28See esp. [Hasker(1989), Hasker(2001)].
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(7.28) Jones will drink coﬀee.
(7.29) Jones will not drink coﬀee.
Thus, there are true propositions that God does not know. He could know (7.28) or (7.29),
but he elects to not know either or them, as Lucas indicated.29 God might thus refrain
because he cannot know either of the following:
(7.30) Jones will freely drink coﬀee.
(7.31) Jones will freely not drink coﬀee.
On this view, there are facts that God cannot know since knowing them yields inconsistency.
One of (7.28) and (7.29) is true, as is the corresponding one of (7.30) and (7.31); but
(7.30) and (7.31) have some peculiar characteristics. If God were to believe one of those
propositions, that proposition would be false because freedom and divine foreknowledge are
incompatible. Since God knows that Jones is free, he cannot believe either (7.28) or (7.29),
for otherwise he would believe (7.30) or (7.31), which is absurd. As a result, for God to have
comprehensive foreknowledge while permitting human freedom is akin to creating a rock so
heavy that he cannot lift it.
Some friends of OT, like Arbour, Boyd, Rhoda, and Tuggy, arrived at OT through OF.30
This is not to say that these thinkers advocated the same notion of OF. Boyd, for instance,
recommended BivOF while Tuggy endorsed NBivOF.31 Scholars in the future contingents
literature tend to associate logical and theological fatalism, but this approach has been
less popular with the freedom/foreknowledge crowd. Nevertheless, recent work by thinkers
like those just mentioned is likely to strengthen this position in the freedom/foreknowledge
literature.
On this type of OT, there are no true propositions that God does not believe. Thus,
God knows all and only true propositions, period. There is no allegedly ad hoc caveat that
29[Lucas(1970), Lucas(1989)]. For a reply, see [Kenny(1979)].
30[Arbour(2013), Boyd(2010), Rhoda et al.(2006)Rhoda, Boyd, and Belt, Tuggy(2007)]
31[Boyd(2003)], p. 5; [Tuggy(2007)], §5
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God knows all and only those true propositions that he can consistently know, as Hasker
claimed.32 Even if Hasker's deﬁnition is not ad hoc, it still generates a signiﬁcant class of
propositions about the future that God cannot know. Such propositions include soft facts
involving free actions, and perhaps soft facts more generally. According to OF, however,
there are no soft facts. If Jones' actions are genuinely free or if there are future contingents,
then there is no particular outcome that is designated beforehand, no fact of the matter,
for anyone to know. Neither (7.28) nor (7.29) is true. God only knows truths, so he knows
neither (7.28) nor (7.29)not because there are truths that he does not know, but because
there are no such facts to be known.
Boyd proposed an interesting rendition of OT which he called neo-Molinism. Roughly,
Boyd's position combines BivOF with Molinism. Traditional Molinists hold that God knows
what would happen in every possible circumstance. In situations involving future contin-
gency, like Jones' coﬀee-drinking, there is no fact to know about what Jones would do in
one scenario or another. Rather, Jones might drink coﬀee and she might not. Therefore,
according to Boyd, God knows what Jones might do instead of what she would do, for God
knows all and only truths.
As far as theism is concerned, the approach taken in this essay is closer to that of Boyd,
Tuggy, and other advocates ofOT who base their view onOF.TF is untenable independently
of theism. Thus, the only viable theistic position is an OT that accommodates OF (or Sup).
Such OT does not infringe upon God's omniscience, but merely follows from his infallibility
given OF.
7.3 Open Futurism and Language
Linguistically, the primary concern with OF is that it does not accommodate S-FLEM's
validity. BivOF rejects the validity of will/not commutativity, as well. Section 6.3.1 argued
that S-FLEM ultimately stems from LEM. Section 7.3.1 aims to show that S-FLEM is not as
32See [Hasker(1989)] for this definition and [Tuggy(2007)] for criticisms.
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intuitively plausible as it may seem. There are also theoretical reasons for rejecting will/not
commutativity and S-FLEM.
OF has diﬃculty accounting for predictions and guesses, not to mention wait-and-see
semantics more broadly. These problems are described in Section 7.3.2. OF has not re-
ceived much scholarly criticism about its handling of predictions, presumably because OF's
primary contender, TF, experiences similar diﬃculties. It was seen in Section 6.3.4 that
TF can address its problems using standpoint inheritance. OF can do likewise, as shown in
Section 7.3.3. Standpoint inheritance grants other beneﬁts to OF, too. A notable advan-
tage is that standpoint inheritance shows how a powerful type argument for S-FLEM fails,
instead supporting a weaker principle that is compatible with OF. Section 7.3.5 adds some
clariﬁcation of how standpoint inheritance works (and does not work) with God's beliefs.
7.3.1 Against S-FLEM's Plausibility
Sup aside, OF rejects S-FLEM's validity. The principle is not easy to debunk given its
prima facie obviousness. One can show that S-FLEM is not quite as evident as it at ﬁrst
seems, but doing so is not enough to demonstrate that S-FLEM should be rejected. Such
arguments may be combined with others showing that S-FLEM, under TF or Sup, involves
unsavory commitments. This section introduces arguments of the ﬁrst type, aiming to jostle
S-FLEM's foundation. Four arguments are discussed, three descriptive/explanatory and one
normative. Note that these arguments tend to favor BivOF. A stronger argument against
S-FLEM's validity uses temporal standpoints and is presented in Section 7.3.4.
The ﬁrst argument is an attempt to explain the apparent validity of S-FLEM in terms
that do not ultimately indicate S-FLEM's validity. The argument points out that most
English speakers may confuse S-FLEM with M-FLEM (or W-FLEM, which is equivalent to
M-FLEM in most systems) on the ground that will/not commutativity stems from error.
Consider and example.
(7.32) The incumbent will win the election.
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(7.33) w ∶= The incumbent wins the election.
(7.34) will:w
Someone might reject (7.32) with:
(7.35) No, the incumbent might lose.
(7.36) possibly:¬w
Possibility is understood as ATC possibility. Conversely, (7.32) might be used to reject
(7.35). This example supports the BivOF thesis that will:φ and possibly:¬φ are logical
opposites. By associating temporal operators with possibility and necessity, the example
directly challenges TF.
The example taken alone is not enough to establish that will/not commutativity fails. A
brief tangent is in order to get the latter result. The thesis that possibly:¬φ is opposed to
will:φ does not exclude the proposal that will:φ and will:¬φ are also opposed. It may be that
will:¬φ and possibly:¬φ are equivalent. Given some rules of classical logic, this last equiva-
lence amounts to the equivalence of will:φ and possibly:φ, again in terms of ATC possibility.
In the nascent stages of temporal logic's development, temporal logic was developed from
modal logic in a way that related will to possibly. Scholars considered the proposal that, in
branching or similar systems, will:φ holds just in case there is some future in which φ is true;
that is, will:φ is analogous to possibly:φ.
When the temporal relation is tree-like, as inOF (but not TF since the temporal relation,
the TRL, is linear), will:φ cannot be equivalent to possibly:φ To see why, consider any future
contingent, such as the now-familiar coﬀee-drinking of Jones. Jones might drink coﬀee
tomorrow and she might not. If will:φ holds whenever φ is true in some possible future, then
Jones will drink coﬀee and she will not. All parties agree that this result is unacceptable.
Whether will:φ and will:¬φ are opposites, as inTF, or maybe will:φ is opposed to possibly:¬φ,
as in OF; will:¬φ is not logically equivalent to possibly:¬φ if the temporal relation is tree-like.
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So BivOF maintains that possibly:¬φ, not will:¬φ, is a logical opposite of will:φ. To
rebut, TF may claim that the speaker of (7.35) engages in a parlor trick by negating (7.32)
with (7.35). (7.35) serves only to make the possibility of losing salient. Many English
speakers, at least those untrained in philosophy, tend to confuse a possibility's psychological
salience with high probability or actual occurrence.
Here is an example illustrating TF's counterpoint. Jones and Smith have an appointment
to meet at a speciﬁc coﬀee shop and at a designated time. Jones arrives on time but Smith
is late. Jones, sitting at a table and waiting for Smith, begins to wonder why Smith is
late. Perhaps he was hit by a car. Maybe he's in the hospital. Et cetera. Considering the
details of these concerns, Jones becomes worried. Fortunately, her training in logic enables
her to identify that there is a low probability that any such thing happened to Smith. He is
only ten minutes late, after all. Recognizing the phenomenon may not completely alleviate
Jones' unhappy psychological state, but at least she would avoid confusing her worry with
high probability or actual occurrence. Many English speakers do not have Jones' fortunate
training. They often conﬂate the salience of upsetting or joyous possibilities with high
probability or actual occurrence. Thus, will:φ and possibly:¬φ are not genuine opposites.
The next descriptive argument also targets will/not commutativity, indirectly challenging
S-FLEM. OF contends that will:φ holds at a given moment just in case φ is true somewhere
on every future branch from that moment (perhaps with some restrictions about when φ
must hold in order to count). Note the universal quantiﬁcation in this portrayal of will.
Unfortunately, as instructors of introductory logic courses know all too well, typical En-
glish speakers are notorious for rejecting positive/negative universals with negative/positive
universals, respectively, instead of the appropriate existentials. For instance, consider the
following propositions.
(7.37) All zombies eat ﬂesh.
(7.38) No zombies eat ﬂesh.
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(7.39) Some zombies do not eat ﬂesh.
Many typical English speakers claim that the negation of (7.37) is (7.38) rather than (7.39).
According to OF, will involves an even more subtle universal quantiﬁcation. OF may claim
that English speakers make the same mistake when they conﬂate will:¬φ with ¬will:φ. On the
OF account of will, the errors are indeed the samemistaking the contrary of a proposition
for its contradictory.
These descriptive arguments are not likely to convince a logician who favors S-FLEM and
the commutativity of will and not. Logicians tend to have speciﬁc ideas of the systems they
endorse and presumably know how to negate statements properly. Regarding the ﬁrst two
arguments, even if typical English speakers commit the errors in question, that hardly ad-
dresses logicians' arguments supporting S-FLEM and will/not commutativity. The problem
is that logicians do not tend to give such arguments, instead claiming that will/not commu-
tativity and S-FLEM are obvious. An argument that may support S-FLEM is the ex post
argument given at the end of Section 6.3.1. This argument is challenged in Section 7.3.4.
Another argument pertains not to confusion on behalf of English speakers, but peculiar-
ities of English grammar. Consider the diﬀerence between cannot and can not.
(7.40) Jones cannot have coﬀee.
(7.41) Jones can not have coﬀee.
These propositions may be respectfully symbolized as:
(7.42) ¬possibly:c
(7.43) possibly:¬c
Instead of being a straightforward compound word, cannot moves the negation outside of
the scope of possibly. That is, cannot amounts to not-can. Recall that will is grammatically
modal, just like can.33 Perhaps there is a similar ambiguity in the case of will. Although
33See Section 3.1.
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willnot is not a word, the contraction won't is analogous to can't, and the latter is equivalent
to cannot. It may be that won't amounts to not-will rather than will-not, just as can't should
be represented as not-can instead of can-not. Notice that the claim is not that will is like
can, but that it might be. One could just as easily say that won't is like shouldn't rather
than can't. Shouldn't amounts to should-not as opposed to not-should. The point is twofold.
First, it would be presumptuous to assume that will is like one other grammatical modality
rather than another without independent support. Can is not well-behaved when combined
with not. It would not be surprising if other grammatical modalities, like will, are similarly
obnoxious.
Although they do not serve to debunk S-FLEM and will/not commutativity, the de-
scriptive arguments given above may serve lesser purposes. On one hand, the arguments
help OF explain its view that S-FLEM and will/not commutativity are implausible, despite
appearances to the contrary. On the other hand, although not strong enough to show that
S-FLEM and will/not commutativity should be rejected, the arguments cast some doubt on
those principles' intuitiveness. The arguments might be used to bolster others for OF.
Another type of argument against S-FLEM and will/not commutativity is normative.
Many such arguments aim to challenge particular theories supporting S-FLEMTF and
Sup. Those arguments are discussed elsewhere. There is at least one normative argument for
the thesis that will and not do not commute, independently of particular theories supporting
S-FLEM.
Will is grammatically modal. Consider other grammatical modalities without direct
temporal import, for they may serve as independent test cases. Should and can are helpful
paradigm cases, the former being normative and the latter being modal in the propositional
or ontological sense.
(7.44) Jones should drink coﬀee.
(7.45) Jones can drink coﬀee.
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Neither should nor can commute with not. Focusing on the should, the following are not
equivalent:
(7.46) It is not the case that Jones should drink coﬀee. (¬should:c)
(7.47) Jones should not drink coﬀee. (should:¬c)
The form corresponding to S-FLEM does not hold for should :
(7.48) should:φ ∨ should:¬φ
Nevertheless, the form corresponding to M-FLEM holds for should :
(7.49) should:φ ∨ ¬should:φ
The situation is analogous for can. Thus, not fails to commute with grammatical modalities
like should and can. In the interest of securing a general and uniﬁed analysis of grammatical
modalities, will should not be represented as commuting with not, either, other things being
equal.
Again, this argument is normative, not descriptive. The goal is not to describe actual use
of will or explain away will/not commutativity as a mistake. For theoretical reasons, will
should not be represented as commuting with not even if almost every English speaker uses
the language otherwise. So if two leading representations of time and temporal language are
otherwise equally good, but one theory involves will/not commutativity and the other does
not, the second should be chosen over the ﬁrst for the sake of having a uniﬁed analysis of
grammatical modalities.
7.3.2 Predictions
Suppose that Jones' future coﬀee-drinking is contingent and Smith asserts that Jones
will drink coﬀee. Depending on the particular rendition of OF employed, the following are
either false or have no truth value.
184
(7.50) Jones will drink coﬀee.
(7.51) Smith's assertion that Jones will drink coﬀee is correct.
Further assume that time has passed and Jones did in fact drink coﬀee. The following seem
correct.
(7.52) Jones was going to drink coﬀee. (was:will:c)
(7.53) Smith correctly asserted that Jones would drink coﬀee.
(7.53) especially seems true. If Smith had bet that Jones would drink coﬀee, he would have
won the bet. To account for (7.53), traditional OF can use statements like:
(7.54) Jones drank coﬀee and Smith asserted that she would drink coﬀee.
(7.54), however, does not admit that Smith's assertion was correct. His assertion's content
was validated in terms of the wait-and-see approach. (7.53) requires (7.52). To account for
predictions (and guesses), then, OF must show how propositions like (7.52) can be true even
though (7.50) was untrue from an earlier perspective.
Before moving on, note that (7.52) follows from a more general principle:
(7.55) When anything is the case, it has always been the case that it will be the case.
That is how Prior put it in 1954.34 He was proposing a reasonable assumption behind
Diodorus' Master Argument. The systems that Prior himself endorsed do not support (7.55),
but something like (7.55) appears necessary to account for (7.53). Even if (7.52) can be
explained away when taken alone, (7.53) is a thorn in the side of OF.
This issue with handling predictions and guesses is symptomatic of a deeper problem.
Traditional OF fails to accurately represent for wait-and-see semantics. The reason why
Smith's assertion was correct and Jones was going to drink coﬀee is that the passage of
time validated Jones' coﬀee-drinking. From a standpoint before Jones drank coﬀee, OF
34[Prior(1955)], p. 210
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maintains that there is no legitimate way to privilege the coﬀee-drinking future from the
alternative. From a later standpoint in which Jones drank coﬀee, it is clear which past's
future to evaluate: this one, the standpoint. Traditional OF semantics cannot represent this
important diﬀerence in standpoint.
7.3.3 Temporal Standpoints for Open Futurism
(7.50) and (7.52) diﬀer in standpoint. The standpoint of (7.50) is prior to Jones' coﬀee-
drinking while the standpoint of (7.52) is later. This variation in standpoint is relevant given
OF's wait-and-see approach to the semantics of will . When the standpoint is earlier than
Jones' coﬀee drinking, there is no particular future that will occur. Thus, (7.50) should not
turn out true. If the standpoint is after Jones' coﬀee drinking, then there is a way to pick out
the future insofar as is necessary to determine that (7.52) is true. From the later standpoint,
but not the earlier, the waiting and seeing has already been done.
There are several ways to manipulate temporal standpoints in English. Here, a simpliﬁed
mechanism is employed to handle the aforementioned observations, ultimately incorporating
(7.55). The technique accounts for cases like (7.53), provides a systematic way to treat
temporal operators, and retains a lot of old results. This method can be called standpoint
inheritance. An introduction to standpoint inheritance was given in Section 3.4 and a formal
account is provided in Section 8.3. A less technical exposition speciﬁc to OF is given here.
A preliminary requirement of standpoint inheritance is that the underlying system ac-
counts for the fact that possibility/accessibility changes depending on where one is in the
ATC tree. It may have been possible for Jones to skip coﬀee yesterday, but that is no longer
possible now that her coﬀee-drinking is said and done. Opportunities are lost to time, so
to speak, as they become necessary per accidens or ATC-necessary. Formally, diﬀerences in
standpoint can be represented using moment-speciﬁc subtrees of the more general ATC tree,
as in Figure 3.4.3. These trees should capture the notion of what is possible from a given
moment. Intuitively, a moment's tree consists of all ATC-accessible paths leading to and
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Figure 7.3.1: Open futurism with temporal standpoints. Diﬀerent standpoints have diﬀerent
ATC subtrees. (a) depicts a standpoint before Jones decides whether or not to drink coﬀee.
(b) illustrates a standpoint during or after Jones'-coﬀee drinking. The standpoint in (c) is a
moment at which Jones does not drink coﬀee.
from that moment.
Notice that diﬀerent standpoints sometimes have diﬀerent accessibility relations corre-
sponding to diﬀerent subtrees. The truth values of modal/temporal statements are based on
accessibility structure. This is how changes in standpoint aﬀect modal/temporal statements
in the context of branching time logics.
Standpoint inheritance has two primary tenets. The ﬁrst divides modal/temporal oper-
ators into two classes. Standpoint-sensitive operators are completely restricted to a stand-
point, which they pass on to all internal propositions. The purely temporal operators will,
was, will-always, and was-always are standpoint-sensitive. Other operators are not restricted
by standpoints, but may pass standpoints on. Such operators include will-inevitably, was-
inevitably, and various kinds of necessarily and possibly. The second tenet proposes that
standpoints should not be changed unless absolutely necessary. Thus, standpoint inheri-
tance for OF is roughly captured by the following:
(7.56) Will, was, will-always, and was-always are the only standpoint-sensitive oper-
ators.
(7.57) Only switch standpoints when doing so is necessary to make sense of an eval-
uation.
Regarding Jones' contingent coﬀee-drinking, various standpoints are illustrated in Fig-
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ure 7.3.1. From a standpoint in which Jones drank coﬀee, as in Figure 7.3.1 (b), one cannot
sensibly evaluate a circumstance in which Jones did not drink coﬀee. The conﬂict in pre-
suppositions yields absurdity. Visually, the contradiction in assumptions is illustrated by
the fact that the standpoint in which Jones did not drink coﬀee is not on the subtree of the
standpoint in which Jones drank coﬀee. The presupposition that Jones drank coﬀee must be
dropped, which requires shifting standpoints. One must switch standpoints to a counterfac-
tual scenario in which Jones did not drink coﬀee, as in Figure 7.3.1 (c). The counterfactual
standpoint is sometimes designated using expressions like:
(7.58) Had Jones not drunk coﬀee...
(7.59) If Jones had not drunk coﬀee...
and so forth. A standpoint is inadequate when inspecting a situation that is not on the stand-
point's subtree. Operators that are not standpoint-sensitive may require such evaluations.
In other words, will-inevitably, was-inevitably, necessarily, and possibly may require shifting
standpoint to a moment that is counterfactual with respect to the current standpoint. Op-
erators that are standpoint-sensitive are restricted to a given standpoint or subtree, so those
operators cannot by themselves generate changes in standpoint.
Standpoint inheritance does not aﬀect the evaluation of (7.50) from the earlier standpoint.
That statement remains untrue on an OF reading. From that earlier standpoint, the future
is still unsettled, as in as in Figure 7.3.1 (a).
(7.52) is true under standpoint inheritance. That scenario is illustrated in as in Fig-
ure 7.3.1 (b). The initial standpoint, that of the outer operator, was, is the circumstance
after Jones has had coﬀee. That initial standpoint is inherited by the inner temporal oper-
ator, will. From that standpoint, it is no longer possible for Jones to not drink coﬀee. Time
has already veriﬁed her coﬀee-drinking.
That (7.52) turns out true does not render the following true.
(7.60) It was the case that Jones will inevitably have coﬀee. (was:will-inevitably:coﬀee)
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Will-inevitably is not standpoint-sensitive. Therefore, will-inevitably is not restricted to
the initial standpoint. (7.60) is false just as:
(7.61) Jones will inevitably drink coﬀee
is false when (7.61) is evaluated from the earlier standpoint, shown in Figure 7.3.1 (a), before
the Jones' coﬀee-drinking became necessary per accidens. For the same reason, (7.60) is false
when evaluated from the later standpoint.
Standpoint inheritance enables the simpliﬁcation of many expressions involving temporal
operators. Any string of consecutive was 's and will 's can be reduced to at most two. Under
OF without standpoint inheritance, the reduction does not work for all combinations of
those operators.35 The reduction is discussed further in Section 8.3.4.
Thus, standpoint inheritance enriches OF in at least four ways. First, it allows the theory
to account for predictions and guesses. Second, standpoint inheritance does a better job of
representing the wait-and-see approach endorsed by OF. Third, it further emphasizes the
semantic diﬀerences between will and will-inevitably. For BivOF, that may be the only
distinction in truth value between those operators, making it all the more important to
emphasize. Traditional BivOF semantics hides the distinction between between will and
will-inevitably, making will appear identical to will-inevitably. Fourth, many expressions can
be simpliﬁed under standpoint inheritance. Any string of consecutive was 's and will 's is
reducible to at most two.
Two objections to standpoint inheritance might be that it is ad hoc and that it is too
complicated. Regarding the ﬁrst objection, standpoint inheritance is generalizable to and
useful for all major branching time systems. The theory of standpoint inheritance for OF
described above is the same as standpoint inheritance for TF, given the diﬀerence in tem-
35Without standpoint inheritance, the reduction works only for non-metric temporal operators, and even
then only because of density. Some operator may involve shifting an arbitrarily small distance, which is
sketchy as a representation of natural language. Additionally, the reduction fails for metric operators without
standpoint inheritance, which are closer than relational operators to English use provided context-determined
restrictions on distances. With standpoint inheritance, the reduction is possible for both non-metric and
metric operators.
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poral relation between OF and TF. Standpoint inheritance is useful for all branching time
systems and a general formal account is provided in Section 8.3.2. In addition to the the-
ory's generality, standpoint inheritance is well-motivated by use of natural language. For
OF, some of the most pointed cases are like those given above: the requirement of accounting
for predictions, the distinction between (7.50) and (7.52), the plausibility of (7.55), and the
distinction between (7.52) and (7.60). Standpoint inheritance addresses those issues for OF,
but within a general framework that helps other branching time systems handle their own
challenges.
Standpoint inheritance does introduce an extra explicit factor, the standpoint, that must
be considered. In that sense, a system with standpoint inheritance is more complicated than
one without. That is not much of a criticism, though. It is important for systems to be
simple and elegant, but only insofar as a proper analysis can accommodate. Standpoint
inheritance is well-motivated by examples and intuitions that should be addressed. The
theory is simple and elegant insofar as it handles those problems within a very general
framework. Additionally, standpoint inheritance grants additional simpliﬁcations, including
the reduction of all will/was strings to at most two, not aﬀorded by the traditional theories.
Besides, as Prior noted, traditional theories without an explicit standpoint parameter still
change standpoint implicitly.36 The diﬀerence is that traditional systems change standpoint
with every new point of evaluation while logics with standpoint inheritance only change
standpoint when absolutely necessary. The relatively conservative approach endorsed by
standpoint inheritance requires making the standpoint explicit.
7.3.4 Ex Post S-FLEM
Section 6.3.1 contained several arguments for S-FLEM and will/not commutativity. The
last argument given in that section was an ex post argument. Supposing that LEM holds
for literals,
36[Prior(1967)], p. 13
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(7.62) Jones is either drinking coﬀee or she is not.
Yesterday, Smith and Brown placed bets on whether or not Jones would have coﬀee. Smith
and Brown's respective bets are that:
(7.63) Jones will drink coﬀee.
(7.64) Jones will not have coﬀee.
Since exactly one disjunct of (7.62) obtains, exactly one of Smith and Brown won the bet.
Thus, exactly one of (7.63) and (7.64) was true. (7.63) and (7.64) are corresponding S-FLEM
disjuncts, so that instance of S-FLEM was true yesterday (not to mention the corresponding
instance of strong future bivalence, contra Sup). This generalizable result appears to show
that S-FLEM should be valid, but in fact such a general conclusion does not follow.
Any standpoint's subtree has only a branchless trunk leading back from that standpoint.
This fact is illustrated well in Figure 3.4.3. The linguistic result of this structure is that
whatever was the case, is now the case, or will be the case at a given standpoint is such that
it was always going to be the casefrom that standpoint. So whatever was, is, or will be is
such that it was going to be, and thus either it was going to be or it was going to not be.
With some symbols:
(7.65) (was:φ) ∨ φ ∨ (will:φ) ⊧ was:(will:φ ∨will:¬φ)
This principle may be called ex post S-FLEM (ExP-S-FLEM). If one of the disjuncts on the
left hand side holds, then φ's truth-makers either did or do now obtain. Hence the name, ex
post.
The ex post argument for S-FLEM only shows an instance of ExP-S-FLEM. The argument
fails to demonstrate a generalizable instance of S-FLEM. The conclusion is compatible with
the thesis that from yesterday's standpoint, before Jones had resolved to drink coﬀee today,
neither Smith nor Brown had won the bet. That is, the target instance of S-FLEM is not
true.
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A standpoint's future may still fork if there are contingencies that are future with respect
to the standpoint. As such, S-FLEM is not valid. The past (including the present), however,
is branchless. This linearity grants ExP-S-FLEM. Advocates of S-FLEM are challenged to
ﬁnd support for S-FLEM that does not really support ExP-S-FLEM or some other principle
in the neighborhood, like W-FLEM or M-FLEM.
Ultimately, S-FLEM is too strong for the evidence granted by the ex post argument, which
does not require a linear future. Standpoint inheritance accounts for the ex post scenario
exactly without the extra baggage of a linear future. Given this observation, standpoint
inheritance commandeers the ex post argument as its own evidence. The ex post argument
supports standpoint inheritance with OF, not S-FLEM or TF. TF may have lost its greatest
advocate.
7.3.5 What God did not Believe
A ﬁnal point requires clariﬁcation. Suppose that Jones' coﬀee-drinking was contingent
and that she drank coﬀee. Using standpoint inheritance as discussed in Section 7.3.3, (7.52)
is true. God believes all and only truths, so:
(7.66) God believes that Jones was going to drink coﬀee. (God believes: was: will: coﬀee)
What does not follow is that:
(7.67) God believed that Jones would drink coﬀee. (was: God believes: will: coﬀee)
(7.67) involves replacing a sub-proposition of (7.52) with a statement that God believes
that sub-proposition. This type of substitution is illegitimate, as (7.67) shows. Standpoint
inheritance does not sanction (7.67). God held no such belief since Jones' coﬀee-drinking
was contingent.
What would enable the unwanted substitution is allowing God's beliefs to be standpoint-
dependent. The beliefs of agents in time are not standpoint-dependent. God is no exception.
(7.66) is true because (7.52) is true. God is aware that the passage of time has veriﬁed Jones'
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coﬀee-drinking. The latter holds because the will in the sub-proposition, (7.50), inherits the
standpoint of the outer was. Again, that standpoint is the relatively future moment in
which she drank coﬀee. God does not evaluate (7.50) from that standpoint, but from the
standpoint at which he holds the belief. From that past standpoint, (7.50) is untrue, so God
did not believe it. (7.67) is therefore false.
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Part III
Formalities and Conclusions
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Chapter 8
Formalities
Much has been said thus far about various temporal logics and standpoint inheritance.
This chapter introduces a logic called MMBT (for Multi-Modal Branching Time) that
serves as a general framework through which to represent the views discussed in preceding
chapters. Section 8.1 provides a generic setup forMMBT, which is like a prime matter from
which particular systems can be individuated. To keep things simple, MMBT is left with
a propositional basis. Section 8.2 gives the main logics discussed throughout this project
(without standpoint inheritance): bivalent and non-bivalent open futurism, absolute and
indexical true futurism, and supervaluationism. Finally, Section 8.3 modiﬁes MMBT with
standpoint inheritance and discusses some results mentioned in other chapters.
8.1 Generic Setup
The goal of this section is to specify a generic multi-modal system incorporating branch-
ing time structures, MMBT. For simplicity, MMBT is developed in terms of propositions,
not properties and relations. Models and validity are deﬁned in Section 8.1.1 and accessibil-
ity relations (including ATC accessibility) in Section 8.1.2. Truth conditions for operators
are given in Section 8.1.3. In addition to the usual sentential operators, generalized modal
and temporal operators are also deﬁned. Such operators are later used with certain accessi-
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bility relations to represent speciﬁc varieties of open futurism (OF) and true futurism (TF).
Standpoint inheritance is not introduced until Section 8.3.
8.1.1 Models and Validity
Deﬁne the simplest sort of model as an ordered quadruple,
(8.1) ⟨M,τ,R, ν⟩,
where M is a set of moments, τ is a time function, R is a set of accessibility relations, and
ν (nu, not vee) is a truth function. This quadruple will do for now. Later, models require
functions to pick out moment-speciﬁc accessibility relations.
Intuitively, moments are temporally sensitive possible worlds, or snapshots of possible
worlds. For this purpose, not much hinges on how exactly one thinks of moments. They
may be points or sets of propositions characterizing states of aﬀairs. Note that this set of
propositions is maximally speciﬁc if and only if bivalence holds.1
The continuum, R, is used as a set of times. Oﬃcially, times might not be real numbers;
but it is plausible to stipulate that the set of times is isomorphic to R. For simplicity, then,
R is used as the set of times.
Since moments are temporally sensitive, each moment has exactly one time such that
it is that time at the moment. The set of times must have enough structure to allow the
development of all-things-considered (ATC) accessibility and metric temporal operators. R,
ordered as usual, lends itself to this task quite nicely.
The time function, τ , assigns a time (real number) to each moment.
1If moments are identified with sets of propositions, care must be taken to specify propositions that are
sufficient to individuate nodes without unnecessarily restricting possibilities. For instance, if moments are
consistent, maximally specific sets of literals, then there cannot be distinct, indiscernible moments (ignoring
modal/temporal statements true at those nodes); and if moments are consistent, maximally specific sets
of all propositions without qualification, then non-bivalent systems are ruled out (assuming that the set of
propositions identifying a moment are those propositions that are true at that moment). So the best option
is to identify moments with sets of propositions characterizing states of affairs; that is, those propositions
mapped to true at respective moments. These sets of propositions are maximally specific if and only if
bivalence holds.
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(8.2) τ ∶M Ð→ R.
It is assumed that τ is a total function. That is, every moment has exactly one time. The
time of a moment will be designated τm. τ is convenient to have around for describing metric
operations.
The system is multi-modal, so instead of being limited to just one accessibility relation,
there may be several. Thus,
(8.3) R ⊆P(M ×M).
The accessibility relations in R may include logical accessibility, physical accessibility, or
whatever else one wishes. Of course, ATC accessibility and the thin red line (TRL) are
relevant here.
The truth function, ν, maps propositions to truth values with respect to moments. ν is
deﬁned by
(8.4) ν ∶M ×ΦÐ→ {1,0}.
Φ is an implicationally complete2 set of propositions for the language used here, which
is roughly the propositional calculus augmented with modal and temporal operators, as
described below in Section 8.1.3. The values 1 and 0 represent true and false, respectively.
No third truth value is used here, although ν shall be partial for non-bivalent systems. For
m ∈M and φ ∈ Φ, νm(φ) is used henceforth in place of ν(m,φ).
Since ν is partial, it is appropriate to diﬀerentiate between two types of validity. Let
Σ ⊆ Φ and φ ∈ Φ.
(8.5) Σ ⊧ φ iﬀ there is no model with a moment m such that for each ψ ∈ Σ,
νm(ψ) = 1 but νm(φ) ≠ 1
If Σ is satisﬁed and φ has no truth value, then Σ ⊭ φ. For logical truths, ⊧ φ as long as φ is
never untrue. ⊧ may be too restrictive under some circumstances. A weaker notion may be
appropriate:
2That is, implicationally complete in the sense used on p. 147 of
[Boolos et al.(2007)Boolos, Burgess, and Jeffrey].
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(8.6) Σ∣≈φ iﬀ there is no model with a momentm such that for each ψ ∈ Σ, νm(ψ) = 1
and νm(φ) = 0
In the case of ∣≈, Σ may be satisﬁed while φ has no truth value. As far as logical truths go,
∣≈ φ just in case φ is never false.
The terms associated with validity used here are as follows:
(8.7) validity: Σ ⊧ φ
(8.8) semi-validity: Σ ∣≈ φ
(8.9) invalidity: Σ∣≈ φ
Note that invalidity is not the opposite of validity. Rather, both validity and invalidity pick
out extrema that are intended to approximate their classical counterparts.
8.1.2 Accessibility Relations
Although one can designate any number of accessibility relations in this system, only a
few are useful here. For good measure, logical accessibility may be deﬁned as
(8.10) logical accessibility: a relation RL =M ×M .
A very important relation is the tree structure generated by ATC accessibility. ATC acces-
sibility may be characterized as follows.
(8.11) all-things-considered (ATC) accessibility: a relation <ATC that is a con-
tinuous, unbounded ordering of one or more trees of moments3 such that every
moment is part of some tree and m <ATC m′ only if τm <R τm′ . (For readability,< is used instead of <ATC unless disambiguation is necessary.)
The criteria provided ensure that < has some desirable properties:
3Moments are nodes and trees are backwards-linear partial orderings. Recall that partial orderings are
irreflexive and transitive. For this purpose, trees need not have root nodes.
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(8.12) <-related moments are ordered chronologically.
(8.13) There are no gaps due to continuity, enabled by the fact that the set of times
is continuous.
(8.14) < forms trees. That is, < is backwards linear, irreﬂexive, and transitive.4
(8.15) Trees are unboundedthey have no beginning and no end.
(8.16) That R represents the set of times makes it easy to establish rulers for metric
temporal operators.
< is used by every system here, but other relations are best deﬁned when particular views are
discussed. One can look forward to the TRL, moment-speciﬁc TRLs, and moment-speciﬁc
ATC sub-trees.
8.1.3 Truth Conditions
This section provides truth conditions for propositions, connectives, and various impor-
tant operators. These truth conditions are designed to be general, applicable to the particular
theories developed in later sections.
A full property calculus is not developed here since quantiﬁcation is not used. Some
special propositions, here called timestamps, prove to be useful in deﬁning some operations.5
timestamp a proposition denoted σt representing the time is t, for time t.
Propositional connectives are deﬁned in the standard way, although extra speciﬁcity is given
to ensure that these deﬁnitions still work if ν is partial and the system is non-bivalent. Let
m be a moment and both φ and ψ, propositions.
4Transitivity does not interfere with statements like It is not yet possible to create a machine that passes
the Turing test, but it might become possible in the future. That is, no one can create such a machine with
the current technology, but there is a possible later technological state under which someone could create
such a machine. The instances of possible indicate an extra-things-considered modality, as in Section 2.5,
that looks like ATC-modality plus a set of propositions specifying technological capacities.
5Cf. Prior’s U operator as in [Prior(1957)]. U is an at operator so that Utφ represents φ holds at t.
Timestamps are designed to represent the temporal content of the at operator.
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(8.17) νm(¬φ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 iﬀ νm(φ) = 0
0 iﬀ νm(φ) = 1
(8.18) νm(φ ∧ ψ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 iﬀ νm(φ) = νm(ψ) = 1
0 iﬀ νm(φ) = 0 or νm(ψ) = 0
(8.19) νm(φ ∨ ψ) ∶= ¬(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ)
(8.20) φ ⊃ ψ ∶= ¬φ ∨ ψ
(8.21) φ ≡ ψ ∶= (φ ∧ ψ) ∨ (¬φ ∧ ¬ψ)
Below are some familiar tables depicting the truth-functional connectives. i is used for the
case in which νm is undeﬁned.
¬ ∧ ψ ∨ ψ ⊃ ψ ≡ ψ
1 i 0 1 i 0 1 i 0 1 i 0
1 0 1 1 i 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 i 0 1 1 i 0
φ i i φ i i i 0 φ i 1 i i φ i 1 i i φ i i i i
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 i 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 i 1
Even in those cases in which the system is non-bivalent, it may be desirable to impose a
limited bivalence. The following stipulation serves this purpose.
(8.22) νm(A) ∈ {0,1} for all moments m and atomic propositions A.
There is nothing unusual about modal operators here except that their truth conditions
depend on which accessibility relations the operators respectively designate. Recall that
accessibility relations may vary greatly in what they represent, like logical possibility and
permissibility, so modal operators are only associated with modality in the formal sense
deﬁned in Section 2.2. Let m be a moment, φ a proposition, and Rx an accessibility relation.
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(8.23) νm(◻xφ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 iﬀ for every m′ ∈M such that mRxm′, νm′(φ) = 1
0 iﬀ for some m′ ∈M such that mRxm′, νm′(φ) = 0
(8.24) ◇x ∶= ¬ ◻x ¬
If RL represents logical accessibility, then ◻L and ◇L pertain to logical necessity and possi-
bility, respectively; given that RATC represents ATC accessibility, ◻ATC and ◇ATC represent
ATC necessity and possibility, respectively; and so forth.
It is also possible to designate operators using inverse relations, like past as opposed to
future. Operations along an inverse relation, R−1x , are designated by ◻−x, ◇−x, et cetera.
Non-metric temporal operators represent it will be the case that and it was the case that.
Instead of the usual F and P , △ and ▽ are used for generalized future and past temporal
operators, respectively. Like ◻ and ◇, △ and ▽ are indexed with respect to accessibility
relations. The triangle notation, although not standard, is relatively intuitive and more
appropriate for multi-modal systems like this one. Analogs to temporal operators exist for
all accessibility relations. There are many △x, but only one F . Indeed, it is controversial
which △x (if any) is the real future operator, and perhaps even more controversial which △x
should be the real future operator.
For the sake of illustration, the following will not do as a deﬁnition of a generalized
temporal operator:6
(8.25)
im
p
l
a
u
si
b
l
e
!
νm(△xφ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 iﬀ for every path Px on Rx starting at m, some m′ on Px
is such that mRxm′ and νm′(φ) = 1
0 iﬀ for some path Px on Rx starting at m, some m′ on Px
is such that mRxm′ and νm′(φ) = 0
6Recall that a path is just a linearly ordered set of nodes (which may contain repeats). Paths may be
converted into a set of edges. For this project (in which only transitive relations are used), it suffices that if
m′ occurs later on a path P than m, then the edge ⟨m,m′⟩ is on P . P is said to be on a relation R just in
case every edge in P is in R. A node is on a path iff the node is a vertex of one of the path’s edges.
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1
2
3 A ↦ 0
A ↦ 1
▵A ↦ 1▵A ↦ 0
Figure 8.1.1: Counterexample to a bad deﬁnition of will . In the model illustrated, ν1(△A) =
1 and ν1(△A) = 0 under the implausible deﬁnition (8.25).
Truth gaps are allowed since ν may be partial. (8.25), however, yields truth glutscircumstances
in which ν maps some proposition to both 1 and 0 for a given moment. Consider a model
with moments m1, m2, and m3; accessibility relation R such that m1Rm2 and m2Rm3; and
truth function ν such that ν2(A) = 1 and ν3(A) = 0. The result is that ν1(△A) = 1 and
ν1(△A) = 0. This model is depicted in Figure 8.1.1. Some other deﬁnitions for non-metric△ are similarly problematic.
A time parameter may be built into the truth function ν to avoid inconsistency, but
that will not be done here.7 One way to characterize the issue is that non-metric temporal
operators do not provide ways of specifying how far in the past or future a given event will
occur. Metric temporal operators can represent speciﬁc temporal diﬀerences. For instance,
two days from now, there will be a sea battle and ﬁve minutes ago, Jones ate a sandwich.
Such statements specify a diﬀerence in time between the current node and a set of target
nodes above (future) or below (past) the current node.
Some non-metric temporal operators may be obnoxious, but generic -inevitably operators
avoid truth gluts. It will later be important to distinguish between temporal operators and
their -inevitably counterparts. △ and ▽ are used for (generic) will and was, respectively. △◽
and ▽◽ are used for (generic) will-inevitably and was-inevitably, respectively. △ and ▽ will
later be deﬁned using △◽ and ▽◽ .
Let m be a moment, φ a proposition, and Rx be an accessibility relation. In what follows,
paths Px on Rx are assumed to be simple and forwards-maximal. A simple path does not
7An example in which a time parameter is build into the truth function is given in [Øhrstrøm(2009)],
p. 29. Note that the truth function takes both a time parameter and a chronicle (TRL) parameter.
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contain cycles (repeat nodes). A forwards-maximal path continues unless it reaches a node
m such that there is no m′ for which mRxm′.
(8.26) νm(△◽ xφ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 iﬀ for every path Px on Rx starting at m, some m′ on Px
is such that νm′(φ) = 1
0 iﬀ for some path Px on Rx starting at m, every m′ on Px
is such that νm′(φ) = 0
(8.27) ▽◽ x ∶=△◽ −x
Under this deﬁnition, νm(△◽ xφ) = 1 if Rx does not contain or terminates at m. If not every
moment is represented on Rx, it might be desirable to specify that νm(△◽ xφ) is false or
undeﬁned when Rx does not contain or terminates at m. Troublesome scenarios are not a
problem in this analysis. The situation only crops up for AbsTF, discussed in Section 8.2.2.
It can be shown that:
(8.28) consistent: {△◽ xφ,△◽ x¬φ}
(8.28) is to be expected since the operator △◽ is non-metric. As an example demonstrating
(8.28), let m1, m2, and m3 be nodes in a model such that ν2(A) = 1 and ν3(A) = 0. It follows
that ν1(△◽ A) = ν1(△◽ ¬A) = 1. See Figure 8.1.2 (a).
Additionally,
(8.29) ¬△◽ xφ∣≈△◽ x¬φ
(8.30) ∣≈△◽ xφ ∨△◽ x¬φ
Here is a model illustrating the invalidities given in (8.29) and (8.30). Let m1, m2, and
m3 be moments; R an accessibility relation such that m1Rm2 and m1Rm3; and ν a truth
function such that ν2(A) = 1 while ν3(A) = 0. ν1(¬△◽ A) = 1 but ν1(△◽ A) = ν1(△◽ ¬A) = 0.
So ν1(△◽ A ∨△◽ ¬A) = 0. This model is shown in Figure 8.1.2 (b).
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1
2
3 A ↦ 0
A ↦ 1
A ↦ 1
¬A ↦ 1△▫△▫
(a)
1
2 3
A ↦ 0A ↦ 1
A ↦ 1△▫¬
¬A ↦ 0△▫
A ↦ 0△▫
A∨¬    A ↦ 0△▫ △▫
(b)
Figure 8.1.2: Models demonstrating facts about generalized will-inevitably . (a) shows that△◽ A and△◽ ¬A are consistent. (b) shows that△◽ does not commute with ¬ and that S-FLEM
does not generally hold for △◽ .
It is good that (8.29) and (8.30) do not hold. MMBT needs to be able to represent
various forms of OF as well as TF and Sup. Without (8.29) and (8.30), MMBT could not
accommodate OF.
Although S-FLEM is invalid, △◽ is deﬁned so that LEM, M-FLEM, and W-FLEM are
valid for this operator. That is:
(8.31) ⊧ φ ∨ ¬φ
(8.32) ⊧△◽ xφ ∨ ¬△◽ xφ
(8.33) ⊧△◽ x(φ ∨ ¬φ)
Given the deﬁnition of△◽ , M-FLEM andW-FLEM follow from LEM. There are a few reasons
why LEM is valid. First, all of the operators deﬁned so far are such that the criteria for
truth and falsity are mutually exclusive. So the only way to obtain a truth glut is from a
truth glut. (A truth glut would entail an instance of φ ∧ ¬φ, entailing an instance of φ ∨ ¬φ
mapping to 0, in which case LEM would be invalid based on the deﬁnition of invalidity given
in Section 8.1.1.) Second, it was stipulated that ν is deﬁned for all atoms. Third, the truth
conditions for the current set of operators ensure that ν only yields truth gaps from truth
gaps. The ﬁrst fact is enough to for LEM to be semi-valid (given that ν is a function). The
three facts combined yield that LEM is valid, not just semi-valid.
LEM, M-FLEM and W-FLEM are merely semi-valid in NBivOF. Semi-validity comes
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with the introduction of operators that are consistent, but allow for truth gaps even if ν
is deﬁned for all of their sub-propositions. Past and future operators will be deﬁned for
NBivOF so as to yield gaps when future contingents are involved. These truth gaps will
propagate to M-FLEM and W-FLEM, and thus LEM.
Generic will-inevitably and was-inevitably are the only non-metric temporal operators
deﬁned so far, and they will remain as such. One might deﬁne will and was with will-
inevitably and was-inevitably, respectively. (Doing so does not hurt TF in any way.) Metric
operators will be considered shortly. For now, the important point is that there are some non-
metric temporal operators. Consider just non-metric versions of △ and ▽; letting △ ∶= △◽
and ▽ ∶=▽◽ for the sake of discussion until speciﬁc views are implemented.
Two other common temporal operators are G and H. G represents the it will always be
the case that, while H corresponds to it has always been the case that. In MMBT, G and H
generalize to ◻x and ◻−x, respectively.
Non-metric temporal operators as given here are too weak to adequately represent tem-
poral language. It seems outright absurd that
(8.34) Jones will drink coﬀee and she will not.
(8.34) is an instance of (8.28). Figure 8.1.2 (a) provides a model illustrating (8.34) provided
that A ∶= Jones drinks coﬀee.
The fact that non-metric operators leave time underspeciﬁed does not accord with stan-
dard English usage. English speakers typically assume that the conjuncts of (8.34) are about
the same time, and surely Jones cannot both drink coﬀee and not drink coﬀee at once. Non-
metric temporal operators do not specify when they about. Perhaps Jones will drink coﬀee
tomorrow and not two days hence.
In English, one can typically rely on conversational implicature to indicate that the dis-
juncts of M-FLEM and S-FLEM are about the same time.8 Conversational implicature does
not clarify the formal representations of English sentences, so those formal representations
8See Section 3.2.
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would require explicit qualiﬁcation on every use. To skirt that annoyance, metric operators
will be used to represent English sentences. Metric operators make it convenient to show
when the disjuncts of M-FLEM and S-FLEM are about the same time and when those dis-
juncts are about diﬀerent times. Note that the analyses in the rest of this chapter do not
hinge on the absence of non-metric operators. One is free to use non-metric operators as
long as it is understood how they do (and do not) correspond to English correlates.
Non-metric operators need only a relation between nodes. Metric operators require a
system of measurement. As such, metric operators do not make sense for relations without a
metric. ATC and TRL accessibilities are both constrained by the temporal metric, given that
times are isomorphic to the continuum. The subscript µ is used to designate an arbitrary
accessibility relation with a metric, Rµ. Distance in metric operations is designated by
superscripts (with positive values), such as △tµ and ▽tµ, corresponding to the Priorian F (t)
and P (t), respectively.
Metric temporal operators can be deﬁned using their non-metric correlates together
with timestamps. Timestamps are special atoms representing propositions of the form It
is date/time x. The timestamp σx is true at m if and only if x = τm. One can think of a
timestamp as a statement giving a very speciﬁc report of the date/time on a calendar/clock.
To deﬁne metric temporal operators using timestamps, the idea is to explicate proposi-
tions like Jones will drink coﬀee tomorrow as It will be the case that Jones drink coﬀee and it
is date/time x. Here, x is whatever time it is when the original sentence is uttered, τm, plus
a day; so x = τm + 1 day in the example. More generally, it is x-o'clock can be represented
using timestamps as something like στm±t. For t ∈ R+,
(8.35) νm(△◽ tµφ) ∶= νm(△◽ µ(φ ∧ στm+t))
As desired,
(8.36) ▽◽ tµφ =▽◽ µ(φ ∧ στm−t)
The operators △◽ tµ and ▽◽ tµ are suitable for will and was for each of the systems considered
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here (although some modiﬁcation is necessary in the case of NBivOF).
(8.37) △tµ ∶=△◽ tµ
(8.38) ▽tµφ ∶=▽◽ tµ
Like their non-metric correlates, W-FLEM and M-FLEM are valid for metric operators,
while S-FLEM and will/not commutativity are invalid.
It may appear suspicious to associate will and was with their -inevitably counterparts. So
far, MMBT is very general. Particular systems will be faithfully represented by specifying
additional information, such as about Rµ. TF uses that tactic. Will-/was-inevitably are
explicated along ATC accessibility but will/was are presented in terms of TRLs.
Time-speciﬁc necessity and possibility may be deﬁned similarly.
(8.39) ◻tµφ ∶= ◻µ(στm+t ⊃ φ)
(8.40) ◇tµ ∶= ¬ ◻tµ ¬
As expected,
(8.41) ◇tµφ â⊧ ◇µ(φ ∧ στm+t).
It is assumed that temporal operators in natural language should translate to metric op-
erators in this system rather than non-metric operators. This rule ensures that (8.34) and
similar statements are false. Granted, it is not always clear what t should be and intervals
may be more appropriate rather than particular times. Regarding the over-speciﬁcity of
metric operators, one might consider examples like
(8.42) Jones will have coﬀee tomorrow,
noting that it does not matter exactly when Jones has coﬀee. The statement turns out true
as long as Jones has coﬀee sometime tomorrow. To address this issue, one could specify a
range of times in which Jones' coﬀee drinking or lack thereof determine the truth value of the
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statement. In the case of the example, the interval would span tomorrow. The complication
is unnecessary for this project, however, and nothing important to this analysis hinges on the
simplifying move to use speciﬁc times rather than intervals. Furthermore, a context function
may be used to specify the value of t, although this presentation does not go into so much
detail. It is henceforth assumed that t is given by context. The system may of course be
expanded to more directly account for intervals as well as operators like since and until.
Suppose that Rµ is transitive. A result that was important in preceding chapters is:9
(8.43) △◽ tµ = ◻tµ = ¬ ◇tµ ¬
(8.43) requires that both operators pertain to the same accessibility relation. One cannot
equate △◽ tTRL to either ◻tATC or ¬ ◇tATC ¬. △◽ tTRL = ◻tTRL = ¬ ◇tTRL ¬, but ◻tTRL and ◇tTRL
have nothing to do with contingency unless the TRL is relevantly modal, not just formally
modal. Recall that permissibility is an example of a formally modal relation that does not
impose on contingency.
8.2 Particular Branching Time Systems
This section brieﬂy outlines speciﬁc traditional branching time logics using MMBT. Re-
call that MMBT has the usual sentential connectives, plus generalized modal and temporal
operators of both the non-metric and metric varieties. The modal operators are ◻ and ◇.
The temporal operators are △◽ and ▽◽ .
The diﬀerences in these logics pertain to will/was (△/▽). As such, the strategy used to
develop particular traditional systems from MMBT is to provide deﬁnitions for △/▽. Only
metric versions of △/▽ are given for the reasons discussed in Section 8.1.3. In transitioning
from natural language, it is assumed that a temporal diﬀerence, t ∈ R+, is speciﬁed explicitly
or implicitly.
9See especially Section 6.4.1.
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8.2.1 Bivalent Open Futurism
BivOF is characterized by making the following stipulations:
(8.44) Will is represented by △◽ tATC ; that is, △t ∶=△◽ tATC .
(8.45) A proposition φ's future contingency is represented by ◇tATCφ ∧ ◇tATC¬φ.
For readability, modiﬁcations on temporal/modal operators are left out for the remainder of
this section. Metric operators are used although time is not written. The relation is < unless
otherwise noted and it is assumed that there is a speciﬁc t ∈ R+ given by context.
Since < is transitive, (8.43) entails:
(8.46) △φ â⊧ ◻φ â⊧ ¬ ◇ ¬φ.
As such,
(8.47) △φ ∨△¬φ â⊧ ◻φ ∨ ◻¬φ.
That is, S-FLEM amounts to ATC-fatalism. Whatever will be is necessary under BivOF.
ArgLF is valid. It readily follows that:
(8.48) ◇φ ∧ ◇¬φ â⊧ ¬(△φ ∨△¬φ)
That is, when and only when φ is future-contingent, corresponding instances of S-FLEM
fail.
8.2.2 Absolute True Futurism
AbsTF requires a single TRL, which may be interpreted as something like an actual
timeline. The TRL is represented by an accessibility relation, TRL ⊆< such that TRL is a
maximal chain10. AbsTF is speciﬁed by:11
10Recall that a chain is a totally ordered subset of a partial ordering and that a maximal chain is not a
proper subset of another chain. The TRL is a linear portion of an ATC tree.
11See also [Øhrstrøm(1983), Malpass and Wawer(2012)] for formal accounts of AbsTF.
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(8.49) Will is represented by △◽ tTRL; that is, △t ∶=△◽ tTRL.
(8.50) Will-inevitably is represented by △◽ tATC .
(8.51) A proposition φ's future-contingency is represented by ◇tATCφ ∧ ◇tATC¬φ.
For clarity, t is left out for the remainder of this section. The subscripts TRL and ATC
remain because both relations are important and they have diﬀerent characteristics.
The linearity of the TRL grants will/not commutativity for moments on the TRL, and
S-FLEM also holds in those cases. If m is on TRL, then
(8.52) νm(△¬φ) = νm(¬△ φ)
(8.53) νm(△φ ∨△¬φ) = 1
With respect to a given accessibility relation, S-FLEM is still contrary to merely formal
contingency. So the following hold.
(8.54) △◽ TRLφ ∨△◽ TRL¬φ â⊧ ¬(◇TRLφ ∧ ◇TRL¬φ)
(8.55) △◽ ATCφ ∨△◽ ATC¬φ â⊧ ¬(◇ATCφ ∧ ◇ATC¬φ)
For TF, < is relevant to genuine future contingency, not TRL. The presence of future-
contingents entails that < is non-linear, unlike TRL. By distinguishing the relations used
to account for future-contingency, on the one hand, and the future operator, on the other
hand; TF maintains will/not commutativity and S-FLEM without interfering with future
contingency.
In AbsTF, Will/not commutativity and S-FLEM and do not function properly outside
of the TRL. If m is not on the TRL, then △◽ TRLφ is vacuously true even if φ will-inevitably,
which uses < and not TRL, is false. That vacuity stems from the fact there are no TRL-paths
for counterfactual moments underAbsTF. As such,△◽ TRLφ turns out true because for every
TRL-path in (8.26) is satisﬁed vacuously. Since △◽ TRLφ is true for all φ, S-FLEM instances
are always true. In fact, both disjuncts of S-FLEM instances are true. For moments m
outside of the TRL,
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(8.56) νm(△φ) = νm(△¬φ) = 1
(8.57) νm(¬△ φ) = 0 ≠ νm(△¬φ)
For instance,
(8.58) Jones will have coﬀee and Jones will not have coﬀee are both true.
(8.59) ∴ It's false that Jones will have coﬀee is false while Jones will not have coﬀee
is true.
Additionally, since △φ always holds oﬀ of the TRL, even if △◽ ATC¬φ is true,
(8.60) △φ∣≈ ◇ATC φ
That is, △φ might be true even when φ is impossible. There is no way to ﬁx this problem
for AbsTF. One could easily redeﬁne △◽ TRL so that △φ is always false (by stipulating that
there is a path from the moment at which truth is assigned), in which case S-FLEM would
always be false oﬀ of the TRL and will/not commutativity would still fail. Other options
for AbsTF, none of which are appealing, are discussed in Section 6.3.2.
8.2.3 Indexical True Futurism
In IdxTF, every moment m has a TRLm. Each TRLm can be represented by an acces-
sibility relation, denoted TRLm or TRL(m), whatever is most convenient. One can include
a (total) function TRL ∶M Ð→ R in the deﬁnition of a model instead of many accessibility
relations, TRLm ∈R. The function TRL is subject to the following constraints:12
(8.61) TRLm is a maximal chain for all m ∈M .
(8.62) m is on TRLm.
(8.63) If m <ATC m′ and m′ is on TRLm, then TRLm = TRLm′ .
12See also [Øhrstrøm(2009)], pp. 27–29; and [Braüner et al.(2000)Braüner, Hasle, and Øhrstrøm] for ex-
positions.
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Given this notion of TRLm, traditional IdxTF may be characterized by the following:
(8.64) When evaluated at moment m, will is represented by △◽ tTRLm ; that is, △t ∶=△◽ tTRLm .
(8.65) Will-inevitably is represented by △◽ tATC .
(8.66) A proposition φ's future-contingency is represented by ◇tATCφ ∧ ◇tATC¬φ.
Again, metric operators are used although t is left out for readability. The notation also
hides the moment-dependence of the future operator, clarifying some formulas.
IdxTF has all of the characteristics of AbsTF without the problems outside of the TRL.
Both will/not commutativity and S-FLEM are generally valid:
(8.67) △¬φ â⊧ ¬△ φ
(8.68) ⊧△¬φ ≡ ¬△ φ
(8.69) ⊧△φ ∨△¬φ
IdxTF is therefore able to handle propositions about the future uniformly, even at relatively
counterfactual moments, unlike AbsTF.
8.2.4 Supervaluationism
Sup can be developed by building oﬀ of IdxTF. The technique used here is similar to
the one used by Thomason.13 Deﬁne:
(8.70) TRLm ∶= the set of all possible TRLm (meeting the criteria of TRLm for
IdxTF).
There is a possible TRLm for each <-path from m. There is a diﬀerent IdxTF model for each
possible TRL structure. These models only diﬀer in TRL structure and, correspondingly, ν.
13[Thomason(1970)], esp. p. 274
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The models are identical in other respects. One can deﬁne a Sup truth function N (capital
nu) as follows.14
(8.71) Nm(φ) = 1 if and only if for all TRLm ∈ TRLm, νm(φ) = 1; and Nm(φ) = 0 if
and only if for all TRLm ∈ TRLm, νm(φ) = 0.
This rendition of Sup has all of the same tenets as IdxTF except that N is used instead of
ν.
(8.72) When evaluated at moment m, will is represented by △◽ tTRLm ; that is, △t ∶=△◽ tTRLm .
(8.73) Will-inevitably is represented by △◽ tATC .
(8.74) A proposition φ's future contingency is represented by ◇tATCφ ∧ ◇tATC¬φ.
(8.75) N is the primary evaluation function, not ν. (That is, if one wants to know the
truth value of a proposition, look to N instead of ν. ν is just an intermediate
step.)
Sup has all validities that hold in IdxTF. If a proposition is valid in IdxTF, then it is true
at all moments under all possible TRL assignments. As such, N renders these propositions
valid, too. It can be shown that LEM, W-FLEM, M-FLEM, will-not commutativity, and
S-FLEM are valid.
Bivalence, however, fails. Suppose that Jones' might and might not drink coﬀee to-
morrow. Then there are two possible TRLs, one by which she will drink coﬀee tomorrow
(△1 dayC) and one by which she will not (△1 day¬C). It is neither true under all possible TRL
assignments that △1 dayC nor that in all possible TRL assignments that △1 day¬C. Thus,
neither △1 dayC nor △1 day¬C is true by N .
14It is not necessary to define a new truth function. One could also modify the truth conditions for each
connective and operator to account for all possible arbitrary assignments—in this case, all possible TRL
mappings. Revising all of the truth conditions would be cumbersome. It is easier for this purpose to just
define a new truth function so as to build off of what has already been established.
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8.2.5 Non-Bivalent Open Futurism
OF does not represent temporal operators using a fundamentally diﬀerent relation than
ATC accessibility, like the TRL. As such, OF must employ other mechanisms to bring out
any diﬀerences between will and will-inevitably. One technique serving this end involves
deﬁning temporal operators △ and ▽ for which bivalence fails:
(8.76) νm(△xφ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 iﬀ νm(△◽ xφ) = 1
0 iﬀ νm(△◽ x¬φ) = 1 and νm(△◽ xφ) ≠ 1
(8.77) ▽x ∶=△−x
Equipped with (8.76) and (8.77), a NBivOF system is captured by the following.
(8.78) The truth function, ν, maps each atom to 1 or 0.
(8.79) Will is represented by △tATC .
(8.80) Will-inevitably is represented by △◽ tATC .
(8.81) A proposition φ's future contingency is represented by ◇tATCφ ∧ ◇tATC¬φ.
As usual, subscripts and superscripts are left out for the remainder of this section, unless
such notation is necessary for clariﬁcation.
It can be shown that LEM and is valid for propositions not involving △.15 In general,
however, LEM is just semi-valid in NBivOF.
(8.82) ∣≈ φ ∨ ¬φ
LEM instances are not true when and only when future contingents are involved. For ex-
ample, suppose it is contingent that Jones will drink coﬀee tomorrow (△1 dayC). She turns
out to drink coﬀee on some ATC-path from today, and she does not drink coﬀee on another
15In the general case where△ and▽ pertain to other metric accessibility relations, LEM and bivalence may
fail for propositions that have △ or ▽. The properties of RATC—most importantly, backwards linearity—
ensure that LEM and bivalence hold when only ▽ is involved.
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ATC-path from today. Thus, she does not turn out to drink coﬀee on all ATC-paths from
today, so νtoday(△1 dayC) ≠ 1; nor does she turn out to not drink coﬀee on all ATC-paths
from today, so νtoday(△1 dayC) ≠ 0. The statements △1 dayC has no truth value, just as it is
indeterminate that Jones will drink coﬀee. Additionally, ¬ △1 day C has no truth value. So
the corresponding instance of M-FLEM, △1 dayC ∨ ¬ △1 day C, has no truth value. Hence,
M-FLEM is only semi-valid.
(8.83) ∣≈ △ φ ∨ ¬△ φ
Instances of M-FLEM are instances of LEM, showing why LEM is also only semivalid. Just
as LEM and M-FLEM are merely semi-valid, W-FLEM is also only semi-valid.
(8.84) ∣≈ △ (φ ∨ ¬φ)
W-FLEM is not valid since νm(△(φ ∨ ¬φ)) is undeﬁned if φ cannot be evaluated at the
requisite points. That situation only occurs when φ involves some future operator for which
truth cannot be evaluated. For instance, νtoday(△1 day(C ∨ ¬C)) = 1, but if φ ∶= △1 dayC ∨¬△1 day C, then νyesterday(△1 day(φ ∨ ¬φ)) is undeﬁned.
Familiar results involving will-inevitably still hold. νtoday(△◽ 1 dayC) = νtoday(△◽ 1 day¬C) =
0 in the preceding scenario. In NBivOF, will-inevitably and will diﬀer in truth value when
future contingents enter the scene.
When < is taken as the accessibility relation, will-not commutativity is valid.16 In other
words,
(8.85) ¬△ φ â⊧△¬φ,
although the following is only semi-valid:
(8.86) ∣≈ ¬△ φ ≡△¬φ
since ≡ is not assigned a truth value if its relata are not assigned truth values. (This result
could be changed by altering the truth conditions of ≡ so that it turns out true when both
relata are indeterminate.)
16It is important that the accessibility relation does not have dead ends.
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Just as bivalence fails in cases of future contingency, neither S-FLEM and M-FLEM are
not valid. In the example of Jones and her coﬀee mentioned above, both νtoday(△1 dayC ∨△1 day¬C) and νtoday(△1 dayC ∨ ¬△1 day C), are undeﬁned. Since will/not commutativity is
valid, corresponding instances of S-FLEM and M-FLEM are logically equivalent.
(8.87) ⊭△φ ∨△¬φ although ∣≈ △ φ ∨△¬φ
(8.88) ⊭△φ ∨ ¬△ φ although ∣≈ △ φ ∨ ¬△ φ
Given that S-FLEM and M-FLEM are equivalent, that an instance of S-FLEM is outright
false entails that a corresponding instance of M-FLEM is false. M-FLEM is a special case
of LEM. So if an instance of S-FLEM were false, an instance of LEM would be false, and
that is undesirable. Thus, S-FLEM/M-FLEM should not be invalid, but at least semi-valid.
NBivOF achieves this result.
8.3 Temporal Standpoints and Standpoint Inheritance
Standpoint inheritance is incorporated into MMBT in this section. Section 8.3.1 re-
hearses the importance of standpoint inheritance. More in-depth coverage is given in Sec-
tions 3.4, 6.3.3, and 7.3.2. Section 8.3.2 describes a general theory of standpoint inheritance
for MMBT that can be used for TF and OF alike. The general theory shows that stand-
point inheritance is not tailored to a particular view, but to branching time systems more
broadly. More details about standpoint inheritance for TF andOF are given in Sections 8.3.3
and 8.3.4, respectively. Finally, Section 8.3.5 delivers the promised result that traditional
Sup can be deﬁned using BivOF with temporal standpoints, eliminating Sup's apparent
dependence on a TRL.
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8.3.1 The Importance of Temporal Standpoints
All of the theories presented so far have encountered diﬃculties with combinations of
temporal operators. Suppose, for instance, that Jones drank coﬀee yesterday, but could
have done otherwise.
(8.89) If Jones had not drunk coﬀee, then God would have known that Jones would
not drink coﬀee.
(8.90) If Jones had not drunk coﬀee, then it would have been the case that Jones
would not drink coﬀee.
Since God knows only truths, (8.89) implies (8.90).
These statements should turn out true on an Ockhamist account.17 Ockhamists in the
freedom/foreknowledge literature, however, never managed to propose a convincing expli-
cation of the hard/soft fact distinction.18 Meanwhile, advocates of TF have yet to answer
Belnap and Green's criticism that statements like (8.90) and hence (8.89) turn out false
under TF.19
OF and Sup do not as obviously get the wrong answer for (8.89) and (8.90). BivOF
yields that (8.89) and (8.90) are both false due to the contingency of Jones action, while
NBivOF and Sup yield that (8.89) and (8.90) have no truth value. One could argue that
this is the correct response, according to those views; but perhaps OF and Sup would only
satisfy their compatriots. Consider, for example, a case in which Smith predicted that Jones
would drink coﬀee. Given that Jones drank coﬀee,
(8.91) Smith correctly asserted that Jones would drink coﬀee
should turn out true. For that reason,
17In [Plantinga(1986)], p. 251, Plantinga indicates that Ockhamists hold such statements to be true.
18[Todd(2012)]. Also, see Section 2.7
19[Belnap and Green(1994)], p. 380. See [Øhrstrøm(2009)] for a recent portrayal of Ockhamism.
Øhrstrøm’s TF system does not address Belnap and Green’s criticism. Belnap and Green’s criticism is
discussed in Section 6.3.3.
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(8.92) Jones was going to drink coﬀee
seems true, as well. OF and Sup need to account for these statements.20
Reichenbach distinguished between three kinds of nodes relevant to evaluating state-
ments.21 First is the moment at which a temporal statement is assigned a truth value
(Reichenbach's S). Second is the moment at which the proposition aﬀected by a temporal
operator is evaluated (Reichenbach's E). Potential moments of evaluation from m (with re-
spect to a given accessibility relation) are those moments accessible from m. Third is a point
of reference (Reichenbach's R) that may diﬀer from the other two moments.22 The systems
proposed thus far only explicitly account for moments of the ﬁrst two types. The third, here
called temporal standpoints (following Lucas), can aﬀect factors like accessibility relations.
For instance,
(8.93) From yesterday's standpoint, Jones may and may not drink coﬀee.
(8.94) From today's standpoint (one in which Jones drank coﬀee), that Jones drank
coﬀee is now unalterablenecessary per accidens.
(8.95) From a counterfactual-today standpoint (one in which Jones did not drink
coﬀee), that Jones did not drink coﬀee is now unalterable.
Standpoints aﬀect the structure of moment-speciﬁc accessibility relations. A moment-relative
temporal accessibility relation is already available for IdxTF. Such relations might also be
utilized for Sup. OF still needs a moment-speciﬁc temporal relation. Since ATC accessibility
serves as the temporal relation in OF, ATC trees must be divided into node-speciﬁc parts.
A simpliﬁed technique is here used to account for temporal standpoints: standpoint
inheritance. The details of standpoint inheritance in general and for TF andOF in particular
systems are provided in the following sections.
20The issue is given in slightly more detail in Section 7.3.2.
21[Reichenbach(1947)]
22See Section 3.4 for more on Reichenbach’s analysis.
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8.3.2 A General Theory of Standpoint Inheritance
This section gives a general of standpoint inheritance. Speciﬁc examples are reserved for
later sections in where there are particular temporal relations to work with.
First, some deﬁnitions are in order to clarify talk of standpoints. In terms of the systems
given here, Reichenbach's S, R, and E are designated as follows.
truth-assessment point a moment m at which νm(φ) is being assessed
standpoint a moment s used to designate moment-speciﬁc accessibility relations; or the
moment-speciﬁc relation designated by s
evaluation point a moment m′ is an evaluation point with respect to moment m and
accessibility relation R just in case mRm′; a moment m′ is an evaluation point with
respect to moment m and modal/temporal operator ◯R if and only if mRm′
Additional deﬁnitions pertaining to standpoints:
standpoint relation a relation or type of relation, S, designating standpoint-speciﬁc ac-
cessibility relations Ss. It is assumed that there is only one standpoint relation.
relative counterfactual a moment m is relatively counterfactual with respect to stand-
point s iﬀ m is not on Ss
Some operators appear to handle standpoints diﬀerently than others. The following term
helps to diﬀerentiate between two types of operators.
standpoint-sensitive operator an operator that uses the standpoint relation to determine
points of evaluation
23
With those terms in mind, a general theory of standpoint inheritance may be stated infor-
mally as follows.
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(8.96) Some operators are standpoint-sensitive while others are not.
(8.97) One should only change standpoint when the point of evaluation is counter-
factual with respect to the standpoint.
Implementing this theory in more detail requires a mechanism to keep track of standpoints.
To this end, a standpoint parameter may be added to the truth function. For proposition φ
and moments m and s,
(8.98) νm∣s(φ) may be read as the truth of φ at m from s or the truth of φ at m
given s.
It is assumed that the truth function is total with respect to atomic propositions:
(8.99) For all m,s ∈M and atom A, νm∣s(A) ∈ {0,1}.
Standpoints are unnecessary for evaluating atomic propositions:
(8.100) For all m,s ∈M and atoms A, νm∣s(A) = νm∣m(A).
Truth-functional operators require no substantial modiﬁcation:
(8.101) νm∣s(¬φ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 iﬀ νm∣s(φ) = 0
0 iﬀ νm∣s(φ) = 1
(8.102) νm∣s(φ ∧ ψ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 iﬀ νm∣s(φ) = νm∣s(ψ) = 1
0 iﬀ νm∣s(φ) = 0 or νm∣s(ψ) = 0
The other truth-functional operators can be deﬁned in terms of ¬ and ∧, as usual.
To assess modal and temporal operators, standpoint inheritance uses a standpoint rela-
tion, which is a moment-speciﬁc accessibility relation. IdxTF is equipped with a suitable
type of relation for standpoint-sensitive temporal operators, the type TRL, for which there
are speciﬁc relations TRLm. TRL is a function from moments to maximal chains. The
notation TRLs is used to indicate that s is a standpoint. A more general technique for
individuating standpoint-speciﬁc relations from any relation S is as follows:
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(8.103) Ss ∶= ⋃{P ∣P is an S-path containing s}
One speciﬁc instance of this technique will be important for this project. Standpoint-speciﬁc
subtrees of <, ATC accessibility, can be deﬁned as:
(8.104) <s∶= ⋃{P ∣P is a < -path containing s}
The idea to create subtrees is not new. Lucas, for example, has employed subtrees.24 Intu-
itively, the subtree <s is the portion of < that contains all paths to and from s. The subtrees<s are important for both OF and TF. OF uses <s as the temporal relation. TF requires <s
to ensure that will-inevitably and was-inevitably pass on the correct standpoint.
All of the systems employed use only temporal standpoints. There are no other types of
standpoints. The temporal relation S (TRL for TF and < for OF) designates the standpoint-
speciﬁc Ss (TRLs for TF and <s forOF). There is exactly one standpoint relation per system.
The theory presented here would require further generalization to accommodate multiple
kinds of standpoints.
Some operators are standpoint-sensitive. For this purpose, the only standpoint-sensitive
operators are temporal operators representing will, was, will-always, and was-always. The
two operators required to deﬁne all others are ◻ and △◽ . Standpoint sensitive versions of
those operators may be deﬁned as follows. Let S be the standpoint relation and assume that
paths are simple and forwards-maximal.
Standpoint-sensitive operators:
(8.105) νm∣s(◻Sφ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 iﬀ for every m′ ∈M such that mSsm′, νm′∣s(φ) = 1
0 iﬀ for some m′ ∈M such that mSsm′, νm′∣s(φ) = 0
24[Lucas(1989)]
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(8.106) νm∣s(△◽ Sφ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 iﬀ for every path Ps on Ss starting at m, Ps contains
some m′ ≠m such that νm′∣s(φ) = 1
0 iﬀ for some path Ps on Ss starting at m, every m′ ≠m
on Ps is such that νm′∣s(φ) = 0
Consider an example. An illustration is given in Figure 8.3.1. There are three nodes, m1,
m2, and m3 and a relation S, where m1Sm2 and m1Sm3. S is the standpoint relation.
Particular standpoint-speciﬁc subsets of S are derived using (8.103), by which the Si are
S-paths containing mi. That yields S1 = S since both elements of S involve m1. m1S2m2
since only that path contains m2. S2 is depicted in Figure 8.3.1 (b). For the same reasons,
m1S3m3. In this model, ν2∣2(A) = 1 and ν3∣3(A) = 0.
This simple abstract example is more like OF than TF. Examples directly relevant to
TF and OF are given in later sections.
Let △ represent the standpoint-sensitive △◽ S. It can be shown that ν1∣1(△A) = 0. The
relevant standpoint-speciﬁc relation is S1, shown in Figure 8.3.1 (a). m1S1m3 is a maximal
path starting at m1. Every m′ ≠ m1 on that path (just m3) is such that νm′∣1(A) = 1. In
particular, ν3∣1(A) = ν3∣3(A) = 0.
ν2∣2(▽△ A) = 1. In this case, the standpoint-speciﬁc relation is S2, illustrated in Fig-
ure 8.3.1 (b). Since S2 amounts to just m1S2m2, there is only one path backwards along S2
from m2 and that path contains only one node preceding m2, namely m1. So ν2∣2(▽△A) = 1
iﬀ ν1∣2(△A) = 1. The operative standpoint-speciﬁc relation in this case is still S2. There is
only one path forwards along S2 from m1 and the only other node on that path is m2. As
such, ν1∣2(△A) = 1 iﬀ ν2∣2(A) = 1.
Standpoint-sensitive operators are very much like the modal and temporal operators de-
ﬁned in Section 8.1.3. There are two important things to notice. The ﬁrst is that standpoint-
sensitve operators use the standpoint-speciﬁc relations Ss, which s may or may not be iden-
tical to m. The second is that standpoint-sensitive operators pass their standpoints to their
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(b)
1
2 3
A ↦ 0A ↦ 1
(a)
1
2 3
A ↦ 0A ↦ 1
Figure 8.3.1: A general model depicting standpoint inheritance. (a) illustrates the given
relation S independently of standpoints, which in this case is the same as S1. S2 is shown
in (b).
sub-propositions. This fact ensures that statements like:
(8.107) Jones was going to have coﬀee. (▽△C)
use the initial standpoint for both temporal operators. As such,
(8.108) C ⊧▽△C
That is, whatever is was going to be. It can be shown more generally that whatever was, is,
or will be was going to be; and that whatever was, is, or will be was either going to be or
going to not be. (The latter principle is ExP-S-FLEM, discussed in Section 7.3.4.)
(8.109) ▽φ ∨ φ ∨△φ ⊧▽△ φ
(8.110) ▽φ ∨ φ ∨△φ ⊧▽(△φ ∨△¬φ)
It is crucial to diﬀerentiate between standpoint-sensitive operators and other operators. This
may be done using notation or context. Regarding notation, ◻ and ◇ are not a problem
since, in this exposition, little will be done with will-always and was-always. ◻ and ◇ are
used in their non-standpoint-sensitive, modal senses only. Will and was are represented
by △ and ▽, distinguishing them from the non-standpoint-sensitive △◽ and ▽◽ used for
will/was-inevitably, respectively.
Non-standpoint-sensitive operators do not use standpoints to determine points of eval-
uation. It is tempting to deﬁne non-standpoint-sensitive operators independently of stand-
points, but this route yields some undesirable results. In particular:
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(8.111) Bad result from proposed deﬁnition: inequivalent: {▽△ φ,▽◽ △ φ}
The reason why the two statements are not equivalent is that▽ passes its standpoint on while▽◽ does not. The backwards-linearity of < should yield that ▽ and ▽◽ are interchangeable.
By analogy, if physical determinism were to hold (that is, < is linear), then whatever will
occur is inevitable. It is already granted that whatever is inevitable will occur, so △ and△◽ would be equivalent if < were linear. Thus, ▽ and ▽◽ should be equivalent since < is
backwards-linear.25 To ensure this result, non-standpoint-sensitive operators must sometimes
pass on their standpoints.
Standpoints are only relevant to non-standpoint-sensitive operators because those op-
erators pass standpoints on to sub-propositions that may be standpoint-sensitive. Unlike
standpoint-sensitive operators, non-standpoint-sensitive operators are not limited by stand-
points to designate nodes at which to perform evaluations. It is necessary to change stand-
points in order to sensibly evaluate at a node that is unrelated to the standpoint by the
standpoint relation. For instance, the scenario depicted in Figure 6.3.1:
(8.112) Before Jones drank coﬀee, it was the case that Jones will inevitably not have
a headache.
The initial standpoint is one in which Jones drank coﬀee. The inner operator, will-inevitably,
has a point of evaluation at which Jones did not drink coﬀee. That node is counterfactual
with respect to the initial standpoint. To evaluate at the counterfactual node, one must
switch standpoints, asking what would have happened if Jones had not drunk coﬀee.
The foundational non-standpoint-sensitive operators may be deﬁned as follows.26 Let R
be an accessibility relation such that Ss ⊆ R for each moment s. Assume that paths are
simple and forwards-maximal.
25Additionally, the inequivalence of ▽ and ▽◽ could be used to resuscitate Belnap and Green’s criticism
against IdxTF, discussed in Section 6.3.3, if not make the problem worse. The coin was-inevitably going to
come up heads would hold at the tails scenario although The coin was going to come up tails would also
hold.
26The upcoming definitions presuppose transitivity.
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Non-standpoint-sensitive operators:
(8.113) νm∣s(◻Rφ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 iﬀ for every m′ ∈M such that mRm′,
if mSsm′, νm′∣s(φ) = 1; otherwise, νm′∣m′(φ) = 1
0 iﬀ for some m′ ∈M such that mRm′, either
(mSsm′ while νm′∣s(φ) = 0) or νm′∣m′(φ) = 0
(8.114) νm∣s(△◽ Rφ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 iﬀ for every path P on R starting at m, for some m′ ≠m
on P , if m′ is on some Ps on Ss, then νm′∣s(φ) = 1;
otherwise, νm′∣m′(φ) = 1
0 iﬀ for some path P on R starting at m, for every m′ ≠m
on P , if m′ is on some path Ps on Ss, then νm′∣s(φ) = 0;
otherwise, νm′∣m′(φ) = 0
The only diﬀerence between the standpoint-sensitive and non-standpoint-sensitive operators
are those clauses involving νm′∣m′ in the deﬁnitions for non-standpoint-sensitive operators.
Those operators' points of evaluations are not restricted by the standpoint to Ss. Points of
evaluation not on Ss are deemed counterfactual with respect to s, so the standpoint is reset
to the new point of evaluation, m′.
As an example, return to the model shown in Figure 8.3.1. For clarity, let △◽ represent
the non-standpoint sensitive △◽ S. In that model, ν2∣2(▽△◽ A) = 0, as follows. The truth
conditions for ▽ require checking nodes behind m2 along S2. There is only one such node,
m1, so ν2∣2(▽△◽ A) = 0 iﬀ ν1∣2(△◽ A) = 0. For the sake of illustrating the deﬁnitions, it is
worthwhile to check all S-paths (note that S is not standpoint-speciﬁc) from m1 although
only the right path is needed. Consider the left path. The relevant evaluation is ν1∣2(△◽ A),
the standpoint being m2. Furthermore, S2 includes the entire left path, so the standpoint
m2 is retained. It is necessary to check all m′ ≠m1 on the left path to see if νm′∣2(A) = 0. In
this simple example, m2 is the only such m′; but if there were others, the standpoint would
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still be m2. The case is diﬀerent along the right path. That path is m1Sm3. It is shown
using the right path that there is a path along S from m1by which ν1∣2(△◽ A) = 0. The only
node on the right path, m3, is counterfactual with respect to m2 because m3 is not along
S2. See Figure 8.3.1 (b). Since m3 is not along S2, the truth conditions for △◽ demand
switching standpoints to m′, which in this case is just m3. ν3∣3(A) = 0, so ν1∣2(△◽ A) = 0;
thus, ν2∣2(▽△◽ A) = 0.
8.3.3 Standpoint Inheritance for True Futurism
Standpoint inheritance is here applied to (branching) IdxTF. The standpoint aﬀects only
the temporal relation, which in this case is TRL. As such, that s is taken as the standpoint
amounts to TRLs being the operative temporal relation. One more bit of terminology needs
to be clariﬁed here. A node m is counterfactual with respect to s just in case m is not on
TRLs.
The method of implementing standpoint inheritance for IdxTF is quite simple. Roughly,
(8.115) All and only standpoint-sensitive operators are those that use TRL, namely,
those representing will, was, will-always, and was-always.
(8.116) Only switch standpoints when the point of evaluation becomes counterfactual.
Observe that only operators that do not use the temporal relation are capable of accessing
relatively counterfactual nodes when the standpoint is held ﬁxed. Suppose the standpoint is
held at s. Any member of a consecutive string of temporal operatorsthose corresponding
to will, was, will-always, and was-alwaysonly specify points of evaluation on TRLs. That
limitation is due to the fact that TRLs is designated as the accessibility relation for those
operators, which is what holding the standpoint at s amounts to.
In symbols, those temporal operators are △TRLs =△◽ TRLs , ▽TRLs =▽◽ TRLs (i.e. △−TRLs),◻TRLs , and ◻−TRLs . Note that the TRL's linearity yields that ◇TRLm =△TRLm and ◇−TRLm =▽TRLm , so there is no need to account for those ◇ operators directly. Only operators that use
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accessibility relations other than TRLs, the non-standpoint-sensitive operators, can access
nodes counterfactual with respect to s, those moments not on TRLs. Such operators include
will-inevitably, was-inevitably, and various forms of necessarily and possibly. In symbols,△◽ <,▽◽ <, ◻<, ◇<, ◻L, ◇L, et cetera, and corresponding ◻ and ◇ operators along inverse relations.
The mechanics of these operators are speciﬁc instances of the general analysis provided in
Section 8.3.2.
Standpoint inheritance avoids Belnap and Green's criticism, discussed in Sections 6.3.3
and 6.3.4. The criticism has not been addressed using traditional branching time logics, but
standpoint inheritance ﬁxes the issue. Without standpoint inheritance, TRLs at counterfac-
tual nodes are hijacked, so to speak, by a dominant TRL somewhere in the past. Standpoint
inheritance blocks such hijacking by ensuring that the inner operator, △, retains the stand-
point of the outer ▽. This technique corresponds to actual usage by avoiding standpoint
shifts as long as it makes sense to do so.
Standpoint inheritance yields:
(8.117) When anything is the case, it has always been the case that it will be the
case.27 (φ ⊧ ◻−TRL△ φ)
(8.118) φ ⊧▽△ φ
(8.119) φ ⊧▽t△t φ for any t > 0
Without standpoint inheritance, (8.117)(8.119) do not hold in any of the systems here
(except AbsTF, which was seen to be deﬁcient). Belnap and Green showed that IdxTF
gives the wrong answer for (8.118) and (8.119) at counterfactual nodes. More generally,
(8.120) consistent: {φ,▽△¬φ}
(8.121) consistent: {φ,▽t△t ¬φ}
27[Prior(1955)], p. 210.
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heads
mh
tails
mt
past
mp
TRLh TRLtTRLp
Figure 8.3.2: Indexical true futurism: Coin toss revisited. The red TRL (heads) dominates
the blue TRL (tails), indicating that the actual timeline contains the heads moment, not the
tails moment.
hold for some φ and t > 0 at some nodes in any model that has future contingents.28 Stand-
point inheritance avoids this unwelcome result by satisfying (8.118) and (8.119).
Example TF1:
For the sake of illustration, recall Belnap and Green's coin toss example, illustrated in
Figure 8.3.2.
Let mh, mt, and mp be the heads moment, tails moment, and past moment, respectively;
and let TRLh, TRLt, and TRLp be the corresponding TRLs. Suppose that TRLp = TRLh ≠
TRLt, but TRLt contains mp, as indicated in Figure 8.3.2. Deﬁne H ∶= The result is heads
and T ∶= The result is tails where T is equivalent to ¬H. Assume νh∣h(H) = 1 and νt∣t(T ) = 1
(standpoints are irrelevant to literals like H and T ).
Consider νt∣t(▽△ T ), the truth value of The coin was going to come up tails at/from
the tails node. νt∣t(▽ △ T ) = 1 since for every (the only) path backwards along TRLt,
some moment m along that path is such that νm∣t(△T ) = 1. (For the non-metric △, every
moment m preceding mt along TRLt makes νm∣t(△T ) = 1. For the the metric △x, at least
one moment m preceding mt along TRLt makes νm∣t(△xT ) = 1. That moment is mp for
x = τt − τp.) νm∣t(△T ) = 1 because for every (the only) path forwards along TRLt from m
contains a moment m′ (namely, mt) such that νm′∣t(T ) = 1.
28In particular, the problem occurs at nodes that are not on a special TRL, which may be called the real
TRL. The real TRL is a unique TRLm such that if m′ < m, then TRLm′ = TRLm. Not all IdxTF models
have real TRL. There is such a TRL if and only if the ATC tree has a root node or a trunk; that is, the tree
has a least m or is linear behind some m. There are nodes that are not on the real TRL if and only if there
are future-contingents.
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Standpoint inheritance retains the following.
(8.122) φ∣≈▽△◽ φ
(8.123) ▽ =▽◽
Example TF2:
Here is an illustration of (8.122) using the coin example above. Consider νh∣h(▽x△◽ xH) for
x = τh − τp. (Metric operators are used for convenience. Showing that the non-metric △◽ H is
false requires showing that H is false at every node on some branch, which is an unnecessary
hassle for this example. There is no need to address what happens if the coin is tossed again
in an hour, for instance. One could achieve the same eﬀect by ignoring all nodes except mh,
mt, and mp.) νh∣h(▽x△◽ xH) = 0 because the only node preceding mh along TRLh at which
the time is τh − x is mp and νp∣h(△◽ xH) = 0. νp∣h(△◽ xH) = 0 since △◽ uses < and there are
two nodes at which the time is τp + x forwards along < from mp, namely, mh and mt. mh is
along TRLh so the standpoint is kept at H (although it makes no diﬀerence for evaluating
the atom H). The relevant evaluation is νh∣h(H) = 1. mt is not along TRLh. As such, the
standpoint switches to mt and the relevant evaluation is νt∣t(H) = 0. Thus, along the tails
path, the coin does not come up heads at the requisite time, ensuring νp∣h(△◽ xH) = 0.
Two examples were just given. The ﬁrst emphasizes standpoint retention for temporal
operators. The second example illustrates the fact that △◽ is not bound by the standpoint.
The next example shows how standpoint retention and switching work together.
Example TF3:
Consider again the coin toss scenario. It will be shown that:
(8.124) νp∣p (△◽ x ((H ⊃▽△H) ∧ (T ⊃▽△ T ))) = 1
Again, the metric △◽ x is used for convenience as in the second example. x = τh − τp, as
above. △◽ uses < and there are two paths forwards along < from mp, the heads path and
the tails path. The only node along the heads (tails) path at which the time is τp + x is mh
229
(mt). mh is along TRLp, so the ﬁrst relevant evaluation is νh∣p ((H ⊃▽△H) ∧ (T ⊃▽△ T ));
but TRLp = TRLh, so it is all the same if νh∣h ((H ⊃▽△H) ∧ (T ⊃▽△ T )) is evaluated,
instead. (The otherwise useless standpoint switch makes the two evaluations symmetric,
allowing for a WLOG argument shortly.) mt is not along TRLp, so the second evalua-
tion is νt∣t ((H ⊃▽△H) ∧ (T ⊃▽△ T )). The two evaluations are symmetric, so consider
only the ﬁrst WLOG. The right conjunct of νh∣h(T ⊃ ▽△ T ) = 1 since νh∣h(T ) = 0. Given
that νh∣h(H) = 1, νh∣h(H ⊃ ▽ △ H) depends on νh∣h(▽ △ H). νh∣h(▽ △ H) = 1 follow-
ing the argument in Example TF1. As such, νh∣h ((H ⊃▽△H) ∧ (T ⊃▽△ T )) = 1 since
both conjuncts are true. Similarly, νt∣t ((H ⊃▽△H) ∧ (T ⊃▽△ T )) = 1. It follows that
νp∣p (△◽ x ((H ⊃▽△H) ∧ (T ⊃▽△ T ))) = 1.
8.3.4 Standpoint Inheritance for Open Futurism
Standpoint inheritance may be applied to BivOF and NBivOF. OF is not by default
equipped with any moment-sensitive accessibility relations. Moment-speciﬁc subtrees of <
are deﬁned using (8.104), as described above. That s is a temporal standpoint amounts to<s being the operative temporal relation.
A node m is counterfactual with respect to standpoint s if and only if m is not on <s.
Unlike the case for TF, that m is not counterfactual with respect to s does not imply that m
is factual with respect to s. Ifm andm′ are distinct, contemporaneous nodes such that s <m
and s <m′, then m and m′ are incompatible, alternate possible futures from s. Thus, neither
m nor m′ are counterfactual with respect to s. Neither moment is factual with respect to s
because OF never prioritizes one possible future of a standpoint over another.29
Standpoint inheritance for OF is roughly captured by these familiar tenets:
(8.125) All and only standpoint-sensitive operators are those representing will, was,
will-always, and was-always.
29This notion of counterfactuality is intended to clarify the discussion, but does not accord with all English
usage.
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mc mnc
mp
(a) (b)
standpoint
mc mnc
mp standpoint
mc mnc
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(c)
Figure 8.3.3: Open futurism: Jones drinking coﬀee revisited. Jones drinks coﬀee at mc, but
not at mnc. Her coﬀee-drinking is future-contingent at mp. In (a), the standpoint is mp and
the corresponding ATC subtree is <p. That subtree includes all of the nodes shown in the
ﬁgure. As such, (a) also shows < independently of standpoint (ignoring nodes outside of the
diagram). In (b), the standpoint is mc and the corresponding subtree is <c. <c does not
include the non-coﬀee branch containing mnc. In (c), the standpoint is mnc and the subtree,<nc. That subtree does not include the coﬀee branch containing mc.
(8.126) Only switch standpoints when the point of evaluation becomes counterfactual.
Standpoint inheritance for OF is the same as that for TF, except for the diﬀerence in
temporal/standpoint relations.
OF with standpoint inheritance, and not without, satisﬁes (8.118) and (8.119). This
goal is accomplished respecting (8.122), (8.123), and S-FLEM's invalidity. OF can therefore
account for predictions without compromising those other important tenets.
Example OF1:
Here is an example of (8.118) that is the same for both BivOF andNBivOF. See Figure 8.3.3
for an illustration of the familiar scenario of Jones' future-contingent coﬀee-drinking, now
including subscripts. Let mc be a node at which Jones drinks coﬀee and mnc be a node
at which she does not (nc stands for no coﬀee). mp is a past node at which Jones'
coﬀee-drinking is contingent.
Consider νc∣c(▽△C), the truth value of Jones was going to drink coﬀee at/from mc, the
node at which Jones drinks coﬀee. The ATC subtree corresponding to mc, <c, is depicted in
Figure 8.3.3 (b). νc∣c(▽△C) = 1 since there is a moment prior to mc on <c, namely mp, such
that νp∣c(△C) = 1. νp∣c(△C) = 1 because every path forwards from mp contains a moment at
which Jones drinks coﬀee. In particular, every such path contains mc and νc∣c(C) = 1.
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Example OF2:
This second example shows that νc∣c(▽t△◽ tC) = 0 for t = τc − τp = τnc − τpin the coﬀee
scenario. The example works for both BivOF and NBivOF. As in Example TF2, metric
operators are used for convenience to skirt unnecessary considerations like whether or not
Jones drinks coﬀee next Thursday on the no-coﬀee branch. νc∣c(▽t△◽ tC) = 0 since the only
node backwards from mc at which the time is τc − t is mp and νp∣c(△◽ tC) = 0. Recall that△◽ uses < and is not limited by standpoint. Ignoring the standpoint, the < is depicted in
Figure 8.3.3 (a). Each <-path from mp contains exactly one of two nodes at which the time
is τp+t, namely, mc and mnc. Evaluating at mc does not require a standpoint switch because
mc is on <c as in Figure 8.3.3 (b), so the relevant evaluation is νc∣c(C) = 1. mnc is not on <c,
so evaluating at mnc requires switching standpoint from mc to mnc. The relevant evaluation
is therefore νnc∣nc(C) = 0. There is at least one <-path from mp along which Jones does not
drink coﬀee at the relevant time.
Another advantage to standpoint inheritance is that it greatly simpliﬁes many expres-
sions. All strings of non-metric and metric △/▽ can be reduced to a string with at most
two of those operators.
The eight possible strings of three operators are △△△, △△▽, △▽△, △▽▽, ▽△△,▽△▽, ▽▽△, and ▽▽▽. Density yields that:
(8.127) △△ φ â⊧△φ
(8.128) ▽▽ φ â⊧▽φ
By those two equivalences, six of the eight length-three strings reduce to length two. The
remaining strings are △ ▽ △ and ▽ △ ▽. The following hold, regardless of standpoint
inheritance.
(8.129) △▽△φ â⊧▽△ φ
(8.130) ▽△▽φ â⊧△▽ φ
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Standpoint inheritance yields that all operators in △/▽ strings use the same standpoint
s, corresponding to the subtree <s. Standpoint inheritance grants (8.129) and (8.130) intu-
itively. Without standpoint inheritance, (8.129) and (8.130) may require a temporal operator
applying over an arbitrarily small interval. That is somewhat inelegant, but the reduction
works nonetheless.
The case is diﬀerent for metric operators. Let t, u > 0. Regardless of standpoint inheri-
tance, the following equivalences hold.
(8.131) △t△u φ â⊧△t+uφ
(8.132) ▽t▽u φ â⊧▽t+uφ
The next equivalences are only supported by standpoint inheritance. Let t, u, v, x, y > 0.
(8.133) △t▽u△vφ â⊧▽x△y φ
(8.134) ▽t△u▽vφ â⊧△x▽y φ
The equivalences hold for x = u and y = t+v. Without standpoint inheritance, it is impossible
to specify a relationship between, on the one hand, t, u, v; and x, y on the other. For any
proposed expression, it is possible to construct a countermodels of the following sorts:
(8.135) △t▽u△vφ ⊭▽x△y φ
(8.136) △x▽y φ ⊭▽t△u▽vφ
Such countermodels always exist because the ﬁrst operator on the left is △, but the ﬁrst
operator on the right is ▽. One can always ensure that the past operator dips below a
confounding branch that changes the result. This is accomplished by placing such a branch
below the standpoint closer than min(x, t). There are no confounding branches below the
initial standpoint given standpoint inheritance. The standpoint's subtree only begins to fork
at the standpoint.
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8.3.5 Supervaluationism based on Open Futurism
There is nothing inherently true-futurist about Sup. Sup does not choose a privileged
future. The only thing that Sup has in common with TF is that will/not commutativity
and S-FLEM are both valid under those theories. It is incidental that semantics for Sup
involve a TRL under Thomason's portrayal.30 This section provides an alternative semantics
for Sup built from OF with standpoint inheritance.
The idea behind Sup more broadly is that some things are underspeciﬁed.31 Those types
of things that can be underspeciﬁed are associated with all of their possible resolutions.
There is something to designate only insofar as possible speciﬁcations are in agreement. In
the case of temporal logic, what is underspeciﬁed is how the future will turn out. TRLs
represent possible speciﬁcations of the future. The Sup truth function N yields truth or
falsity to the extent that what will happen is resolved.
Using TRLs might not seem sensible to a friend of OF. In OF, the future is resolved as
time passes. Whatever will happen tomorrow, for instance, will be resolved two days from
now. Structurally, this resolution amounts to ATC subtree pruning over time; in terms of
statements, ExP-S-FLEM holds in all OF systems with standpoint inheritance. A TRL that
represents a particular contingent future is arbitrary if not empty from today's standpoint.
A TRL might be legitimate if there were a standpoint to look back from, a standpoint from
which everything is past. What will happen tomorrow will be resolved two days from now,
but there is no time at which everything will be resolved, assuming time is unbounded and
there is no point at which the future is determined. Creating something like a TRL from the
perspective of OF requires a time beyond all other times. Put another way, the ATC tree
must have maximal elements. OF does not presuppose a time after all others. Even though
the TRL is arbitrary or senseless from the perspective of OF, ATC subtree pruning yields
intermediate resolutions that are suﬃcient to provide a Sup semantics. There need not be
30[Thomason(1970)]
31[van Fraassen(1966)]
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a time at which everything is resolved as long as each aspect of the future will be resolved
at some time.
(8.137) Nm(φ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 iﬀ every < -path P starting at m contains a moment
s0 on P such that for all s > s0, νm∣s(φ) = 1
0 iﬀ every < -path P starting at m contains a moment
s0 on P such that for all s > s0, νm∣s(φ) = 0
The node s0 is a point at which φ's truth at m is resolved. When a fact is resolved, it
no longer changes. No amount of waiting and seeing can aﬀect something that is resolved.
(8.137) is designed to capture this notion of resolution. If it can be determined in advance
how φ will be resolved, then N , assigns the truth value accordingly. Otherwise, φ does not
get a truth value at m.
When employing the deﬁnition in (8.137), it does not matter whether BivOF orNBivOF
is taken as the basis. That is because BivOF and NBivOF only disagree on the handling
of unresolved propositions. Sup draws from its foundational logic only insofar as resolution
is concerned.
(8.137) yields a Sup logic with all of the essential features of Thomason's original pre-
sentation. LEM, S-FLEM, and will/not commutativity are all valid. When φ is future-
contingent at m, not all paths agree on whether or not φ will be true. As such, Nm(△φ) is
undeﬁned.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions and Further Research
The arguments of the preceding chapters indicate that TF is not the best view to hold in
a dynamic framework. If TF works at all, it is under absolutism (eternalism, the B-theory,
and company). At the end of the day, BivOF is the position of choice for avoiding fatalism
within a branching time framework. Standpoint inheritance, a theory proposed to enhance
all branching time views alike, was seen to have a number of advantages. These results
endorse freedom/foreknowledge incompatibilism while avoiding theological fatalism. This
chapter reviews those conclusions and proposes some avenues for further research.
9.1 True Futurism and Ockhamism
TF is the only theory to accommodate S-FLEM, will/not commutativity, and bivalence.
As a logic that is relatively simple and keeps basic intuitions, TF seems ideal. The criticisms
proposed by Belnap and Green were addressed using IdxTF combined with standpoint
inheritance. In those respects, TF is in good standing.
The introduction of standpoint inheritance clariﬁes what it is for statements character-
izing God's beliefs to be soft facts. Ockhamists hold that God's past and present beliefs are
soft when they are about soft facts, although the tenet is not part of TF more generally.
To retain their occasional softness, God's beliefs must be standpoint-dependent. The be-
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liefs of other agents are not standpoint-dependent and it is not clear how an agent in time
can have standpoint-dependent beliefs. Ockhamists must explain how God's beliefs can be
standpoint-dependent to justify the view his beliefs are soft. Lacking such an explanation,
it is ad hoc to propose that God's beliefs are so drastically unlike other beliefs. If God's
beliefs are not standpoint-dependent and are instead like the beliefs of other agents, then he
is fallible although in fact never wrong. At least, given a model in which there is a dominant
TRL, God is never wrong along that TRL. God holds some false beliefs at counterfactual
moments. A ﬁnal option for TF is to maintain that God's beliefs are like those of other
agents, but he lacks comprehensive foreknowledge. This position is a type of open theism
akin to Hasker's.1
Another challenge for TF is to justify S-FLEM, strong future bivalence, and will/not
commutativity. Several arguments were given indicating that those principles cannot be
taken for granted. The supposed validities might stem from confusion, as the ﬁrst few
arguments in Section 7.3.1 indicate. The last argument in that section points out that other
grammatical modalities, like can and not, do not commute with not. A uniﬁed theory would
treat will like other grammatical modalities. These arguments do not conclusively show that
will does not commute with not, in which case S-FLEM would fail, but that the burden
of proof is on TF to give solid arguments for S-FLEM and commutativity. A candidate
argument for S-FLEM and strong future bivalence is the ex post argument. The discussion
in Section 7.3.4 shows that the ex post argument does not really support S-FLEM or strong
future bivalence at all, but instead endorses the weaker ExP-S-FLEM. ExP-S-FLEM holds in
OF systems equipped with standpoint inheritance. As such, TF isn't as intuitively plausible
as it may seem at ﬁrst glance. TF is challenged to ﬁnd independently plausible evidence for
S-FLEM that does not just endorse W-FLEM, M-FLEM, or ExP-S-FLEM.
Two arguments were given against TF to show that interpreting will as actually-will
does not help. Both arguments draw from the fact that will is formally modal and thus
1[Hasker(2001)]
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actually-will is logically equivalent to not actually-possibly not. The ﬁrst argument proposes
that actually-possibly should be interpreted as actualizably. Actualizability is necessary for
contingency if not outright identical to ATC possibility. The second argument adds that
actually is truth-functionally redundant. So not actually-possibly not amounts to not possibly
not, which is just necessarily in some relevantly modal sense. To rebut these arguments, TF
must show how will ought to be understood so as to secure its non-modality. Actually-will
does not get the job done. TF cannot avoid fatalism without such an explication.
The arguments involving actually-will just mentioned directly conclude that TF yields
fatalism. A related concern is the general grounding problem, by which TF is either ad
hoc or entails fatalism. The temporal relation of TF, the TRL, can be speciﬁed with a
comprehensive set of soft facts (given all of the hard facts). Conversely, the TRL designates
a comprehensive set of soft facts. The general grounding problem challenges TF to explain
either why the TRL selects one future over others or, equivalently, why the set of soft
facts is constituted as it is. For instance, why will Jones drink coﬀee tomorrow instead of do
otherwise? Any such explanation, so goes the criticism, yields fatalism. Grounding soft facts
and the TRL requires a chronologically backwards dependence relation, for soft facts depend
on future events. Chronologically backwards dependence is at best anomalous, especially in
the context of dynamic time.
The grounding problem has another facet when God is involved. In particular, it is not
clear how God or anyone else in time can come to infallibly know soft facts. Any conclusive
evidence for a soft fact's truth would make the corresponding event determined. Molinism
gives a popular candidate explanation for God's knowledge of soft facts and the TRL. The
underlying ATC tree is known by God through his natural knowledge. Soft facts and the TRL
are speciﬁed via God's middle knowledge (as far as agents go, in terms of counterfactuals
of freedom). Everything stems from God's essence and God perfectly understands his own
essence. So he knows what free agents and indeterministic subatomic particles would do
in every possible situation. Commentators tried to justify middle knowledge of free agents'
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behavior using soft facts. Soft facts, however, cannot be taken for granted. Molinists need
to explain soft facts in the ﬁrst place. Molinism does not serve as an explanation of TF, but
instead presupposes TF.
The only viable alternative for TF is general eternalism, which would be combined with
ThEtrn if God is in the picture. Eternalism removes the mystery of the backwards de-
pendence of soft facts on corresponding events. Truth itself is atemporal. Soft facts are
(atemporally) true because the events that they are about are (atemporally) occurring. If
God is atemporal, then he has epistemic access to events at all times, unlike temporally re-
stricted agents who have much more limited evidence. General eternalism is part of a more
thorough absolutism, involving the B-theory and perdurantism. By turning to eternalism,
TF may be exiled from all aspects of the dynamic framework.
9.2 Open Futurism
OF does not have the same initial plausibility as TF, but considerations like those men-
tioned above have led some thinkers to accept OF. OF provides a way out of both logical and
theological fatalism while yielding uniﬁed linguistic and philosophical analyses of temporal
language. The evidence considered in this project leans towards BivOF, which was Prior's
favored position, at least in his later writings.2 Contra Prior, it was seen that OF requires
standpoint inheritance.
All forms of OF emphasize a wait-and-see semantics for will, but look only at presently
determining factors for will-inevitably. The distinction between will and will-inevitably was
formally evident in traditional NBivOF and is brought out formally in BivOF by standpoint
inheritance (the diﬀerence was there to begin with, but somewhat hidden by the formal
system). Thus, neither BivOF not NBivOF can be charged with conﬂating will and will-
inevitably.
Traditional OF cannot represent predictions and guesses that come out true. This is-
2[Prior(1967)]. Cf. [Prior(1957)].
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sue stems from a deeper problem, a failure to capture the wait-and-see semantics of will.
Standpoint inheritance provides a framework to naturally handle predictions and faithfully
represent wait-and-see semantics. In addition to granting a superior characterization of true
predictions and clarifying the diﬀerence between will and will-inevitably for BivOF, stand-
point inheritance allows OF to reduce all strings of consecutive will 's and was 's to at most
two such operators.
Arguments against will/not commutativity and S-FLEM show that BivOF is the best
option. NBivOF retains commutativity while sacriﬁcing bivalence and LEM. Sup keeps
LEM, S-FLEM, and commutativity; but not bivalence. As a result, Sup develops a chasm
between object- and meta-theory that is at best awkward, if not incoherent. The sacriﬁces
required by NBivOF and Sup are unnecessary if commutativity and S-FLEM lack founda-
tion to begin with, as proposed in Sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.4. Among varieties of OF, the only
obstacle for traditional BivOF was the apparent conﬂation will and will-inevitably. BivOF
with standpoint inheritance avoids the confusion, which was based on other confusions from
the start.
9.3 Standpoint Inheritance
Traditional branching time logics eﬀectively switch standpoint with every new point of
evaluation. Every modal or temporal operator switches standpoint. Standpoint inheritance
suggests a more conservative approach, motivated by counterexamples to traditional logics
and corresponding to the empirical claim that speakers do not change standpoint unless they
have to. Temporal operators do not aﬀect standpoint at all. For modal operators, instead of
switching standpoint with every new point of evaluation, a new standpoint comes into play
only when a moment is incompatible with the current standpoint. Formally, this scenario
is detected using standpoint-speciﬁc accessibility relations. For this project, the relevant
accessibility relations are TRLs and ATC trees. If a moment is not on the standpoint's own
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relation, then the moment is incompatible with the standpoint.
All major theories using branching time semantics need to incorporate temporal stand-
points. Belnap and Green showed that traditional TF gets incorrect results at counterfac-
tual scenarios. AbsTF cannot handle temporal statements at counterfactual moments at
all. Here is an example demonstrating the point made by Belnap and Green against IdxTF.
Given that Jones drank coﬀee, the following holds at a counterfactual moment at which
Jones did not drink coﬀee:
(9.1) Jones did not drink coﬀee although she was going to. (¬c ∧ ▽△ c)
(9.1) and its kin indicate the most prominent linguistic obstacle for IdxTF. Standpoint
inheritance eliminates oﬀensive propositions like (9.1) for IdxTF.
Standpoint inheritance also sheds light on the hard/soft fact distinction. The standpoint-
dependence of propositions allows IdxTF to get correct results, avoiding statements like
(9.1). Suppose that Jones' coﬀee-drinking is contingent. Thus:
(9.2) Jones will drink coﬀee
characterizes a soft fact. The softness of (9.2) is demonstrated by the fact that (9.2)'s truth
value depends on future standpoint. In order for statements characterizing God's beliefs
to be soft, those propositions must be standpoint-dependent. That is, God's beliefs must
themselves be standpoint-dependent. Ockhamists are therefore committed to the view that
God's beliefs are standpoint-dependent, for they advocate statements like:
(9.3) Since Jones drank coﬀee, God believed that she was going to drink coﬀee.
(9.4) If Jones had not drunk coﬀee, God would have believed that she was going to
not drink coﬀee.
In the context of branching time, (9.4) requires that God's beliefs are standpoint-dependent,
unlike the beliefs of other agents. Standpoint dependence clariﬁes this observation.
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OF needs to account for temporal standpoints in order to account for predictions and
faithfully represent wait-and-see semantics. If (9.2) was contingent, then it was untrue.
Assume that:
(9.5) Smith predicted that Jones would drink coﬀee.
Smith's prediction was correct. Under standpoint inheritance, (9.2) remains untrue from
earlier standpoints from which Jones' coﬀee-drinking is contingent. From later standpoints
in which Jones drank coﬀee, her coﬀee-drinking and the veracity of Smith's prediction has
been aﬃrmed with the passage of time. (9.2) is true and Smith's prediction was correct from
those later standpoints.
Under standpoint inheritance, temporal operators are restricted by standpoint. Like all
operators, temporal operators pass their standpoints on to subsequent operators. These
facts together yield that a string of was 's and will 's uses the same standpoint throughout.
As such, any string of was 's and will 's can be reduced to at most two of those operators.
Unlike the traditional view, this result holds for metric operators and discreet (non-dense)
arrangements of moments.
Sup is traditionally formulated using IdxTF as a basis. With standpoint inheritance,
Sup can be depicted in terms of OF, instead. This is an advantage for anyone who wants
to avoid the TRL instead using OF's wait-and-see semantics characterize Sup.
9.4 Research Avenues
There are a number of ways in which this project could be extended. One obvious loose
end is absolutism. Adequate treatments of eternalism, the B-theory, and related views are
beyond this essay. A goal of this project is to enhance the dynamic approach, improving
A-theoretic systems in ways that challenge their static counterparts. Another task is to show
that the dynamic view is the best option for representing freedom and contingency. This
might be accomplished by demonstrating that accidental possibility, which is required for
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freedom and contingency, only makes sense within dynamic, branching systems.
This essay is relatively non-technical. It is not a logical treatise. For the sake of being
explicit, a system (MMBT) was given in Chapter 8 through which speciﬁc views were por-
trayed and standpoint inheritance was implemented. MMBT could use a lot of development.
Here are a few obvious improvements:
(9.6) Axiomatizations
(9.7) More operators: since, until, now, and so forth
(9.8) Property (predicate) calculus
(9.9) Additional meta-theorems
One might also add probabilities to MMBT. As mentioned in Section 3.1, will has a proba-
bilistic sense. A related advancement would be to add a non-relevance conditional. Linguists
have made a lot of headway in researching conditionals. Non-relevance conditionals might be
implemented using the restrictor analysis, Fintel's analysis, or Gillies' analysis.3 Probabili-
ties and conditionals are interesting in their own right, but one could incorporate both. That
may seem gratuitous, but a system equipped with probabilities, conditionals, and modality
could shed light in a few intricate puzzles, like the problem of old evidence.
9.5 Looking Back
The main goal of this project is to address theological and logical fatalism. These goals
have been accomplished within the dynamic framework given here. OF, and in particular
BivOF, is the best option along with the associated type of OT. Along the way, standpoint
inheritance was proposed as a way to enhance branching time logics. Standpoint inheritance
allows branching systems to account for some linguistic diﬃculties. The theory clariﬁes not
3See, for instance, [Fintel and Iatridou(2002), Gillies(2009)]. [Fintel(2009)] contains a useful summary.
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only the hard/soft fact distinction, but also what is required for characterizations of God's
beliefs to be soft.
Despite the achievements of this endeavor, there is still more to be done. Absolutist
frameworks were beyond the scope of this analysis. There is also a lot more to be said about
standpoint inheritance and how branching logics with standpoint inheritance compare to
their static counterparts. It is hoped that the successes of this project will lead to excellent
developments that hitherto were only possible.
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Appendix A
Notations, Truncations, and Acronyms
The notations used in this essay are designed to conserve space without becoming over-
whelming. It is a problem when most readers have to memorize lots of acronyms, especially
when many of those acronyms are not even used outside of a particular document. Here,
acronyms are used sparingly, with some truncation for clarity and with links to this section
for quick reference.
A.1 Major Arguments
ArgLF argument for logical fatalism (generalizable)
ArgThF argument for theological fatalism (generalizable)
ArgLF-Act argument for logical fatalism using actually-will (generalizable)
A.2 Open Futurism and Company
OF open futurism
BivOF bivalent open futurism
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NBivOF non-bivalent open futurism
Sup supervaluationism
OT open theism
OF-OT open futurist open theism
TF-OT true futurist open theism
A.3 True Futurism
TF true futurism
AbsTF absolute true futurism
IdxTF indexical true futurism
SmTF semantic true futurism
OnTF ontological true futurism
EpTF epistemic true futurism
A.4 Theistic Eternalism
ThEtrn theistic eternalism
DurEtrn duration theistic eternalism
PtEtrn point theistic eternalism
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PrdEtrn perdurantist theistic eternalism
A.5 Logical Principles
LEM law of excluded middle, ⊧ φ ∨ ¬φ
S-FLEM strong future law of excluded middle, ⊧△φ ∨△¬φ (△ = will)
ExP-S-FLEM strong future law of excluded middle, ⊧△φ ∨△¬φ (△ = will)
M-FLEM medium future law of excluded middle, ⊧△φ ∨ ¬△ φ (△ = will)
W-FLEM weak future law of excluded middle, ⊧△(φ ∨ ¬φ) (△ = will)
A.6 Symbols
Many of the operators used here are more general than those used in other contexts. Most
operators given here (e.g. △◽ ) can apply to any accessibility relation. Indeed, except in the
case of NBivOF, △ is deﬁned as△◽ along whatever is taken to be the temporal relation, the
relation used to explicate will and company. For clarity, other popular symbols are given in
accordance with the primary use of operators in this essay. It should be understood that the
operators here are typically not equivalent to those other operators, but more general. All
operators can be used with any suitable accessibility relation, R, speciﬁed by a subscript,
e.g. ◻TRL.
Symbol Other popular symbols. English.
△ F. It will be the case that. (Works along the temporal relation)
▽ P. It was the case that. (Works along the temporal relation)
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△t F(t). It will be the case t units (days/seconds/...) hence that
▽t P(t). It was the case t units (days/seconds/...) ago that
◻T G. It will always the case that. (T is the temporal relation)
◻−T H. It was always the case that. (T is the temporal relation)
◇R M/◇. Possibly. (Meaning depends on accessibility relation R.)
◻R L/◻. Necessarily. (Meaning depends on accessibility relation R.)
A.7 Other
ATC all-things-considered
MMBT Multi-Modal Branching Time. MMBT is the generic system described in Sec-
tion 8.1.
StPt standpoint inheritance
TRL thin red line
TRLm thin red line speciﬁc to moment m, as used in indexical true futurism
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This essay is a contribution to the new trend and old tradition of analyzing theological
fatalism in light of its relationship to logical fatalism. All results pertain to branching
temporal systems that use the A-theory and assume presentism. The project focuses on
two kinds of views about branching time. One position is true futurism, which designates
what will occur regardless of contingency. The opposing view is open futurism, by which no
possible course of events is privileged over others; that is, there are no soft facts.
A contextualist theory of temporal standpoints, standpoint inheritance, is designed to
enhance Priorian temporal logics. The proposal helps all branching time systems, not only
those with an open future. Even though an account of temporal standpoints goes a long way
towards aiding various analyses from a linguistic standpoint, theories that designate a true
future ultimately succumb to philosophical diﬃculties. Under open futurism, standpoint in-
heritance commandeers the best semantic evidence for true futurism. Standpoint inheritance
accounts for the evidence, but the evidence does not support true futurism's stronger claims.
Furthermore, attempts to explain why one timeline is privileged as the actual future lead to
fatalism. Open futurism and a related kind of open theism are the only viable alternatives
under dynamic, branching time. If true futurism is feasible at all, it is so only with a static
or eternalist basis.
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Standpoint inheritance is very general. It is applied to every system discussed in this
analysis to handle damning linguistic shortcomings of traditional logics. Standpoint in-
heritance yields several other fruitful results, too. The theory helps clarify what it is for
characterizations of God's beliefs to be soft and how his beliefs must diﬀer from normal
beliefs to retain softness. For open futurism, all strings of consecutive will 's and was 's can
be reduced to at most two such operators under standpoint inheritance, but not under tra-
ditional theories. The open futurist distinction between will and will-inevitably is clariﬁed,
too. Standpoint inheritance allows for a supervaluationist semantics using open futurism as
its basis instead of the usual true futurism. The theory of standpoint inheritance enhances
dynamic, branching accounts of time to better compete with their static correlates.
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